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 Chemical weapons are a threat to international security. According to an 
international convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), all chemical 
weapons fall under a stringent and irreversible disarmament regime that seeks the 
abolition of the use and existence of chemical weapons altogether. The CWC is 
considered to be the first verifiable disarmament treaty; furthermore, it targets an 
entire category of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
 
 Unfortunately there is a gap between the legal requirements of the CWC 
disarmament regime and its implementation. This gap between the theoretical and 
practical aspects of disarmament implies a practical, result-based approach to 
disarmament throughout this study; it raises doubts about the feasibility of chemical 
weapons disarmament under international law. The central question of this study is 
whether international law can achieve the effective disarmament of chemical 
weapons.  
 
 A background on the chemical weapons disarmament regime is provided in 
this study. The legal control of chemical weapons follows a clear evolution, from the 
ban on the use of chemical weapons in conflicts to the international consensus to 
disarm them altogether. Concerning the legal control for chemical weapons, questions 
arise about the type of instrument suited for effective disarmament.  
 
 As of August 2006 the CWC had been in force for nine years; it is considered 
to be a well-established treaty and benefits from a very broad membership. However, 
the disarmament of chemical weapons knows many political, technical and financial 
difficutlies. It is behind the schedule imposed by the CWC and weapons possessors 
struggle to meet the environmental and technical requirements provided in the CWC. 
Throughout this study these difficulties are examined and illustrated with case studies 
of the main weapons possessors. Such difficulties highlight numerous flaws in the 
legal regime, at the time of its constitution and during its implementation. 
Furthermore, they have serious implications for the credibility and authority of that 
regime.  
 
 The chemical weapons disarmament regime, as well as other traditional arms 
control and disarmament instruments, currently evolves in a changing international 
security environment that is characterized by new threats. The CWC is challenged by 
new national and international security policies which rely less on traditional legal 
instruments and more on alternative, political instruments. The role of treaties such as 
the CWC is questioned and challenged, which in turn threatens the continuation of 
and commitment in chemical weapons disarmament. This study concludes with an 
analysis of the evolution of the chemical weapons disarmament regime in this 
changing environment, and proposes alternatives and changes that are more suitable 
for achieving effective disarmament. While the weaknesses of the chemical weapons 
disarmament regime must be acknowledged, it remains a useful security tool; there 
are no grounds to question its existence entirely.  
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Introduction: the International Legal Control of Chemical Weapons 
A. The problem of Chemical Weapons 
Chemical weapons (CW) have been an abhorred method of warfare since they became 
available to states. They have been extensively used, especially during World War I, 
but have also been widely rejected as an instrument of warfare. CW have also been 
the object of control by international law for a long time. They now fall under a 
sophisticated legal regime, and within this regime, the elimination of CW is sought 
through disarmament. However, the control of CW remains a rather obscure and 
unknown topic in international law and in international public knowledge.  
B. Aim of the Study: can International Law Achieve the Effective 
Disarmament of Chemical Weapons? 
This study focuses on the international legal regime controlling CW, and more 
specifically, on the disarmament aspect of that regime. The content of this study is a 
comprehensive analysis of the current CW disarmament regime. It aims to determine 
whether international law can achieve the effective disarmament of CW. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention1 (CWC) is the main instrument of the CW control 
regime. This study examines how this example of international law of arms control is 
implemented and the extent to which it can be and is enforced.  
The CWC seeks the effective disarmament of a specific category of weapons. 
In that respect this study specifically focuses on how the CWC is implemented and 
succeeds at achieving effective disarmament. The author adopts a functional approach 
to the CW disarmament regime; the focus is thus on the utility of the rules to achieve 
the aims of their authors. Highlighted and questioned in this analysis is the suitability 
of traditional international arms control instruments to achieve effective disarmament. 
To a certain extent, such a study of the CW disarmament regime points to 
more general and theoretical public international law and arms control law issues. For 
example, from an international security perspective, it examines the contribution of 
CW disarmament to improve security from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  
                                                 
1 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature 13 January 1993, (entered into force 28 April 
1997) (‘Chemical Weapons Convention’). 
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However, although such general issues are raised, the intent of this study is not 
to exhaustively examine the implications of or solutions to these issues. They are 
mentioned throughout this study as they are related, sometimes directly, to the CW 
disarmament regime. In that respect they place the CW disarmament regime within a 
more global framework. However, the CW disarmament regime is studied 
individually and from a practical, result-based, perspective. The study does not 
comprehensively examine the lessons and benefits of the CW disarmament experience 
for public international law and arms control law. 
C. Scope of the Study: International Law of Arms Control, Disarmament 
and Chemical Weapons.  
 The central topic of this study is the current international law on CW. A 
definition of CW, of arms control and of disarmament is thus called for, arms control 
being the part of international law under which the CW disarmament regime falls. 
 Once this framework under which the CW disarmament regime falls is 
determined, the regime itself is considered. The relationship between the CW 
disarmament regime and its general public international legal framework and arms 
control framework is not specifically examined.  
 CW are defined by the CWC, which provides an extensive and technical 
definition of CW.2 Such a definition is useful for the implementation of the 
convention, and particularly for the disarmament task. However, another, simpler 
definition can also be used: CW refers to the use of toxicants in war.3  
The topic of CW immediately draws attention to the CWC, which is an arms 
control treaty and therefore a part of international law on arms control. There are 
various definitions of arms control and, by extension, of disarmament. Historically, in 
the Cold War arms control consisted in ‘the rules for limiting arms competition, rather 
than reversing it [arms competition].’4 It did not necessarily imply a reduction or 
limitation of arms, but rather a legal framework for armaments.5 Now the concept of 
arms control has expanded to include all measures focused on reducing armaments. 
                                                 
2 Chemical Weapons Convention art 2. 
3 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Chemical and Biological Warfare’ in Marek Thee (ed) SIPRI Findings: Arms 
and Disarmament’ (1986), 179, 180.   
4 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: a Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (1994), 3. Goldblat, n 4,  
5 Micheal J Sheehan, ‘Arms Control : Theory and Practice’ (1988), 6. 
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The resulting proximity and frequent overlaps between the concepts of arms control 
and disarmament makes defining them a difficult task.  
Some definitions distinguish arms control from disarmament. Such is the case 
with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which 
defines arms control as ‘the limitation of the number and/or of certain types of 
weapons’.6 The ACDA considers disarmament to be a ‘far more comprehensive goal 
than the objective of arms control’. According to the ACDA, disarmament ‘refers to 
the eradication of certain types or even all weapons’; it corresponds to the 
‘elimination of types or all weapons’ whereas arms control is only a ‘quantitative or 
qualitative limitations of weapons’.7 This definition suggests that disarmament is a 
goal which can be set apart from arms control. Similarly, the United Nations Institute 
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) distinguishes between the two concepts. It 
states that ‘arms control measures place political or legal constraints on the 
deployment and/or disposition of national security means’.8 Disarmament, on the 
other hand, is defined as measures that ‘seek to reduce the level of national military 
capabilities or to ban altogether certain categories of weapons already deployed’.9 
Other definitions, however, comprise disarmament within arms control. For example 
according to arms control expert Jozef Goldblat, arms control includes non-
proliferation, disarmament, verification and confidence-building measures.10 It is 
clear from these examples that there is no single, generally accepted definition of 
arms control or of disarmament. Whether disarmament is separate or a part of arms 
control is largely irrelevant in the study of CW disarmament. However, for practical 
purposes, disarmament is considered throughout this study as an arms control measure 
and as one component of the law of arms control. 
It can be deduced from these definitions that arms control has a spill-over 
effect: restricting the growth of arms and thus maintaining the level of armaments, but 
it does not reverse the arms race. Disarmament, however, reverses the armament 
process by reducing the number and/or quality of armaments available. For the 
                                                 
6 The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agreements (1984), xxix.  
7 Ibid.   
8 S. Tulliu and T. Schmalberger, Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building 
(2004), 7.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Goldblat, n 4, 3. 
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purpose of this study this trait of disarmament influences the choice of a disarmament 
approach over a more general arms control approach.  
Disarmament is only one aspect of the control of CW by international law. 
However, as noted above, this study is restricted to the part of that law which deals 
with the disarmament of CW. The author favours such a disarmament approach 
because CW are the object of the first verifiable disarmament regime. The CWC is the 
first ‘real’ disarmament treaty seeking to achieve CW disarmament under 
international control. In that respect the convention is usually praised by experts, and 
commentators as a ‘unique achievement’ and the ‘first treaty of its kind’.11 The 
French ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the CWC negotiating 
body, describes the CWC as ‘the first genuine multilateral disarmament’.12 Because of 
its disarmament obligations, the CWC stands out from other arms control agreements. 
The CW legal regime is also the first to ban and eliminate an entire category of 
WMD, another novelty in the field of arms control.13 Finally the chosen approach is 
also justified by the current circumstances since the CW disarmament should be 
drawing to an end, as will be examined with the CWC disarmament schedule. Such a 
disarmament approach to CW further suggests a functional analysis of this topic, 
which is suitable and corresponds to the definition and the nature of disarmament. 
 CW are thus the only category of weapons entirely banned and the object of a 
disarmament instrument, and the CWC is the first and only instrument imposing such 
an obligation. This disarmament regime is also reaching its climax at the time of this 
study.  For these reasons the disarmament aspect of the international law on CW calls 
for a specific consideration. A careful study of the CW disarmament regime is called 
for before general lessons can be drawn from its achievement and eventually 
transferred to other areas of weapons control. 
D. Method and Sources of International Law. 
The study of CW disarmament is based mainly on an analysis of the primary 
sources of international law, mainly the CWC and similar conventions. Other sources 
                                                 
11 Stephen J. Ledogar, ‘Concluding Negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention: a Flexible 
Global Agreement Whose Time Has Come’ (1993) 16, Disarmament, 42.   
12 Gerard Errea, ‘The Outstanding Characteristics of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons’ (1993) 16, Disarmament, 24, 25.  
13 Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Great Achievement in Multilateral 
Disarmament’ (1993) 16, Disarmament, 1, 12.  
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of international obligations which complete the CWC are also taken into account, 
particularly those arising in environmental law and from international organizations.  
It can be noted that most of the literature on CW offers a comprehensive study 
of the CWC, or a study of the CWC within the larger framework of arms control. 
Breaking with that approach, the author restricts herself to the disarmament aspects of 
the CWC. 
Overall CW disarmament remains mostly a national effort and much 
information comes from the governments of states concerned with disarmament, and 
in particular that of CW possessors. These secondary sources on CW disarmament are 
varied. National chemical demilitarization programs provide the bulk of technical 
information relating to CW disarmament and control. Sources also include the reports 
and analyses of technical bodies (scientific, medical, environmental agencies), of 
financial institutions and research institutes specialized in disarmament, strategic 
studies and security issues. However, even though information on CW disarmament 
has numerous sources, it remains scarce. Some of these secondary resources must be 
considered carefully, for they serve national interests and might be biased. Generally, 
in light of the specificity of CW matters, and especially of CW disarmament, 
resources for such a study are lacking. It can also be remarked that there are great 
differences between primary and secondary sources, the former relate little to 
practical disarmament issues, while the latter can be overly technical. The author 
favours primary sources over secondary sources, to the limited extent that primary 
sources provide sufficient information on CW disarmament. This research effectively 
covers the development of CW disarmament up to August 2006. The research is 
presented in five separate chapters. 
E. Contents of the Dissertation. 
Chapter 1 provides a brief history of the CW ban, from the prohibition of CW use to 
the complete ban of CW, and of the subsequent CWC negotiations. A more detailed 
justification of the disarmament approach to CW and the implications of such an 
approach are also examined in this chapter. As noted, the study focuses on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Details of its disarmament regime are 
examined in chapter 2. The CWC is in its eighth year of existence and a short 
overview of its implementation is also called for. The implementation of the regime is 
characterized by the difficulties encountered by the handful of states concerned with 
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CW disarmament. Chapter 3 examines these difficulties, which highlight the large gap 
between the CWC and effective disarmament. This gap is marked by technical and 
financial impracticalities between the letter of the treaty and the real situation of CW 
arsenals. A specific case study of the CW disarmament practice of the Russian 
federation- the largest CW possessor- further underlines the gap created by the CWC 
in the area of disarmament requirements, and is covered in chapter 4. Chapter 5 draws 
conclusions regarding the successes and failures of the international CW disarmament 
regime. This last chapter also studies the CW disarmament regime in the context of 
the current international security environment, characterized by changing threats. This 
new tendency challenges the role of traditional arms control instruments like the 
CWC and diminishes its role. Finally this chapter proposes alternatives to remedy the 
failures or legal weaknesses of the CWC. Not all the aspects of the international legal 
control on CW, and specifically its disarmament aspect, are questioned; the focus of 
the author’s criticism mainly relates to the ‘Geneva Process’ from which the CWC 
originates.  
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Chapter 1: The Foundations of the Disarmament of Chemical Weapons: 
From Prohibition of the Use of Chemical Weapons to the Principle of 
Chemical Weapons Disarmament. 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the CW disarmament regime with a short history of the ban 
on CW, which has resulted in a consensus to disarm CW. This study focuses on to the 
drawing up of the international norm to control, or ban, CW. This control of CW 
highlights the difference between the restriction on the use of CW and the prohibition 
of CW altogether. A distinction is made throughout this chapter between these two 
aspects of the CW ban. The first step of the ban is the restriction on the use of CW 
under international law. The second step is the consensus to renounce CW by 
eliminating them. This consensus is the basis of the CW disarmament regime. 
The first section provides a brief international legal background of the current 
ban on CW. The early control on the use of CW eventually evolved into the consensus 
to eliminate CW, in order to enforce the prohibition on the use of CW and achieve an 
effective ban. The second section examines the emergence of that consensus and the 
arguments supporting the disarmament of CW. In the third section the implications of 
the disarmament of CW are analyzed. The fourth section examines the choice of the 
appropriate instrument for the disarmament of CW. Following two decades of 
negotiations the ban on CW has brought about the conclusion of the CWC and the 
current CW disarmament regime. A brief overview of these negotiations is provided 
in the fifth section. This study concludes with the main difficulties encountered during 
those negotiations. 
Section 1: The Early Ban on Chemical Weapons: the Prohibition to Use 
Chemical Weapons in Armed Conflicts.  
This section examines how and why CW were banned in the first place. The ban on 
CW is usually introduced with the notorious example of the use of chemical warfare 
during the First World War, which resulted in 1.4 million casualties. Yet the ban on 
the use of CW has a ‘long history’ and begins earlier.14  
                                                 
14 Ibid, 2.  
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The ban on CW began with conventions prohibiting the use of CW in 
international armed conflicts. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on the Laws of 
War on Land attempted to restrict the use of poisonous or ‘noxious’ gases in armed 
conflicts.15 Similarly, the aborted 1922 Washington Disarmament Treaty attempted to 
prohibit the use of CW.16 The culminating point of these earlier efforts was the 1925 
Geneva Protocol,17 until the adoption of the CWC, the main instrument dealing with 
the use of CW.  
The Geneva Protocol remains in force; it prohibits the use of CW in armed 
conflicts between its member states. As opposed to earlier restrictions on the use of 
CW, its wider scope covers the use of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of 
all analogous liquids, materials or devices’18, which are determined ‘according to their 
toxic effects on man, animal and plant.’19  
The Geneva Protocol was Europe’s response to the extensive use of CW 
during the First World War. It is based on humanitarian considerations; CW are 
deemed too cruel, causing unjustified suffering and are thus banned as a method of 
warfare.20 The Protocol is also largely founded on the preceding humanitarian laws of 
war, which it embodies.21 The justification for such a ban can therefore be attributed 
to the abhorred effects of CW on human beings.  
  Unfortunately the Geneva Protocol is generally considered a weak and 
limited instrument, with numerous restrictions and a limited scope. The text of the 
Protocol states that it applies ‘in war’ and that its contracting parties ‘agree to be 
bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration’. The ban 
applies between its member states only and in the limited context of international 
armed conflicts, something deplored by various authors.22 Arms control expert Jozef 
                                                 
15 Hague Declaration II Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, annexed to the 1899 Hague Regulations with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (‘Hague Convention II’) and Hague Regulations 
annexed to the Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare (‘Hague 
Convention IV’). See also The United Nations Department for disarmament Affairs, The United 
Nations and Disarmament’ (1985), 132. 
16 Coit D Blacker and Gloria Duffy (eds), International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements (1984), 
140.  
17 The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 17 June 1925, LNTS 94, 
(entered into force 8 February 1928) (‘Geneva Protocol’). 
18 Geneva Protocol art 1. 
19 Goldblat, n 4, 91. 
20 Ibid, 188-190. 
21 The United Nations Department for disarmament Affairs, The United Nations and Disarmament’ 
(1985), 132. 
22 Goldblat, n 4, 91-2 and Blacker and Duffy (eds), n 16, 140. 
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Goldblat points out that this theoretically allows the use CW against states not 
member to the Protocol or if the conflict is not considered a ‘war’.23 Although he also 
considers these possibilities ‘highly unlikely’, the wording of the Protocol remains 
lacking. Furthermore, he highlights that the threat of CW use is not covered by the 
Protocol and finally, that there is no mechanism to verify compliance with or enforce 
the Protocol.24 The Protocol is criticized for providing ‘a false sense of security’.25  
 In addition to these weaknesses, numerous states have placed restrictions on 
the scope of the Protocol. They have adopted reservations allowing them to use CW 
in retaliation should CW be used against them first.26 The Protocol is therefore known 
as a ‘no-first-use’ type of instrument.27 Its strength is further reduced by a restrictive 
interpretation of its scope. States producing CW, and specifically the United States, 
have maintained for a long time that the Protocol does not apply to the use of non-
lethal agents nor of anti-plants agents such as defoliants.28 Although this view is not 
shared by most member states to the Protocol, it can be concluded that the Protocol 
suffers from many limitations. 
 On top of the Protocol’s weaknesses, its authority has been weakened by 
known or suspected violations.29  There were strong suspicions that CW were used by 
Italy in the Ethiopian war.30 There have been allegations that CW were used in Laos, 
Cambodia and Afghanistan although these suspicions have never been confirmed.31 
More unproved allegations charge the use of CW in Korea, Indo-China, China and 
Yemen.32 Unfortunately the lack of a verification mechanism in the Geneva Protocol 
prevented the confirmation of such allegations.  
 In spite of this feeble norm, none of the CW produced between the two World 
Wars were used. The Second World War was thought to be a ‘chemical war’ but 
                                                 
23 Jozef Goldblat, ‘The Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Ban on Chemical Weapons’ in Marek Thee 
(ed), SIPRI Findings: Arms and Disarmament’ (1986), 351.    
24 Ibid, 353-4. 
25 Emeka A. Azikiwe, ‘The Chemical Weapons Convention: An Assessment of Future Implications’ 
(1993) 16, Disarmament, 125-6. 
26 Golblat, n 6, 277-9; see also Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, n 6, 15-18. 
27 Blacker and Duffy (eds), n 16, 140.  
28 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, n 6, 10. 
29 John Gee, ‘The Destruction, Removal or Rendering Harmless of Iraq’s Chemical Warfare 
Capability’ (1992) 15, Disarmament, 77 and Hyltenius, n 13, 5.  
30 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, n 6, 9. 
31 Blacker and Duffy (eds), n 16, 144. 
32 SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-
1970, (1971) vol 4, 196-201, 234-8 and 243-7. 
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against all expectations CW were not resorted to.33 This resulted in an ongoing 
controversy as to why CW were not used during the Second World War, and a debate 
about the role of the Geneva Protocol’s in preventing CW from being used.34 It is a 
debate that continues.35 Supporters of the Geneva Protocol, mainly Russia, have 
maintained that this could be attributed to the authority and success of the Geneva 
Protocol. Other states, mostly European states and the United States, have argued that 
CW were not used in the Second World War only because circumstances were 
unfavourable to use CW. Therefore the extent of the Protocol’s role in keeping states 
from resorting to CW has remained uncertain.36 
 Although the controversy over the explanation why CW were not used during 
the Second World War is of historical interest, it was determining for the conclusion 
of the CWC. It is significant for the adoption of a norm to disarm CW, since the 
Protocol does not attempt to disarm CW. Whether the Protocol is sufficient to enforce 
the ban on the use of CW determines the need to adopt another ban on CW.   
 The same states which diminish the role of the Geneva Protocol in the Second 
World War support a stronger ban on CW. They argue that if the Protocol is 
insufficient to enforce the ban on CW then another ban must be sought. Other states, 
led by Russia, argue that the Protocol was successful in keeping CW from being used 
in World War II and that it is sufficient to enforce the ban on the use of CW. These 
supporters of the Protocol have subsequently opposed the conclusion of another ban 
on CW. These states have also suggested that the Geneva Protocol could be modified 
and strengthened to adapt to new circumstances.37 The role of the Protocol in World 
War II and the subsequent debate on the need to keep, replace or strengthen it has 
influenced the decision to conclude another ban on CW. 
 The existence of the CWC shows that an agreement was reached on the need 
to negotiate another, more stringent ban. In spite of this and even with the entry into 
force of the CWC in 1997, there are ongoing efforts to increase participation in the 
Geneva Protocol and strengthen it. States with reservations to the Protocol are 
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encouraged to withdraw them.38 The UN regularly reiterates its support for the 
Protocol and the need to strengthen it. Resolutions entitled ‘Measures to uphold the 
authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol’ have recently been adopted by the General 
Assembly, calling for ‘its observance and for the removal of the reservations’.39 The 
latest resolution requests that the Secretary-General submit a report on the 
implementation of these measures.40  
  The efforts to support and strengthen the Protocol are a waste of time and 
resources. As one author points out, the Protocol is now of ‘historic significance.’41 
Once it has been supplanted by a more efficient ban on CW, such efforts appear 
unjustified and unnecessary. This criticism is founded on the fact that the CWC has 
entered into force and has imposed a much more stringent ban on CW. Concerning 
participation in the Protocol, efforts to expand its membership appear useless since 
but for six countries, all members of the Protocol are also members of the CWC, and 
are bound by its stricter regime. Concerning the strength and authority of the Protocol, 
the use of CW in the 1980s42 and the previous allegations of CW use establish the 
failure of the Protocol to enforce the ban on the use of CW. Finally from a 
disarmament perspective the Protocol is irrelevant; it does not contribute directly to 
the disarmament of CW. In spite of this the Protocol remained the main norm on CW 
until negotiations on the CWC began in the 1970s. Until then the ban on CW only 
corresponded to restrictions on the use of CW only; no efforts were made to disarm 
CW or even limit chemical warfare. 
 The period following the Second World War until the negotiations on the 
CWC was marked with contradictions. On the one hand it was characterized by a 
chemical arms race which took place mostly between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, although most European countries experimented with or considered chemical 
warfare. On the other, the strength of the ban on CW use increased beyond the scope 
of the norm embodied in the Geneva Protocol. 
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Since there was no ban or limitation on CW production and possession CW 
armament took place from World War I until well after World War II; the Protocol 
left a legal vacuum which made the chemical arms race possible. Before 1945 CW 
developments were justified by the potential need to use them in war. After 1945 CW 
were a part of the arms race characteristic of the Cold War, and which did not end 
until the late 1980s. The US and the Soviet Union extensively pursued CW research, 
development and production. The chemical arms race was significant in terms of 
quality and quantity.43 The production of chemical agents during the Cold War was 
estimated at hundreds of thousands of metric tons.44 CW were also diversified and 
sophisticated, for example with the discovery of nerve agents in the 1930s and 
1940s45 and the discovery of binary CW in the 1960’s.46   
While CW arsenals grew the norm on the prohibition to use CW was also both 
strengthened and broadened. In 1969 the UN General Assembly, in resolution 2603A 
expressed the idea that the 
 
Geneva Protocol embodies the generally recognized rules of international law 
prohibiting the use in international armed conflict of all biological and chemical 
methods of warfare47 
 
Resolution 2603A also ‘declares as contrary to the generally recognized rules of 
international law,’ as embodied in the Protocol, the use of ‘any chemical agents of 
warfare’ and ‘any biological agents of warfare’. The language of this resolution 
extends the prohibition on the use of CW beyond the Geneva Protocol’s scope by 
mentioning ‘any chemical agents of warfare’ and strengthens the prohibition 
embodied in the Protocol. 
The prohibition on the use of CW in armed conflict has the status of 
customary international law. Goldblat states that ‘According to a widely shared 
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opinion, the Protocol is already part of customary law’;48 the SIPRI expresses the idea 
that the debate on CW ‘increases the force of the international customary law 
prohibiting the use of CW.’49 The customary value of this norm is now casually 
reiterated in the literature on CW. 
  However, even though in retrospect it is easily accepted that the prohibition to 
use CW has customary value, the formation of that custom is unclear50 and poorly 
documented. The language of the GA Resolution 2603A suggests that the prohibition 
on the use of CW has customary value. The intent of the states which sponsored this 
resolution, mainly non-aligned states, but also Sweden, is to formalize what they 
perceived to be an international custom.51 Furthermore, Goldblat points that other GA 
resolutions have stressed ‘the necessity for strict observance of the principles and 
objectives of the Protocol by all states’.52 This application of the Protocol’s norm to 
non-member states further suggests that the norm embodied in the Protocol has 
become a custom.  
  The endorsement of the custom on the prohibition to use CW can be attributed 
to the UNGA resolutions which reiterate, interpret and extend this prohibition beyond 
the Protocol’s scope. Finally, the formation of this custom can also be attributed to the 
practice of refraining from using CW when they were available. Unfortunately even 
though the prohibition was strengthened and extended the control of CW is limited to 
the use of CW in armed conflicts. 
 Numerous conclusions can be drawn from the early history of the control on 
CW. The outcome of the ban on the use of CW is toned down. On the one hand, 
efforts were made to restrict the use of CW, mainly with the Geneva Protocol, which 
reflects the international concern about chemical warfare. Although this norm has 
gained much strength, it suffers severe drawbacks.  
 The early control of CW focuses on the use of CW only, not on CW 
themselves. The control on the use of CW did not prevent the chemical arms race, or 
suspicions that the norm had been repeatedly violated. It can be concluded from this 
early experience of the ban on the use of CW that more was needed to enforce such a 
ban and obtain an effective prohibition of the use of CW in armed conflicts.  
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 The weaknesses and failures of the Geneva Protocol especially suggested that 
a stronger instrument was necessary. In turn this hinted that in order to enforce the 
ban on the use of CW, the elimination of CW was required. The elimination of CW 
can therefore be seen, in the author’s view, as a law-enforcement measure intended to 
ensure compliance with the ban on the use of CW. Unfortunately it highlighted that 
‘the question of CW and chemical warfare was considered intermittently in the 1950s’ 
and 1960s’’53 This neglect is usually attributed to the use of nuclear weapons at the 
end of World War II, which overshadowed the question of CW.54 As a result, it was 
not until negotiations on a chemical weapons convention began in the 1970s’, that a 
consensus on the need to eliminate CW emerged. The arguments which founded this 
slowly emerging consensus explain and justify the need to disarm CW. 
Section 2: The Emergence of a Consensus on the Disarmament of 
Chemical Weapons  
This section presents the arguments and factors which explain the international 
consensus for the elimination of CW and which spurred the disarmament of CW. The 
proponents of this consensus argue that the elimination of CW is necessary to enforce 
the ban on the use of CW and that such a ban calls for a stronger instrument. This 
section therefore aims to explain the link between the consensus to eliminate CW and 
the need to enforce the ban on the use of CW. These two endeavours resulted in the 
negotiation of the CWC.  
 The arguments for the elimination of CW reflect the view of a majority of 
states which were opposed to chemical warfare. Their arguments were largely based 
on military and political considerations. However, even though the consensus to 
eliminate CW had a solid foundation, it was reached slowly and with difficulty. The 
renunciation of CW as a means of warfare was not shared by all states; some were 
unwilling to abandon the right to use and possess CW.  
 The arguments of states supporting chemical warfare are first presented in this 
section, followed by the arguments supporting the elimination of CW. Finally, the 
historical circumstances and factors which have contributed to the disarmament of 
CW and spurred the conclusion of a stronger ban are briefly presented.  
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A. The Arguments Supporting the Acquisition and Possession of 
Chemical Weapons 
While a consensus to eliminate CW emerged in international opinion, a minority of 
states remained reluctant to give up CW as a means of warfare and argued for the 
need to keep them and perhaps resort to them. These states, among them CW 
possessors, expressed their intention to retain CW, which was then permitted under 
international law. Their arguments for seeking or keeping CW challenged the 
consensus to eliminate CW and were an obstacle to negotiations on a CW ban. 
 States supporting the acquisition and possession of CW invoked the deterrent 
and retaliatory capability of CW to justify their position.55 CW deterrence relied on 
the military and political usefulness of CW possession; it was based on the 
assumption that a state would not attack a CW possessor for fear of the consequences 
of the use of CW in retaliation (‘retaliation in kind’). Accordingly with to the 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine, deterrence relied on the destructive 
damage of CW, and on the assurance that they can either cause more harm than the 
advantages gained by attacking, or cause the mutual destruction of both adversaries.56 
In that respect, CW were assimilated with nuclear weapons; the principles of the 
former were simply extended to CW.57  
CW deterrence had a lot of weight and was thought to be the main argument 
justifying CW possession.58 Supporters of chemical deterrence argued that CW were a 
‘tempting deterrent’ because they were ‘highly threatening to an adversary’, they were 
effective and they were easily obtainable.59 Therefore, if only among possessors, CW 
were deemed to be a ‘powerful’ deterrent.60 Finally, the deterrence argument was 
further supported by the belief that deterrence had been successful in keeping CW 
from being used in WWII.61 
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The deterrent capability of CW has been argued on two notable occasions to 
justify the possession of CW. CW deterrence and retaliation were argued at the 
occasion of negotiations for a US-USSR bilateral ban on CW. The US and USSR 
proposed to keep two percent of their respective CW capability for use in retaliation.62 
It has been argued that they only intended to keep CW and their production capability 
until all other possessors had committed to renounce and disarm CW. From the two 
powers’ perspective, the proposal was therefore a refusal to unilaterally commit to 
total disarmament without assurances that other states would renounce CW as well.63 
Such a proposal was, in their view, an expression of their support for a multilateral 
convention on CW.64 In that respect retaliation with CW and deterrence from CW 
through possession was perceived as a security assurance.  
Acquisition and possession of CW for deterrence and retaliation was also 
invoked by non-possessors, and in particular by Arab countries neighbouring Israel.65 
These states justified CW possession as a necessity to ensure their national security 
against a threatening –and possibly nuclear-armed- neighbour.66 A CW capability was 
believed to keep both regional and other enemies (especially nuclear powers) from 
attacking.67 As a consequence these countries expressed reluctance to join the ban on 
CW. Their views were expressed during the 1989 Paris Conference on the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons.68 However, they were not widely shared, even among 
developing countries.69 They were not reflected in the Final Document of the 
conference where states unanimously expressed their support for the complete 
elimination of CW.70  
In these two examples CW deterrence was clearly seen as the main argument 
to retain or acquire a CW capability. However, acquisition of CW in the Middle East 
has also been attributed to the tense state of affairs in the region, as well as to political 
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and cultural factors.71 Concerning the US-USSR bilateral proposal, the deterrence 
argument was perceived as an attempt by the great powers to impose their will on the 
majority of States and as an abuse of political leverage.72 More than once the two 
powers’ deterrence argument was attributed to their reluctance to give up CW 
capabilities and to their intention of retaining CW.73 There was clearly scepticism 
over whether the deterrence argument was well-founded. 
The US-USSR proposal was not well received and created suspicion that 
powerful states were unwilling to renounce chemical warfare.74 Unfortunately it 
carried the impression that if the main possessors were reluctant to give them up, then 
CW might be useful, hinting at the potential value of CW and casting shadows on the 
need to renounce them.75 The overall result was an unwillingness to commit to CW 
disarmament, a reduced adherence to the CW ban, and doubts about the contribution 
of bilateral efforts to a global ban.76  
The alleged deterrent capability of CW clearly had a negative consequence for 
the consensus on CW disarmament (and on efforts for negotiating a ban on CW). 
While some military usefulness of CW can be acknowledged, arguments for keeping 
CW undermined the consensus for CW disarmament and slowed the already difficult 
negotiations on a CW ban. From a military perspective, any interest in chemical 
warfare was also contrary to efforts seeking to eliminate them altogether. For example 
the renewed interest in CW with the development of binary CW undermined the 
negotiations on a CW ban.77 Such an interest also resulted in concerns about 
increasing CW proliferation during the 1970s and 1980s.78 Among the arguments 
supporting the elimination of CW, risks related to CW possession will show that 
chemical warfare programs were perceived as ‘a powerful stimuli of proliferation’.79 
Furthermore, CW were usually dubbed as the ‘poor man’s atomic bomb’ in light of 
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the fact that they are much easier and cheaper to acquire than nuclear weapons.80 CW 
were therefore attractive to states which cannot afford nuclear weapons.  
Although the arguments supporting CW possession were eventually 
withdrawn,81 in the author’s view as long as there were argument supporting the 
possession of CW and that they were thought to have any use as a deterrent, CW 
disarmament could not be seriously envisaged. 
B. The Arguments Supporting the Disarmament of Chemical Weapons  
While some states supported chemical warfare, the majority of states disputed both 
the use and the existence of CW and argued the need to eliminate them. Their 
arguments were largely founded on the poor or lack of military usefulness of CW, as 
well as on political considerations and on the risks inherent in the existence of CW. 
These arguments justify the need to enforce the ban on the use of CW and the need to 
conclude a stronger ban on CW.  
1. The Controversial Reality of Chemical Deterrence 
Firstly, as often as CW deterrence was argued, it was objected that CW did not have 
the deterrent value attributed to them by assimilation with nuclear weapons. The 
existence of chemical deterrence and retaliation was debated and contradicted by 
supporters of CW disarmament.82 Chemical deterrence was disputed by CW and arms 
control experts on the basis that the destructive potential of CW could not be 
assimilated with that of nuclear weapons.83 Therefore the MAD doctrine did not 
appear to apply to CW. As a consequence possession of CW and the threat of 
retaliation with CW were thought to be ineffective to dispel an attack.84 Efficient CW 
deterrence was therefore unlikely, and not generally accepted.85  
More generally the existence of CW deterrence was contradicted by the idea 
that arms control concepts applying to nuclear weapons did not extend and apply to 
CW. Lundin pointed out that most of these concepts were simply yet mistakenly 
transposed to CW.86 Even authors who acknowledged a deterrent capability to CW 
rejected the comparison and assimilation between CW and nuclear weapons. For 
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example, Hedley Bull highlighted the fact that CW ‘are no substitute for a strategic 
nuclear force’.87  Similarly, Goldblat considered that ‘CW are not comparable to 
nuclear weapons in terms of destructiveness or usefulness as deterrent against 
aggression’.88 He also concluded that ‘most nations have now set aside the idea that 
chemical weapons are a poor country’s “nuclear deterrent.”’89 This further suggests 
that CW deterrence founded on the nuclear model was not accurate.  
Secondly the argument supporting chemical deterrence based on the WWII 
experience was played down. The absence of CW use in WWII was attributed to the 
success of chemical deterrence but also to ‘the lack of preparations for military 
operations’ and to the existence of the Geneva Protocol.90 This suggests that chemical 
deterrence can only be accepted to a certain extent. It has also been suggested that the 
lack of use of CW in WWII was an early indication of their questionable military 
uselessness.91  
Although the deterrent value of CW now has an historical interest only, it was 
vital in the consensus to eliminate CW. As Robinson points out, ‘the value of CW as 
deterrent of [CW] is the only public justification for possessing such weapons.’92 This 
implies that once the deterrence argument was weakened there was no longer a 
justification-at least in terms of public opinion-for acquiring or possessing CW. 
In light of these facts, it is submitted that the deterrence argument had some 
strength but was clearly insufficient to justify possession of CW, thus raising doubts 
about the legitimacy of CW acquisition and possession founded on deterrence.  
2. The Possession of Chemical Weapons is Threatening and Bears 
Inherent Risks  
Another key argument supporting the elimination of CW related to the inherent risks 
associated with the existence of CW. In addition to the lack of alleged strategic 
advantages to CW possession, there were risks of political and military nature 
associated with the possession of CW.  
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Lundin considered that the possession of CW raised suspicions regarding the 
intentions of its possessor, and that uncertainty about which countries possess CW 
was ‘the most destabilizing factor’.93 The existence of CW in arsenals was a cause for 
insecurity and therefore more threatening than no CW capability.94 Furthermore CW 
possession was believed to increase the likeliness of a CW conflict.95 This insecurity 
was thought to extend to non-possessors and that ‘all nations…must fear that the very 
possession of a [CW] capacity may draw the threat of such warfare upon them’.96  
 From a military perspective CW possession was deemed dangerous as it was 
generally believed to create an incentive for possession in other states, therefore 
spurring CW proliferation. Proliferation has been attributed to the wish to emulate 
CW possessors. For example, this was the case with the discovery of binary CW.97 
Proliferation was also often explained by the perceived need to possess CW to deter 
attacks from another CW possessor, and ensure one’s security.98 Based on the then 
recent and successful use of CW by Iraq, Mack pointed out ‘one obvious strategic 
lesson’, that if one state had CW, ‘the incentive for its opponent to seek 
countervailing capability-if only for deterrence, will be extremely high.’99 In such 
circumstances, CW acquisition created an incentive for other states to possess CW as 
well. Such proliferation concerns were especially strong in the 1970s and 1980s.100 
The use of CW by Iraq brought about increased international awareness of the 
problem of CW proliferation,101 and concern over the increasing number of CW 
possessors.102  
 Another argument supporting CW elimination was the belief that available 
CW were an enticement to resort to their use, should a state be in such need. During 
the CWC negotiations the representative of Nigeria at the CD stated that ‘the sheer 
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existence of chemical weapons provides an irresistible incentive for their use.’103 
Goldblat highlighted ‘the danger that, under certain circumstances, the weapons 
prohibited maybe be resorted to, as has already occurred, will not disappear as long as 
these weapons remain in the arsenals of states.’104 Similarly, it was feared CW could 
be used as a ‘last resort’ weapon. Such concerns clearly stressed the majority opinion 
that as long as CW existed there was a risk that they would be used.  
 This concern was expressed in the Final Declaration of the 1989 Paris 
Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which states the grave concern 
of states over the ‘growing danger posed to international peace and security by the 
risk of the use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are 
spread.’105  This declaration clearly highlighted the fact that CW were a threat as long 
as they existed. This concern was crucial for the consensus on CW disarmament as it 
directly pointed to need to eliminate CW in order to enforce the ban on their use, and 
suggested that disarmament was the only viable solution for a successful ban on the 
use of CW. 
The general belief that there were inherent risks derived from the sole 
existence of CW supported this theory. Although the dangers related to CW arsenals 
will be looked into with the difficulties related to CW destruction, it can be remarked 
that CW arsenals themselves were thought to be threatening. Old CW stockpiles were 
thought to be an environmental hazard.106 This extended to all CW arsenals and CW 
production facilities; even in peacetime they were acknowledged to be threatening to 
the environment.107 It is submitted that although this sole concern cannot justify the 
elimination of CW, it has influenced CW disarmament. The key conclusion related to 
CW possession was that it did not improve security; on the contrary it created more 
risks than dispelled them.  
3. The Questionable Military Usefulness of Chemical Weapons  
A key argument supporting the elimination of CW was that they had only little, if no 
military interest, which greatly favoured the consensus on CW disarmament. The 
prevailing opinion on the matter was that CW had only limited usefulness in 
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conflicts.108 The use of CW in conflict was generally considered a poor choice and 
was disapproved of by the military. Therefore, based on military considerations, the 
possession of CW was not justified. 
Firstly the use of CW required the fulfilment of numerous conditions, 
‘environmental conditions’109 (wind, temperature, humidity and chemical agents 
properties), and strategic conditions.110 The use of CW also required the protection of 
one’s own troops against the risk of CW being blown back.111 These ‘complicated 
operational capabilities’ were a significant disadvantage, de facto restricting the 
occasions for using CW and hindering their efficiency.112 CW were usually only 
considered useful when they surprised an unprotected and unprepared enemy.113 
Finally in spite of these conditions CW retained an element of unpredictability and 
imprecision. Because of these practical difficulties, CW were not generally considered 
‘strategically decisive’114 and provided only limited military advantages. Furthermore 
there were political costs to the use of CW which potentially exceeded the ‘immediate 
strategic benefits’ of their use,115 as well as the risk of eventual international 
sanctions.116  
Secondly there was clearly a strong reluctance on the part of the military to use 
CW. From a moral perspective, military commanders generally disapproved of CW 
which they traditionally perceived as ‘dirty’ and ‘immoral’ weapons.117 The ban on 
the use of CW found its origin in the fact that CW were deemed cruel and caused 
unnecessary suffering.118 Various authors expressed this distaste and disapproval of 
the military towards chemical means of warfare.119 In the author’s view such as 
disapproval of chemical warfare from the military itself had a key role in making CW 
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disarmament possible. Military reluctance towards chemical warfare both prevented 
further CW developments and supported the elimination of CW. 
A corollary to the military uselessness of CW was the existence of efficient 
defences against CW, or ‘protection against CW’. Experts considered that such a 
defensive capability removed the intended benefits from a CW attack.120 Protection 
against CW was even thought to benefit security as it acted as a deterrent against 
chemical warfare.121 Protection against CW made the threat of retaliation with CW 
inefficient. If effective protection cancelled the gains from the use of CW, the alleged 
benefits of CW deterrence and retaliation were also subsequently cancelled. Therefore 
on the one hand a protection capability increased security from chemical warfare;122 it 
was even considered the ‘best protection’ against the use of CW.123 However, on the 
other hand a protection capability against chemical warfare was not usually 
considered threatening as it did not have the ‘destabilizing’ effect that Lundin 
attributed to defensive CW capabilities (which are similar and indistinguishable from 
an offensive CW capability).124 As a result protection against CW diminished the 
incentives for the use of CW.125  
Even though the matter of protection against CW was not directly related to 
disarmament, protection against CW was yet another argument contributing to the 
consensus on CW disarmament. Today in spite of the disarmament obligation in the 
CWC, the Convention allows the development of protective capabilities against CW 
use.126 The Convention also imposes an obligation of assistance between states parties 
in the case of a threat or use of CW.127 Should a state decide to launch a CW attack, 
these measures are meant to deter it, again by cancelling the gains which could have 
been obtained from the use of CW. 
With respect to the military interests of CW, the USSR ambassador to the CD, 
Serguei Bastanov, suggested that CW were abandoned and disarmed only because 
they are militarily irrelevant.128 Such a statement shed doubts on the success of the 
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consensus to eliminate CW. It suggests that it was only because CW were militarily 
irrelevant that they could be disarmed. In turn, Moritan responded: 
 
[I]t might legitimately be asked, then, what importance the Convention on the 
 prohibition of chemical weapons has if the value of the chemical weapons we are 
 prohibiting are of little military value.129  
 
However he also refined the judgment on this matter and concluded that in light of the 
inherent threatening nature of CW, ‘the doubtful effectiveness of chemical weapons 
from a strictly military point of view is insufficient to guarantee their non-use’.130 He 
also highlighted the central link between the need to conclude a multilateral arms 
control instrument and the enforcement of the ban on the use of CW, if only to ensure 
security from these weapons.131  
In the author’s view no firm conclusion can be drawn from this idea. However, 
it raises questions about international law and disarmament. The idea introduced by 
Bastanov suggests that it was not so much an ‘affirmative’ support for the elimination 
of CW which resulted in a consensus as arguments undermining the possession of 
CW. More specifically, if the possession of CW was founded on their potential 
military interest, the great scepticism about such a military usefulness simply removed 
the justification for possessing CW. Other authors share this view and conclude that 
CW disarmament was only a partial success for international security, because of the 
minor military usefulness of CW and therefore the limited scope of the CWC.132 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the elimination of CW can be perceived as the failure 
of international law to enforce the ban on the use of CW, since disarmament is the 
acknowledgement that the prohibition of the use of CW is insufficient to prevent their 
use. However, these analyses overlook political and contextual considerations 
justifying disarmament, not to mention the humanitarian foundations of the ban on 
CW. 
Although this question today remains theoretical, it suggests that the 
disarmament of CW is only a partial success in terms of arms control, partly because 
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of the minor military relevance of CW, partly because of the lack of enforcement of 
the ban on the use of CW. However, in the author’s view such an analysis could be 
determining, as disarmament could be extended to other weapons the use of which is 
prohibited under international law. Disarmament could be envisaged regardless of 
whether it applies to militarily insignificant weapons, of whether it is necessary to 
enforce a ban on their use, or simply as the logical step following the prohibition to 
use a given category of weapons. In that respect the author submits that independently 
from the consensus that justifies the disarmament of CW, the resulting disarmament 
model has further applications. 
4. The Possession of Chemical Weapons is Contradictory to the Ban on 
the Use of Chemical Weapons. 
The arguments for the disarmament of CW are corroborated with the idea that there is 
an inherent and obvious contradiction between CW possession and the prohibition of 
their use.133 Until the conclusion of the CWC, the right to retain CW for ‘second use’ 
(allowed under the reservations to the Geneva Protocol) justified the possession of 
CW. However, in light of the customary value of the prohibition to use CW, such a 
right to CW use, and subsequently CW possession, was deemed ‘incompatible with a 
ban on the very possession of those weapons.’134 Some states have pointed out this 
contradiction, insisting that ‘as long as the weapons covered by the Geneva Protocol 
were retained in the arsenals of states, an unconditional non-use obligation could not 
be credible’.135 This statement was the first suggestion of the link between the 
enforcement of the ban on CW and the need to eliminate them altogether.  
C. The Factors and Circumstances Supporting the Disarmament of 
Chemical Weapons 
External factors contributed to the consensus on CW disarmament and to the 
conclusion of a new ban on CW. Events involving chemical warfare and the resulting 
public reaction on CW matters played a great role in renewing interest in CW and in 
spurring the international community to action towards a ban on CW.  
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The use of CW-whether alleged or proved-resulted in strong reactions against 
CW.136 The key event sparking awareness and interest in chemical warfare at the 
international level was the use of herbicides by U.S forces in Viet-Nam.137 It was 
followed by an intense public debate on the US’ chemical warfare policy.138 More 
alleged uses of CW in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Manchuria and Korea, even 
though they were never confirmed, also contributed to the renewal of interest in the 
issue of CW.139 A U.S domestic incident involving CW also spurred a strong public 
reaction, namely the accidental release of nerve gas which killed 6000 sheep in March 
1968.140  
The international and domestic reaction to the use of CW is usually one of 
very strong distaste and disapproval. For example Myrdal refers to national and 
international ‘dismay’ towards CW stocks; Flowerree mentions ‘public revulsion’ 
towards CW.141 There were numerous examples where a strong public reaction 
influenced chemical warfare policies. The use of CW in WWI resulted in a ‘public 
outcry’ in numerous countries over the violations of the 1899 Hague Convention.142 
At the domestic level, public opposition to CW in the US resulted in cuts on spending 
for chemical warfare.143 The public reaction and debate over the use of defoliants in 
Vietnam was described as the ‘stimulus’ to ban CW.144 Later on the public’s support 
of a ban on CW eventually coerced the US Senate into ratifying the Geneva Protocol. 
More importantly it was believed that the 1969 US unilateral moratorium on CW 
production was essentially based on an ‘emotional reaction’ to the sensitive topic of 
CW.145 Even after the disarmament of CW was under way, public opinion had a 
significant role in CW disarmament operations.146  
The public’s opinion and hostile stance towards chemical warfare had an 
important role in the ban on CW. Earlier public condemnations of the use of CW 
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favoured their ban in war. The Geneva Protocol’s preamble refers to the public 
opinion’s role on the use of CW; it states that the use of CW in war ‘has been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world.’ The public’s abhorrence 
towards chemical warfare was determining for conclusion of the CWC; its 
condemnation of chemical warfare was yet another argument supporting a stronger 
ban on CW.147 More importantly, in the author’s view, public support of the ban gave 
the CWC negotiations credibility and legitimacy. Much credit can be given to the 
public for placing pressure on decision-makers; it clearly influenced, in a positive 
way, the disarmament of CW. Such events provided both at the national and 
international levels, the momentum and the political will that allowed a consensus to 
disarm CW to emerge. 
D. The Need for a New Ban Providing for the Elimination of Chemical 
Weapons  
The idea eventually emerged that CW should be eliminated to ensure they are never 
used, thus linking the prohibition on the use of CW with their elimination.148 In the 
author’s view such a link is the key conclusion from the arguments and factors 
supporting the elimination of CW. The main other conclusion was that a new 
instrument was needed to enforce the ban on the use of CW, and that such an 
instrument had to include the elimination of CW. It is submitted that disarmament was 
the only solution to enforce the ban on the use of CW and that such a ban had to be 
embodied in a new instrument in order to have any strength.  
 However, it remains unclear when the need for a new instrument to embody 
the CW ban was first expressed. A new CW ban was first hinted at along with the 
criticism of the Geneva Protocol’s weaknesses and lack of enforcement. Myrdal 
suggests that efforts to prohibit CW possession and production were initiated in the 
1960s by scientists, people and also the UN General Assembly.149 ‘Serious 
consideration’ of CW, along with Biological Weapons (BW) has been pinpointed to 
the summer of 1969.150 However it was generally acknowledged that the control of 
CW received little if any attention for many years following WWII. The focus of 
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international community was on nuclear weapons, and attempts to control CW were 
sporadic failures.151 
In the author’s view it is not relevant to trace the precise moment when a 
decision to conclude such a ban was reached. However, for practical purposes the 
efforts to conclude a ban on CW can be traced to the late 1960s, and the efforts 
specific to the conclusion of the CWC can be pinpointed to the period following the 
conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972.152  The important 
outcome of efforts towards a new ban on CW was the consensus that disarmament 
had to be included in this ban,153 as opposed to earlier efforts which distinguished 
between ‘measures to prohibit the use and measures designed to abolish [chemical] 
weapons.’154 
The consensus on CW disarmament and the need to conclude a stronger ban 
on CW were eventually expressed clearly and connected together. This conclusion 
was reiterated on many occasions; many authors have voiced the need for the ban on 
CW to impose the elimination of CW. For example, in an early study on CW 
destruction, Mikulak stated that the ‘complete and effective CW prohibition requires 
the destruction of stockpiles and CWPF [CW Production Facilities]’.155 In the same 
study, Ooms declared that ‘in all CW prohibition discussion, there was a consensus 
that treaty should include provisions for destruction (or conversion) of stockpiled 
chemical agents and munitions.’156 This conclusion was also expressed at the occasion 
of the 1989 Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In the Final 
Declaration of the Conference, ‘150 states expressed the determination “to prevent 
any recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminating them.”’157 Furthermore 
the participating states highlighted the need for a new CW ban, stressing ‘the 
necessity of concluding, as an early date, a Convention on the prohibition of the 
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development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their 
destruction’.158  
The consensus on CW disarmament and on the need to conclude a new CW 
ban resulted in international negotiations which eventually led to the conclusion of the 
CWC. The arguments supporting the elimination of CW are therefore the foundation 
of the current CW disarmament regime. 
Section 3: The Implications of the Disarmament of Chemical Weapons.  
In spite of arguments supporting the possession of CW, a consensus for a new ban 
providing for the elimination of CW slowly emerged. The disarmament of CW can be 
examined from various perspectives beyond its law-enforcement purpose. A broader 
approach to CW disarmament is presented in the first part of this section, with a view 
to identifying more general objectives and benefits achieved by the disarmament of 
CW. The second part of this section examined the scope and intended results of the 
disarmament of CW from a law-enforcement perspective. The scope of CW 
disarmament details what is expected of disarmament, what effective disarmament 
entails. The implications of CW disarmament are the requirements that disarmament 
must meet to fulfil its purposes. 
A. The Benefits of Chemical Weapons Disarmament 
The disarmament of CW is the response to the need to enforce the prohibition on the 
use of CW and the need of a stronger norm to enforce this prohibition. This ‘law-
enforcement’ role is the primary objective intended of disarmament. However, 
disarmament serves other purposes and brings about other benefits. 
 From a global perspective CW disarmament is not a goal pursued on its own 
but seeks to improve international security, which it does indirectly by removing the 
possibility to use CW. This is suggested in the Final Declaration of the 1989 Paris 
Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Participating states highlight 
the ‘growing danger posed to international peace and security by the risk of the use of 
chemical weapons’.159 Supporters of CW disarmament all highlight this international 
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security benefit to support CW disarmament efforts.160 Overall the CWC can be 
perceived, as Bastanov describes, as ‘an outstanding achievement for international 
peace and security’,161 being the first and only treaty removing an entire category of 
WMDs. The disarmament of CW clearly serves a global security purpose regardless 
of the military aspects of CW. 
 From a non-arms control perspective, CW are not methods of warfare but 
toxic hazards. They are both threatening as a stockpile of dangerous weapons and as a 
toxic hazard to people and to the environment.162 Disarmament eliminates these risks 
related to the existence of CW. This aspect of disarmament is often overlooked in 
studies of the CW disarmament regime, but it is relevant from an environmental law 
perspective. It also matters to the people affected by CW storage and destruction sites, 
especially in light of the difficulties of finding safe destruction and transport methods.  
 The disarmament of CW can also be seen from an international humanitarian 
law perspective. The ban on CW was originally founded on such considerations.163 In 
that regard the elimination of CW contributes to international humanitarian law by 
removing cruel and inhumane weapons. Dahinden highlights this ‘overlap’ between 
the law of arms control and disarmament and international humanitarian law.164 
Furthermore Goldblat mentions the ‘intrinsic link between the development of 
international humanitarian law and progress in the field of disarmament’, regarding 
the risk to resort to weapons prohibited by laws of war unless they are not 
destroyed.165 Therefore, to a certain extent, disarmament serves the purpose of 
enforcing international humanitarian laws.  
 From an international law perspective the disarmament of CW serves yet 
another purpose.  The CWC is the first disarmament instrument targeting an entire 
category of WMD, which is also a success for international law.166 The CWC is a 
novelty in many respects; with new and unique law-enforcement and intrusive 
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verification mechanisms. In that respect it distinguishes itself from other arms control 
instruments, mainly by eliminating all CW.167  
B. The Scope and Intended Results of the Disarmament of Chemical 
Weapons  
The scope and intended results of disarmament must be determined; unfortunately 
disarmament is not often defined with precision and its scope is usually overlooked. 
Bastanov states that ‘the CWC is designed to ensure the elimination and the non-
resurrection of CW.’168 How the CWC fulfils these requirements is looked into in 
greater detail with the study of the CW disarmament regime in the following chapter. 
However, what is implied in this statement is examined in this section.  
 The scope of CW disarmament determines what is intended and required of 
the obligation to disarm CW and therefore what can be expected of the CW 
disarmament regime. In practical terms it corresponds to the extent of the intended 
destruction obligation. The scope of the disarmament of CW is therefore a crucial 
issue; it points out the size and complexity of the intended task.  
The CW disarmament regime must be wide enough to cover all aspects of 
chemical warfare and fulfil the security purposes of CW disarmament. As early as 
1959 a CW disarmament proposal submitted by the USSR to the UN General 
Assembly included the destruction of CW but also the prohibition of military research 
and development, and the provision of controls over the disarmament regime.169 Soon 
thereafter, developing countries proposed that disarmament include the ‘total 
prohibition of manufacture, maintenance of [CW] and the elimination of all 
equipment and facilities.’170 
A 1980 SIPRI study on CW destruction and conversion introduced two key 
questions: first, ‘what is to be eliminated and precluded?’ and second, what ‘activities 
associated with CW that are to be proscribed.’171 The first question referred to the 
definition and delimitation of CW. In regard to the second question it has been 
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suggested that ‘to abolish the threat, the convention needs to cover activities of 
preparation for offensive chemical warfare; simply destroying CW stockpiles is not 
enough.’172 Similarly Myrdal suggested banning all production of CW tools, including 
munitions and CWPF, following the destruction of stockpiles. Furthermore the 
prohibition of the production of CW agents must include ‘all related activities.’173 
Finally, she suggested the prohibition of CW testing and research.174  
As Myrdal pointed out, the disarmament obligation must cover ‘all means of 
chemical warfare.’175 CW disarmament must include existing CW but also all the 
means to produce them. The scope of CW disarmament may extend even further. The 
1961 US-USSR Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations 
(‘Mc Cloy Zorin Statement’) calls for the destruction of delivery systems for 
WMD.176  
The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency takes a slightly more general 
approach to CW disarmament. It states that ‘the elimination of chemical weapons 
involves two principal activities, the destruction of existing weapons and the 
prevention of the proliferation of new ones.’177 This approach suggests that 
destruction must include non-proliferation efforts in order to be effective. Although 
the non-proliferation element is often overlooked, it must not, in the author’s view, be 
ignored.  
Disarmament and non-proliferation are complementary and the completion of 
one without the other is useless. On the one hand disarmament without non-
proliferation measures could allow the production of new weapons and the renewal or 
replacement of stockpiles with other-if not better-chemical means of warfare. On the 
other hand, as the definition of proliferation suggests, it only has a spill-over effect. 
Non-proliferation measures only would merely stop CW armament from increasing- 
stopping CW production and acquisition- but not reversing it. The threat from CW 
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stockpiles would then remain unaddressed, and another kind of proliferation is still 
possible via diversion or theft of existing weapons from stockpiles.178  
The author agrees with the fact that the scope of CW disarmament must be 
very wide and cover numerous activities; states must not retain CW or the means to 
produce them for the CW ban to have credibility. Therefore the disarmament 
obligation must extend beyond the destruction of CW and CWPF and include perhaps 
unforeseen CW-related activities. Such a wide scope could be interpreted as 
preventive non-proliferation measures, seeking to keep states from being able to 
produce CW.  
 The disarmament of CW must also meet certain requirements to fulfil its 
goals; they determine what is implied in the disarmament of CW. Firstly the cessation 
of CW production is the necessary corollary of the commitment to disarm CW.179 A 
commitment from states to end or renounce the production of CW was one the first 
goals sought in the CWC negotiations. Arms control diplomat Alva Myrdal was 
particularly adamant on this first step, stating that ‘the aim of CW negotiations must 
be to agree immediately on the commitment to prohibit totally the production of 
chemical warfare means,’180 and that such a binding decision ‘should be taken with all 
possible haste.’181 CW production is in direct opposition with the goal of 
disarmament. The end of weapons production was on of the Mc Cloy-Zorin Statement 
principle and an obligation in the US-USSR 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.182 
For most states the cessation of CW production was undertaken fairly easily; 
most CW possessors spontaneously and unilaterally renounced CW production 
regardless of the negotiations on a CW ban. The Soviet Union did so in 1987.183 
Unfortunately at the same time the US ended an 18-years unilateral moratorium on 
CW production and decided to renew its CW stockpiles with binary CW.184 
Throughout the CWC negotiations all states were encouraged to abandon CW 
production. This objective was also pursued in the context of the US-USSR bilateral 
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negotiations on a ban on CW.185 The obligation not to produce CW is now contained 
in the first article of the CWC.186  
In the author’s view the end of production is self-evidently necessary for the 
prohibition of CW. However, the experience of CW disarmament suggests that it was 
not the case, if only in light of replacement or renewal arsenals with new CW. This 
was especially a concern with the development of binary CW to replace old and 
obsolete CW,187 and with the renewed interest of some states in developing their own 
chemical warfare capabilities.188   
The matter of CW production highlights the second requirement of CW 
disarmament; CW destruction must be irreversible and CW are not meant to be 
replaced. As Lohs points out, the goal of destruction is to make agents ‘unusable for 
military purposes’.189 To fulfil this, the destruction process must be definitive and 
irreversible to ensure that former CW capabilities and destruction by-products cannot 
be reversed and put to prohibited uses.190 The destruction of CWPF must ensure ‘that 
CW agent production or filling couldn’t be resumed’ and that ‘its components cannot 
be reassembled’; meaning that no more CW production can take place after 
disarmament.191  
Irreversible disarmament also implies that the destruction process must not 
convert one kind of CW into another. This must be pointed out since CW possessors 
have sometimes replaced old weapons with new weapons, which is contrary to the 
goal of disarmament.192 The CWC now imposes the destruction of CWPF and CW, 
and that destruction must result in by-products that are not toxic nor can be used as a 
CW.193 In the author’s view these requirements meet the need for irreversible 
disarmament, although there are interpretation issues over some of these 
obligations.194 
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In light of the numerous benefits of CW disarmament, the scope and 
requirements of CW destruction serve other purposes, namely environmental and 
human safety purposes. In studies on CW destruction, environmental and human 
protections are also mentioned as mandatory requirements.195 Among the goals of CW 
disarmament Lohs points out the need to ‘reduce their [chemical agents] toxicity so 
that there are no hazard for man and for the environment’.196  It is the author’s belief 
that CW disarmament ought to be considered from this broad perspective and not only 
as the process of arms destruction. 
 These requirements were taken into account in the drawing up of the CWC 
negotiations.197 However, the extent to which they were followed up in the CWC both 
leaves room for criticism and highlights the great difficulty to anticipate the practical 
aspects of disarmament.198 On the one hand, as the SIPRI study on CW destruction 
and conversion underlines the difference between ‘issues that are important and must 
be discussed for progress in the negotiation of the treaty’ which are often very 
technical, and other, unrelated issues of concern.199 In the author’s understanding, the 
latter are often contextual political issues which must be debated, sometimes to the 
detriment of ‘substantive technical issues’ which are subsequently overlooked.200 This 
neglect of the practical aspects of disarmament can be criticized, but not without 
nuances.  
The requirements of CW disarmament clearly have a strong technical 
connotation. Even though they are usually based on previous experiences of CW 
disarmament, it would have been difficult to anticipate such technical details during 
negotiations at the CD. The downside of this is that these requirements were 
challenged with the disarmament of CW. Although it is the author’s belief that 
technical aspects of disarmament could not be not part of the ‘diplomatic’ agenda 
during the CWC negotiations at the CD, unfortunately this suggests that the CD is not 
the appropriate body for negotiating all aspects of disarmament, in light of the 
scientific and technical implications of CW destruction. This raises a more general 
question about the ability of multilateral arms control negotiating forums and 
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procedures to meet the needs of effective disarmament. However, the CWC remains 
the first example in that respect and its negotiation the first attempt to achieve 
effective disarmament. 
Some conclusions about the nature of CW disarmament can be drawn from 
these requirements. In the author’s view they suggest that disarmament is intended to 
be effective and to show accountable results. The elaborate CWC verification system 
also suggests that effectiveness and accountability are key features of the CW 
disarmament regime. The intended results of CW disarmament can be summarized as 
the concrete destruction of CW, the subsequent security benefit and the successful 
implementation of the CWC disarmament regime. If CW disarmament is not 
effective, the convention has failed its purpose. Also, as long as disarmament is not 
completed, the ban is not fully enforced and the CW threat remains. In other words 
until disarmament is complete, it can be said that both the success of the CWC and of 
the ban on CW are pending. 
Section 4:  Finding the Appropriate Disarmament Instrument for 
Chemical Weapons 
Concomitantly with the consensus to eliminate CW, international efforts were 
pursued for the conclusion of a ban to enforce the prohibition on the use of CW and 
for that purpose, seek their elimination. Firstly the appropriate forum for negotiating 
this ban and the adequate type of ban must be found. Secondly the matter of 
participation in the negotiations must be resolved. 
A. The Choice of the Type of Instrument to Ban and Eliminate Chemical 
Weapons 
The arguments supporting CW possession show that the decision to ban and disarm 
CW was not self-evident for some states. A similar difficulty occurred with the type 
of ban required; alternatives to a multilateral, traditional arms control agreement were 
also envisaged and a bilateral ban on CW between the two superpowers was also 
considered. 
The choice of an appropriate instrument to ban and disarm CW turned out to 
be difficulty in negotiations. A first proposal to keep and modify the Geneva Protocol 
was quickly discarded,201 although it was the approach favoured by the SU.202 A 
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review and modification of the Protocol was also envisaged, to include disarmament 
provisions and adapt it to newer chemical warfare technologies,203 along with the 
removal of reservations to the Protocol. However, it was eventually agreed that the 
Protocol could not prevent the use of CW.204 This also corresponded to the need for 
another instrument and eventually resulted in a consensus to replace the Protocol with 
a more stringent instrument.205 
 Other means to ban CW were envisaged, including the adoption of voluntary, 
unilateral measures. Mexico proposed that CW could be renounced and banned 
unilaterally with decisions to renounce CW by individual states.206 This suggestion 
was also discarded, other countries stating that ‘unilateral decisions were not a 
substitute for internationally binding agreements’.207 Although there was merit to 
unilateral measures in the CWC negotiations,208 it now seems obvious that they could 
not replace a multilateral, legally-binding instrument.209 Once it was agreed a legally-
binding, multilateral instrument to ban CW was needed, the matters of the choice of 
the negotiating forum and of participation in the negotiations were raised. 
 The CD was automatically chosen as the forum for the negotiation of a global 
ban on CW; it is the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of arms control and 
disarmament. It is responsible for the negotiations and conclusion of the CWC,210 as 
well as other key arms control agreements.211  
 The CD works independently from the UN; it adopts its own rules of 
procedure and agenda.212 Membership of the CD is limited and meant to be 
representative of all regions and all groups of states.213 States or organizations which 
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can contribute to the negotiations or are particularly concerned by them are given 
observer status in the CD.  
 The CD works by consensus, a rule which both expresses and explains the 
reduced number of member states allowed to conduct negotiations.214 The rule is 
justified by the politically sensitive nature of arms control for states.215 The rule 
results in the procedure of vote by consent, as opposed to decisions opposing a 
majority to a minority.216 Although the CD has expanded its membership since its 
creation in 1979, it is kept to a limited number in order to maintain the rule of 
consensus.  
Before the matter of participation in the negotiations of the CWC at the CD are 
looked into, another negotiating forum for a ban on CW must be mentioned. Side by 
side with efforts at the CD bilateral negotiations towards a CW ban took place 
between the US and the SU, in parallel but independently from the multilateral 
negotiations at the CD.217 These bilateral efforts sought similar results but their 
influence and impact on multilateral efforts were controversial.  
Bilateral efforts to ban CW raise questions about the potential of bilateral 
arrangements, whether as a contribution, competition or alternative to traditional 
multilateral arms control treaties.218 As the study of the different CW disarmament 
regimes will show, bilateral efforts were not intended as a replacement of the ‘Geneva 
Process’; in spite of this they have raised the fear that no multilateral ban would take 
place. 
B. Participation in the Disarmament Instrument  
The choice of the CD as the negotiating forum for the CWC directly relates to the 
matter of participation in the negotiations, which is closely linked to the composition, 
internal workings and rules of procedure of the CD. Participation in the negotiations 
of the ban on CW has significant implications. However, participation in the ban is 
very different from participation in the drawing up of such a ban, which is examined 
first.  
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The eradication of CW is a global security issue of concern for every state. At 
the occasion of the First Special session of the General Assembly (GA) on 
Disarmament,219 it justly underlined the ‘right of each state to participate in 
disarmament negotiations’, along with ‘the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of 
disarmament.’220 However, whether participation in CW negotiations is a right or a 
duty of every state is not a central aspect of the study of CW disarmament; it is only 
secondary from a practical disarmament perspective. On the one hand since CW are a 
global issue it seems right, in the author’s view, that any state can participate in the 
ban on CW. Furthermore the CWC is intended as a global instrument221 and is 
intended to achieve universal adherence.222 On the other hand, from a functional 
perspective since only a limited number of states are concerned with CW 
disarmament, only their participation is necessary. This suggestion can be 
corroborated with the idea that the participation of the main CW possessors is 
necessary for the ban to be successful and credible. However, it must be added that 
the CWC has a direct effect on the activities of the chemical industry, and this fact 
influences the matter of participation beyond disarmament questions only. 
However, even though the ban on CW is the concern of all states, it does not 
necessarily mean every state must take part in the negotiations of such a ban. The 
composition and rules of procedures of the CD seem to support this conclusion, and 
as the forum for the conclusion of the CWC it automatically excluded wide 
participation in the negotiations. In the author’s view the limited number of 
participants yields better results and speeds up the negotiating process. Although 
participation in the CWC negotiations is now a historical matter only, it hints at the 
question of restricted participation in disarmament instruments. 
 The composition of the CD could be interpreted as the need for a restricted, 
‘qualitative’ participation in arms control matters. ‘Qualitative’ implies that only 
states with a special interest or particularly affected by CW should be actively 
involved in certain arms control matters.223 This view is supported by the Final 
Document of the UNGA First Special Session on Disarmament which states that 
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militarily significant states have a primary responsibility for halting and reversing the 
arms race.224 A similar view is found in the 1991 Cartagena declaration, in which 
Latin American states point out that militarily developed States have a particular 
responsibility concerning WMD.225 
 Concerning the disarmament of CW, this suggestion could be extended to 
participation in the ban; a strict interpretation of this suggestion would limit the 
involvement in CW disarmament to a limited number of states. Following that 
thought, participation in the CWC would not be a matter of numbers but of identity. 
Participation could be determined by the state’s significance or ‘quality’ in 
disarmament matters, depending on its CW capability or its chemical industry. This 
suggestion is further supported by the number of CW possessors;226 only a small 
number of states are directly concerned with the disarmament aspects of the CW ban. 
 A related argument supporting this theory is the idea that certain states, ‘all 
CW-capable states’ must participate in the CWC for it to have any strength.227 
Furthermore, documentation on the CWC also distinguishes member states according 
to their ‘quality’ as CW possessors or not.  Such documentation usually indicates 
which of the ‘relevant’ states members of the CWC are and which are not.228 From a 
disarmament perspective and for the realization of the disarmament goal only the 
participation of these states is relevant and necessary.  
The matter of restricted participation has several implications. First it suggests 
that the CWC can be successful only if CW possessors are members, which in turn 
implies that although the CWC is considered a non-discriminatory treaty, de facto it 
distinguishes between its member states in terms of disarmament. Secondly, from a 
disarmament approach, the focus on CW possessors does not correspond to the 
negotiating process undertaken at the CD, which represents all groups of states and 
takes into account their various interests.229 
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In the author’s opinion the downside of this suggestion is that disarmament 
matters could be the licence of a limited number of states and that participation in 
disarmament instruments would be exclusive to the point of discrimination. It could 
furthermore be argued that such a distinction contradicts the sovereign and equal 
rights of every state, especially in a matter of global concern such as CW 
disarmament. It implies that all states do not have the same status before disarmament 
matters, an assumption which could be very unpopular. 
In the author’s view it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the participation 
and involvement of states in arms control instruments from the CW experience only. 
However, it can be underlined that not all states are equally concerned by the ban on 
CW. In the case of the CWC there is a difference between states interested in the ban 
from a security perspective and states concerned by the ban because of their civilian 
chemical activities. As the analysis of a disarmament ban proceeds, a clear distinction 
between a handful of states directly concerned by CW disarmament, and all other 
states, will appear. 
It can be concluded from this analysis that first an agreement was reached on 
the type of instrument to ban CW. Secondly, the CD was chosen as the institution to 
lead the negotiations of this instrument. Participation in these negotiations followed 
the CD’s composition and rules of procedures. Participation in the ban, however, 
followed the model of arms control instruments, seeking as broad an adherence as 
possible. However it is the author’s belief that these traditional arms control 
institutions and mechanisms do not necessarily correspond to a disarmament 
approach, nor meet the specific needs of CW disarmament. 
Section 5: The Negotiations of a Ban on Chemical Weapons 
Multilateral negotiations for a CW ban are distinct from efforts on disarmament 
undertaken at the UN level, which also encompass CW. The UN contributed to the 
ban of CW, yet it is not a negotiating body but a forum for deliberation in this 
particular context.230 This section introduces a very brief history of the early 
negotiations of a CW ban, which includes and underlines the role of the UN. It is 
followed by an overview of the CWC negotiations at the CD. The negotiations on the 
CW ban brought about the distinction and division between CW and Biological 
Weapons (BW).  
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A. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons Undertaken Under the Aegis of the 
United Nations 
Early disarmament efforts undertaken at the UN were not specific to CW. No real 
discussion on CW took place until they were isolated and considered independently 
as a separate item in the UN agenda.231 It is agreed among authors that until then most 
of the attention and arms control efforts focused on nuclear weapons.232 BCW were 
overshadowed and received little attention in terms of arms control;233 they were 
mostly ignored during the 1950s and 1960s.234 
The CW ban was closely intertwined with the general history of arms control 
and especially that of WMD, which began with the creation of the UN. CW were 
considered together with BW (‘BCW’); not as a distinct category of weapons but as a 
component of WMD.235 The disarmament of BCW was first sought as part of the goal 
of ‘General and Complete Disarmament’, initiated in 1959.236 However, while the 
goal of General and Complete Disarmament eventually failed, partial measures of 
disarmament were sought and awareness of CW increased.237  
Interest in CW at the UN level was mostly triggered by international factors 
mentioned above. The use of CW or means of chemical warfare, alleged or proved, 
led to reactions from states and the public.238 The fact that BCW had been overlooked 
was first pointed out in the UNSG annual report for 1967-1968.239 A number of UN 
documents underlined the gravity of the BCW threat and the urgency of giving BCW 
proper consideration in the arms control and disarmament agenda. Key documents 
include the 1969 Report requested by the UNGA, with an important foreword by the 
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UNSG.240 Other, non-UN, documents provided knowledge on BCW, especially a 
World Health Organization report241 (similar to that of the UN), and the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament (the CCD, a CD predecessor) report on BCW.242 
Later on other UN efforts spurred negotiations and contributed to the ban on CW. For 
example, the Final Document from the First Special Session of the General Assembly 
devoted to Disarmament in 1978 emphasized the disarmament of CW among the 
priorities to be pursued.243 
The debate on BCW reached its peak in the late 1960-early 1970s; BCW were 
considered in a separate item on the UN agenda for the first time in 1969.244 UN 
efforts in the field of BCW increased awareness, disseminated information and 
renewed interest in BCW issues, but they did not lead to a legally binding 
disarmament instrument. 
B- The Role of the United Nations in the Chemical Weapons 
Disarmament Debate 
The role of the UN in the BCW debate and in the CW ban is significant yet it must be 
put in perspective; its role in CW disarmament can be commented. The UN is usually 
considered to have the primary responsibility in arms control matters.245 UN 
institutions provide a forum for deliberation, discussion, information and proposals 
for BCW arms control.246 The UN promotes the goal of CW disarmament and 
contributes towards its achievement. It commends proposals and conventions on the 
control of BCW; it encourages and supports such arms control efforts, as the 
numerous UN documents and efforts supporting the disarmament of BCW testify.247 
 Other UN contributions include the UNSG mandate for investigating alleged 
uses of CW, and the subsequent reports submitted by the Group of Experts appointed 
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by the Secretary-General for this task.248 The UN has called for the early conclusion 
of and the broad adherence to the CWC on many occasions.249  Following its entry 
into force, a relationship agreement has been drawn up for cooperation between the 
two organizations.250  
Generally it can be said that the UN contribution to CW disarmament is a 
positive one. On the one hand UN forums are representative; they contribute to and 
promote the success of disarmament. On the other, it is the author’s opinion that they 
can only have a limited role in disarmament. Programs of general disarmament 
undertaken in the UN are not result-based and result in political declarations. While 
resolutions reflect a deliberation on topics of concern and a general consensus, they 
remain indicative rather than commanding and are not binding. As the implications of 
CW disarmament show, effective disarmament calls for technical negotiations. The 
UN is quite remote from such discussions; it is not the appropriate institution to 
achieve effective disarmament, nor is it mandated to conclude arms control and 
disarmament instruments. 
C. Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament 
The history of the CW ban at the CD closely followed that of the UN efforts on CW. 
The ban on CBW was first taken up separately by the Eighteen Nations Committee on 
Disarmament (ENDC, another CD predecessor) in 1962, without success.251 Attempts 
at controlling BCW were ‘sporadic’ until 1969 when they began to be seriously 
considered by the CCD.252 However, in retrospect it is usually considered that it was 
another decade before a ban on CW was seriously envisaged.253 
CW were a specific item on the permanent agenda of the CD from 1979.254 An 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons was established in 1980 and re-
established every year until the conclusion of the CWC. It first had a formal 
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negotiating mandate in 1984 and began the final drafting in 1990.255 The negotiations 
were largely based on the US draft convention submitted in 1984; from then work 
proceeded on a ‘rolling text’.256  
A final text was agreed on in 1992 and transmitted to the UNSG. The CWC 
was opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997. The CWC is far and 
away one of the main achievements of the CD.257 Before the difficulties and 
significant points of disagreement on CW disarmament are underlined, some 
conclusions can be drawn from the multilateral efforts to ban CW. 
 A few remarks must be made, in the author’s view, to place the disarmament 
of CW in the general international arms control debate. In the author’s view the 
importance of CW could be played down to a certain extent. Until international arms 
control talks focused on separate categories of weapons, CW were clearly a secondary 
preoccupation after nuclear weapons on the general arms control agenda.258 This is 
supported by the poor military interest of CW and the earlier suggestion that these 
weapons are not seen to be as crucial to international security as supporters of their 
ban and elimination would believe. However, from an international legal perspective 
the CW ban is significant since it is the first disarmament treaty and a novelty in 
international law in many respects. Myrdal justly underlines a special link between 
CW and disarmament.259 This suggests a difference between the security benefits of 
CW disarmament and the international legal benefits of the CW disarmament regime. 
These two different perspectives shed an entirely different light on the value of CW 
disarmament.  
D. The Division Between Chemical and Biological Weapons 
The negotiations on CW cannot be separated from efforts on biological weapons 
(BW). Historically, CW and BW were linked and considered together until the 
conclusion of the BWC in 1972.260 Traditionally CW and BW were considered 
together by international law; efforts at control regrouped them under a single 
category.  
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 The scope of the Geneva Protocol covered bacteriological (or biological) 
means of warfare along with CW. BCW were a single agenda item at the UN and at 
the CD,261 where multilateral efforts sought to ban both categories of weapons under a 
single instrument. This was explained, in short, by the similarities between the 
weapons and by their historical association in the public mind. However, the 
negotiations highlighted the complexity and specificity of a CW ban and soon a 
division between a BW and a CW ban was suggested.  
The division of the two types of weapons was a very controversial point in 
negotiations at the CD.262 The UK and the US supported the division and introduced a 
draft convention banning BW only.263 The majority of states, including the SU, 
supported a joint prohibition and opposed the drafts on BW.264 The debate came to an 
end when the SU withdrew from its position and submitted a joint draft with the US 
on a BW ban,265 which resulted in the adoption of the BWC. As a result, from 1971 
CW were considered on their own at the CD. 
 The debate on the division of CW and BW mainly revolved around the issue 
of verification and the fact that a ban on CW required a separate and more elaborate 
verification system than a ban on BW.266 While verification of the ban on BW was 
expected to be easy, verification of a ban on CW would be extremely difficult. This 
was explained by the existence of large CW arsenals and by the widespread chemical 
industry with activities often undistinguishable from chemical warfare.267  
Other factors favoured the division with BW and the conclusion of the BWC. 
The BW ban was made easier by the unilateral renunciation of biological means of 
warfare by the USA in 1969,268 and followed up by other states. 269 In addition, the 
fact that BW were of lesser military use and interest than CW made their disarmament 
less of a ‘military sacrifice’ than was the case with CW.270  
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The verification problem and the differences between CW and BW justified 
the separate conclusion of the BWC; the CW ban was considered later on since it 
required longer and more elaborate negotiations to deal with the technical aspects of a 
verifiable ban. This partial but immediate solution was reluctantly chosen over a 
comprehensive but lengthier ban.271 Unfortunately a severe drawback from this 
division was the risk that a ban on BW would postpone and perhaps compromise the 
conclusion of a ban on CW.272 In order to avert this a provision was introduced in the 
BWC, expressly commanding that States work towards the earliest conclusion of a 
ban on CW.273 However, it appears that these fears were well-founded in light of the 
lengthy and difficult negotiations of the CWC.  
Some comments can be made about the division between BW and CW and its 
relationship to the nature of disarmament under international law. In the author’s 
submission the existence of arsenals influences on the decision to disarm, 
discouraging or slowing disarmament. This, in turn, is directly related to the military 
interest of weapons. It is also possible that the division between CW and BW reflects 
yet again the reluctance to give up CW, since they are more useful militarily than 
BW. In turn this suggests that the disarmament of weapons is largely made possible 
by and depends upon their lack of military usefulness; the more military interest, the 
harder it is to ban and eliminate a category of weapons from states’ arsenals.  
Finally, verification is a key issue affecting the achievement of a ban on a 
category of weapons, affecting the conclusion of a disarmament agreement. The 
decision to ban and disarm weapons therefore depends on numerous factors, in this 
case highlighted by the contrast between BW and CW.  
Numerous authors have dwelled at length on the separation between CW and 
BW. The details of the arguments for joining or dividing CW from BW are no longer 
relevant,274 although the debate reflected issues likely to occur in CW negotiations.  
Conclusion: The Difficulties of Negotiating a Ban on Chemical Weapons 
This chapter concludes with a remark on the matter of verification of the ban on CW. 
The verification of disarmament, and more generally verification measures, are a 
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broad topic calling for a specific study. The CWC verification system is a key feature 
of the Convention, although it was the main difficulty in the conclusion of the 
CWC;275 it was clearly highlighted with the division between the BW and CW bans.   
The need for verification of a CW ban can be explained by the significant CW 
arsenals and by the vast civilian chemical industry.276 Verification serves two distinct 
purposes: ensuring that CW capabilities are destroyed and that no CW production 
takes place from the chemical industry. An effective verification system is also 
necessary for the CW ban to have any strength and credibility.277  
 Verification of non-disarmament activities is justified by the similarities and 
closeness between military and civilian chemical activities,278 and by the dual-use of 
chemicals. Dual-use implies that toxic chemicals and their precursors which can be 
used in chemical warfare also have legitimate applications in the civilian sector.279 
This aspect of verification is the most problematic because of the extensive civilian 
chemical activities existing in parallel with military chemical activities. The interests 
of the chemical industry (protection of chemical trade and of industry secrets) clash 
with the security objectives of the CWC. 
 Concerning disarmament activities, verification is a central aspect of the 
disarmament obligation; it is clearly necessary for the success of disarmament.280 
There were differing opinions on the means to achieve effective verification.281 The 
main difficulty came from the Soviet Union’s idea of verification of CW 
disarmament.282 
 The verification system was largely applauded and praised as a great and 
novel achievement, and as a contribution for arms control agreements.283 However, 
concerning CW, ‘absolute control’ in a CWC has been said to be ‘both unnecessary 
and unachievable’, and that it was ‘politically cumbersome’ to insist on it.284 
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The mechanisms envisaged under the CWC can therefore be envisaged as 
safeguards against major violations of the convention.285 The success of the CWC 
remains determined by the good will of its member states to commit to CW 
disarmament, not by the existence of intrusive verification measures. Although they 
offer guarantees, they do not replace compliance or trust.286 It is the author’s belief 
that verification measures are not crucial to the realization of the disarmament goal.  
Unfortunately verification difficulties slowed the negotiations of the CWC and 
eventually affected the realization of the elimination of CW. Concern about 
verification issues can be linked to disarmament issues which were overlooked during 
the CWC negotiations. 
Verification took up most of the attention yet turned out not to be a major 
issue. Goldblat foresaw that the CWC verification system would meet its purpose and 
guarantees that no significant violation of the CWC would occur.287 Furthermore he 
stated that ‘the process of elimination of chemical weapons is likely to pose more 
problems than verification will.’288 The author fully agrees with that statement, since 
it also highlights a gap between the solid consensus on the need to disarm CW and 
practical aspects of disarmament which were largely overlooked during the 
negotiations. This gap will be subsequently exposed throughout this study.  
These remarks point to the general difficulty of CW disarmament, namely the 
gap between matters of ‘political’ nature such as verification which have drawn 
attention during the negotiations at the CD, and practical matters related to CW 
disarmament, which have mostly been neglected at the CD. In that respect, the history 
of negotiations of this CW ban does not really correspond to the requirements of CW 
disarmament.  
Finally the negotiations on a CW ban also raise many theoretical questions 
about the arms control machinery, especially on the participation to disarmament 
efforts. Questions of participation are evoked in the following chapter with the goal of 
universal adherence to the CWC. However, the matter of participation in disarmament 
efforts is not thoroughly examined before the end of this study. The CW disarmament 
regime is detailed in the following chapter, taking into account the drawbacks of the 
CWC negotiations.  
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Chapter 2: The Chemical Weapons Disarmament Regime 
The Chemical Weapons (CW) disarmament regime is based on the consensus to ban 
CW by renouncing their use and eliminating them. Once the consensus for 
eliminating CW has been examined, the disarmament regime itself will be explored. 
  The main instrument for the disarmament of CW is the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), the product of two decades of negotiations and a lengthy 
ratification process and now in its ninth year of existence. There are other instruments 
aiming at or capable of achieving the disarmament of CW. The aim of this chapter is 
to provide a comprehensive overview of the different kinds of CW disarmament tools, 
their features, and which are successful at eliminating CW. 
   In accordance with the rest of this study CW disarmament regimes are 
examined from an effective and result-based disarmament perspective. However, 
although they have various sources, this study is limited to instruments resulting from 
international legal sources. The success of disarmament both corresponds to the 
successful implementation of these regimes and the subsequent achievement of the 
goal of effective CW disarmament. Based on the experience with CW, some of these 
disarmament instruments could be extended to any category of weapons. 
  An introductory section presents a very short typology of disarmament 
instruments. The first section focuses on the various ‘conventional’ instruments with 
compose the current CW disarmament regime, but mainly on the CWC. These 
‘conventional’ sources and instruments of the CW disarmament regime are described 
and classified and the extent to which they contribute to the successful disarmament 
of CW is examined. The following section introduces other sources of disarmament 
which are not the result of a state initiative but are disarmament measures imposed 
under international law. The third section briefly looks into the recent evolution of the 
CW disarmament regime. This study concludes with a brief overview of the practical 
results of the CW disarmament instruments. 
Introduction: the Different Sources of the Chemical Weapons 
Disarmament Regime 
Disarmament can be brought about in various ways; a typology of available 
disarmament instruments can be drawn up. Arms control instruments are most often 
traditional, multilateral agreements; the CWC is one such instrument. Disarmament 
can also be the result of unilateral and voluntary initiatives undertaken by a state or 
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group of states without the conclusion of reciprocal international arrangements. These 
‘unilateral’ disarmament measures refer to all measures which are not binding or 
reciprocated with obligations written in a legally-binding arrangement. ‘Bilateral’ CW 
disarmament corresponds to the US-USSR efforts on CW preceding the conclusion of 
the CWC. Finally, disarmament can also be imposed on a state or group of states, 
either by other States, for example following a war, or by an international 
organization; it can result from a treaty or a decision by an international organization.  
 Throughout this study the author distinguishes between conventional and 
imposed disarmament. Disarmament instruments labelled ‘conventional’ are legally 
or politically binding initiatives determined by the fact that they are undertaken 
voluntarily; these instruments are unilateral or multilateral. Imposed disarmament is 
defined by the fact that it is imposed upon a state and not undertaken freely. 
Section 1: Conventional Sources of Chemical Weapons Disarmament  
Conventional disarmament encompasses decisions to disarm CW, whether they are 
embodied in unilateral, bilateral or multilateral instruments. They are voluntary and 
freely consented to.  
A. Unilateral Renunciation of Chemical Weapons 
CW disarmament can be the result of a unilateral decision by one State or a group of 
States, which is then a ‘collective’ unilateral decision. Most unilateral disarmament 
measures are voluntary; some are obligatory.289 They can be contained in an 
agreement or remain outside. They are characterized by the absence of reciprocity, 
and are usually not stricto sensu legally binding. A common example is the 
declaration of non-possession and intention not to acquire CW, or a moratorium on 
weapon possession and production.290 Such unilateral declarations are one type of 
arms control confidence-building measures (CBM).291  
 Unilateral declarations are usually made in the context of multilateral arms 
control negotiations, which they complement.292 They express states’ intentions to 
contribute to international peace and security, often by renouncing the possibility of 
use or acquisition of certain weapons, in this case CW, and prohibiting them or their 
                                                 
289 Lundin, n 57, 139, 140-146. 
290 Heckrotte and Steiner, n 264, 71.  
291 Goldblat, n 4, 3-4. 
292 Lundin, n 57, 146. 
  
52 
52 
components on their territories. Most unilateral ‘disarmament’ declarations relate to 
WMD or nuclear weapons; CW are simply mentioned in these declarations. Such 
CBM can have an important role concerning nuclear weapons, but also with CW.293  
 Some authors point that unilateral measures may depend on ‘reciprocal actions 
of others’ or on conditions, implying an agenda beyond the unilateral decision.294 
Similarly Myrdal introduces the theory that states adopt unilateral measures in the 
expectation that other states will do the same.295 For example, the US renunciation of 
BW production in 1969 was believed to spur negotiations on the BWC by putting 
pressure on the USSR to agree to a BW ban.296 The US resumption of CW production 
in 1987 was undertaken with similar objectives.297 
 There are many examples of unilateral renunciation of CW by States or groups 
of States. Unilateral renunciation of CW often comes from groups of States or covers 
specific geographical areas, thus creating CW-free zones. For example, the 1991 
Cartagena Declaration298 promotes Latin America and the Caribbean as the first 
WMD-free zone.299 Its States Parties commit to renounce the possession, production, 
development, use, testing and transfer of all WMD and [to] refrain from stockpiling, 
acquiring or retaining these weapons under any circumstances.300 They also affirm 
their intention to be original signatories of the CWC, to participate in it and be bound 
by it.301  Finally they underline the fact that militarily developed States have a 
particular responsibility concerning WMD.302 Other, similar declarations include the 
Mendoza Agreement,303 the Pakistan and India Joint Declaration on Chemical 
Weapons,304 and more recently the Declaration of San Francisco de Quito.305 There 
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have been other, unsuccessful attempts to renounce CW in certain geographical areas, 
for example the 1985 proposal for a CW-free zone in Europe.306  
 In the context of negotiations on a ban on CW, several unilateral renunciations 
of CW significantly built confidence, such as the US unilateral renunciation of CW 
production and first use in 1969, which was followed by similar renunciation by 
Sweden, Canada, the UK and the Netherlands.307  
 During the CWC negotiations other CBM included on-site visits of facilities, 
test-runs, and experiments with destruction methods and generally the obligation to 
cooperate in finding a destruction method.308 Although an element of reciprocity is 
suggested in these measures, they have solved many technical, legal and political 
problems, contributing to the success of negotiations. 
 However, questions remain about the contribution of unilateral renunciation of 
CW, and more generally unilateral disarmament measures, to the disarmament of CW. 
The ‘disarmament’ nature of unilateral declarations remains unclear; they are not 
‘disarmament’ obligations stricto sensu. They do not result in destruction or 
verification measures; there is no weapon elimination involved at all. Yet in the 
author’s view they can be considered a ‘preventive’ disarmament instrument because 
States renounce the right to acquire, possess and use weapons, hence giving up the 
right to be possessors309 and therefore excluding the possession and use of CW. Such 
a broad interpretation of unilateral measures would assimilate the accession to an 
existing multilateral disarmament agreement to a unilateral renunciation. The 
contribution of unilateral measures to the disarmament of CW is only indirect, yet 
their potential for the success of CW disarmament calls for some comments.  
 The strength of unilateral declarations can be played down to a certain extent 
as varies greatly according to their state author, the context in which they are made 
and their purpose.310 It would be a mistake to think that all unilateral declarations on 
CW - or any other weapon - had the same impact. Their strength ranges widely. They 
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are a simple act of good will when coming from a state which never had any intention 
of having or never had any CW capability. However they are a significant 
contribution to disarmament negotiations when they occur at the beginning of 
negotiations and come from militarily powerful states.311 
  In the author’s view the renunciation of CW by groups of states or in specific 
zones (regional measures) has much potential and such initiatives deserve more 
attention. Effective CW-free zones could create ‘safe enclaves’ from CW; such zones 
could exist in parallel and independently from the CWC yet contribute to its goals. 
Consequently participating states may not need to be bound by the CWC verification 
regime-thereby lightening the verification task-and be exempted from certain CWC 
obligations. An alternative to traditional, multilateral treaties, two-step treaties could 
be envisaged, with a provisional application based on the unilateral initiatives of its 
member states. In other words states having submitted credible unilateral CBM could 
be extended from some of the obligations of the treaty. More credit should be given to 
the fact that voluntary initiatives may bind their authors as arms control obligations 
would.  
  Questions still remain about the effect and intent of unilateral renunciation of 
CW and other unilateral measures. Could CBM change the course of negotiations? 
Although they do not weaken treaties, how can they strengthen existing treaties, and 
would their absence weaken them? In the case of a weak treaty, would unilateral 
measures be enough to compensate or even replace a multilateral instrument?312  
During the debate over the choice of the instrument to ban CW that preceded the 
CWC negotiations, unilateral measures to ban CW were envisaged but given very 
little credit.313 It appears that although some political weight can be attributed to 
unilateral measures, they cannot seriously be envisaged as an alternative to 
multilateral instruments. It seems that the value of CBM in the CW disarmament 
regime can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
  Concerning the purpose of unilateral measures, although a security agenda can 
be attributed to them it does not appear to extend to CW since they are usually played 
down as a strategic weapon. In CW matters, CBM reflect, in the author’s view, a 
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genuine interest to renounce chemical warfare and enforce the prohibition to use 
them. 
B. Bilateral Chemical Weapons Disarmament Agreements 
The CWC is the main, but not the only instrument on CW disarmament. Following 
the conclusion of the BWC, bilateral talks between the United States and the SU for 
the conclusion of a legally-binding instrument banning and eliminating CW began 
simultaneously with the multilateral talks at the CD (CD). Although bilateral efforts 
did not fully succeed they contributed to the multilateral negotiations on CW. 
  Bilateral efforts on disarmament have a long history. General bilateral efforts 
on disarmament include the so-called Mc Cloy-Zorin Statement of 1961,314 which 
sets forth principles for conducting disarmament negotiations; it is considered as a 
guide for disarmament negotiations.315 Though not legally binding, the principles 
include a sensible reduction of armaments.316  
  Although the statement has no direct bearing on the current CW disarmament 
regime it suggests that better disarmament results can be achieved with bilateral 
efforts. Furthermore, even though this statement is now obsolete, it holds interest 
because beyond political declarations it focuses on practical aspects of disarmament. 
Another bilateral agreement (not specific to CW), the Weapons Destruction and Non-
Proliferation Agreement,317 contributed to cooperation in disarmament methods.  
  Bilateral negotiations on CW began in parallel with the negotiations at the CD 
with a US-USSR ‘joint initiative’ following the 1974 Moscow summit.318 
Negotiations were conducted between 1974 and 1980, and again in 1986-1990 after 
an interruption.319  
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  The outcome of these efforts is the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.320 
It provides for the cessation of CW production,321 the reduction of stockpiles ‘to low, 
equal levels’ and for verification measures to ensure compliance.322 Concerning 
disarmament its key provision is the reduction of CW stockpiles down to 5000 metric 
tons by 2002, which would have reduced 90 percent of the US CW stockpiles and 80 
percent of the SU CW stockpiles.323  
  Disarmament operations would have started by December 31st 1992 at the 
latest324 and taken place in stages, with 50 percent done by 1999. The agreement 
limits CW storage facilities to eight for each State, which must be located on their 
territory.325 States are required to cooperate on ‘methods and technologies for safe 
and efficient destruction of CW’, which includes the construction and operation of 
destruction facilities.326 A document on inspection procedures was to be negotiated 
separately, as it was not completed by 1990.327 
 The bilateral Destruction Agreement is a thorough ban on CW and a 
comprehensive disarmament instrument. However, it is not without flaws and 
imprecision. The composition of the remaining 5000 tons of CW stockpiles that states 
are allowed to keep is not regulated. This is a severe flaw as they could include the 
most potent CW or a wide variety of CW which may be produced on a large scale. 
Concerning the disarmament obligation, in case a state cannot meet its destruction 
quota, a justification may be requested but only if the other State has not destroyed a 
minimum amount of CW every year by 1995.328 The downside of this is the silence 
between the parties regarding the destruction progresses as soon as they met the 
minimum yearly threshold. 329 In other words a State Party could get away with 
meeting the minimum destruction threshold only (of 1000 tons ach year) without 
risking any sanctions.  
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  There is much to learn from bilateral efforts on a CW ban. Some 
achievements of the CWC are in fact the result of technical and political work 
accomplished between the US and SU. The CWC is often thought to be heavily 
influenced by the bilateral agreement; it clearly benefited from such efforts.330 
The bilateral agreement is clearly an ambitious disarmament undertaking. 
Unfortunately it never entered into force and therefore theoretically has only an 
historical interest. In the author’s opinion much would have been gained had it 
entered into force, especially in terms of CW disarmament. It would have drastically 
reduced the CW arsenals of the two largest CW possessors and contributed to the 
global elimination of CW.331 Previous experience with CW destruction would have 
both gained ground with the CW disarmament task and anticipated difficulties 
currently encountered with the disarmament of CW.  
  Despite this partial success, bilateral efforts contributed to multilateral talks 
by solving technical issues of destruction and verification.332 Substantial progress was 
achieved on CW destruction technologies.333 Much ground was also covered in the 
area of CBM. These included exchange of data on CW capabilities and intrusive 
verification measures, according to a Memorandum of Understanding dating back to 
1989 which resulted in mutual on-site visits to CW facilities.334 Politically the 
agreement was also significant as it unlocked key issues between the most important 
actors of the ban on CW.  
  In spite of these benefits the outcome of bilateral efforts on the global ban on 
CW can be toned down. The end of CW production, the destruction of the bulk of CW 
stockpiles by the two largest CW possessors increased confidence towards a global 
ban on CW. It can be suggested that the CWC might not have been concluded without 
these concessions from the US and USSR. In that respect bilateral negotiations gave 
political impetus to multilateral efforts.335 Furthermore the bilateral agreement 
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supported the conclusion of a multilateral ban, and measures inciting other states to 
declare and renounce their own CW and join the CWC were adopted.336 
  However bilateral efforts were also viewed with mistrust and were criticized 
by many states. Allegedly they undermined and shortcut multilateral efforts. 
Although they supported a multilateral ban, bilateral efforts were not particularly 
welcome in the CD,337 which no longer had the ‘primary negotiating role’.338 The CD 
put pressure on bilateral efforts and sought to ‘reassert its multilateral negotiating role 
in the chemical talks.’339 The criticism concentrated on the self-allocated right of the 
main two CW possessors to retain retaliatory CW capabilities, while every other state 
was encouraged to renounce all CW capabilities. The fact that the most important CW 
States were allowed to keep CW crystallized the opposition to bilateral 
negotiations.340 
  The debate between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on CW is now of 
no import since the CWC has entered into force and is recognized as the main 
convention on CW. However, it is not without interest when considering alternatives 
to lengthy multilateral negotiations,341 either to extend to and prohibit other weapons, 
or to complete existing agreements (e.g. the BWC).  There are pros and cons to both 
approaches.  
  On the one hand institutions like the CD are representative and democratic. 
The CD, like the UN, is largely governed by the idea that every State has a right to 
participate or be represented in arms control negotiations.342 A downside of the wide 
participation and of the rule of consensus is that negotiations can be lengthy and be 
blocked easily by the inherent right of veto.343 On the other hand, bilateral 
negotiations are founded on restricted and selective participation.  
  From a disarmament perspective a bilateral agreement between the most 
powerful States effectively and immediately deals with a substantial part of the issue 
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of existing weapons. For example bilateral talks are result-based but also seek to 
ensure strategic balance between two powerful States, while attempting to achieve 
global arms control. Yet a downside of a bilateral instrument on CW is massive and 
uncontrolled proliferation of the weapons by other States. It may also overlook other 
States’ existing or potential weapon capabilities.  
  It is the author’s belief that these different types of instruments should not 
compete but instead complete and complement one another, since they seek similar 
goals; both improve international security from CW. Finally this debate suggests that 
disarmament results can be achieved with other instruments than traditional, 
multilateral arms control agreements and avoid traditional arms control structures and 
procedures. It can therefore also be proposed that should multilateral forums fail an 
alternative solution- bilateral, regional or any other partial solution - should be 
available. The most appropriate model of control of CW cannot be discussed at length 
in this study. Alternative methods of controlling CW are examined later in this study, 
as well as variations of the existing CW disarmament regime, within the model of 
multilateral agreement. However, not all, and especially the most recent, alternatives 
to multilateral agreements contribute to the existing CW disarmament regime. 
Therefore the different types of instruments must be considered with caution. 
C. Multilateral Disarmament Instruments: the 1997 Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 
The central instrument of the CW disarmament regime is the CWC, a traditional, 
multilateral arms control agreement. It is the current legal regime for CW 
disarmament. It is a recent and thorough instrument which is broadly adhered to.344 
The convention is a comprehensive disarmament and non-proliferation instrument. In 
many respects it is a unique achievement for the international law of arms control; 
from a disarmament perspective it is the first ‘real’ disarmament instrument.  
  The CW disarmament regime had two ‘starting points’, the opening for 
signature which marks the conclusion of negotiations, and the entry into force of the 
convention, with the deposition of the 65th instrument of ratification in 1997. In the 
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meantime a Preparatory Commission (‘PrepCom’) was mandated with the provisional 
application of the convention.345 
  The aim of this section is to provide the legal background of the CW 
disarmament regime, and how that law contributes to the realization of the 
disarmament goal. The contents of that legal regime will be detailed, first with the 
main disarmament provisions, followed by some original characteristics of the CW 
disarmament regime. It must be kept in mind that the CWC is not without faults and 
imperfections. 
1. Introduction to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
The Chemical Weapons Convention is a long and detailed treaty with three 
voluminous Annexes which ‘form an integral part of the Convention’.346 An 
international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), was created upon the convention’s entry into force to implement it and to 
verify compliance with it.  
  This study distinguishes between the disarmament and the non-disarmament 
aspects of the CWC; the former are relevant to this study. The CWC covers all 
chemical activities, military or civilian, authorized or unauthorized. The disarmament 
aspect covers most former and current military activities. It includes provisions on 
disarmament, non-proliferation but also verification and cooperation. Disarmament 
obligations are found in Articles 1 to 5 of the Convention, corresponding to Parts IV 
and V of the Verification Annex. Activities not relating to disarmament can be 
classified as non-proliferation, international assistance and cooperation, and 
international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemistry.347 These other chemical 
activities form the bulk of the CWC; the disarmament regime is only a small part of 
the convention’s text. 
  Although only the disarmament aspects of the Convention are examined, all 
chemical activities are closely related and sometimes have a direct bearing on CW 
disarmament. For example former military facilities may be converted for peaceful, 
                                                 
345 Michie, n 223, 345-377; OPCW, Genesis and Historical Development 
<http://www.opcw.org/en/CWC_History.html> as of 8 July 2005.  
346 Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Implementation and Verification (‘Verification Annex’); 
Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (‘Confidentiality 
Annex’); Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals (‘Chemical Annex’) and Chemical 
Weapons Convention, art 17: ‘Status of the Annexes’ 
347 Hassan Mashhadi, ‘The OPCW and the Struggle Against Chemical Terrorism’ (2001), OPCW 
Synthesis, 1.  
  
61 
61 
civilian purposes; unchecked exports of restricted substances could hide covert 
military programs. Non-proliferation measures such as the prohibition to move CW 
directly influence disarmament obligations.  
2. The Disarmament Obligation 
The basic disarmament provision is found in the first article of the CWC which sets 
out the obligation to disarm all CW, abandoned CW, and CWPF.348 This Article 
clearly indicates that the object and purpose of the treaty is the complete prohibition 
and elimination of CW. The agreement on the principle of total, complete and 
irreversible destruction of all CW is the product of a difficult negotiation. 
 Article 1 also contains the CWC’s other ‘basic’ obligations and defines the 
scope of the Convention. It indicates the main prohibited activities, namely the 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, detention, transfer of CW (non-
possession and non-proliferation). 349 This includes their use, the military preparations 
for such use, and the assistance or encouragement to ‘engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.’  
 Article 1 also prohibits the ‘use of riot control agents as a method of 
warfare.’350 The definition and use of riot-control agents for law enforcement is now 
an issue that poses difficulties of interpretation with the growing interest in non-lethal 
weapons (NLW).351 Although the matter of NLW is beyond the scope of this study in 
the author’s view this interest is in direct opposition with the purpose of the CWC and 
compromises the CW disarmament objective. These other obligations relate only 
indirectly to the disarmament of CW. However, they complete the disarmament 
regime and altogether constitute the comprehensive ban on CW. 
  The disarmament obligation is also contained in Article 4 ‘Chemical 
Weapons’ for CW and in Article 5 ‘Chemical Weapons Production Facilities’ for 
CWPF.352 Article 4 details the disarmament obligation under Article 1 and the related 
prohibitions concerning CW. It contains the obligation to destroy CW according to 
the ‘order of destruction’, which is defined as ‘the agreed rate and sequence of 
                                                 
348 Chemical Weapons Convention art 1 paras 2, 3 and 4 respectively.  
349 Ibid, para 1. 
350 Ibid, para 5. 
351 SIPRI Yearbook 2003, 662-5; Kerry Boyd, ‘U.S Grapples with Use of Nonlethal agents’ (2003) 33 
(3), Arms Control Today, 44 and Brad Knickerbocker, ‘The Fuzzy Ethics of Nonlethal Weapons; 
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Science Monitor (Boston) 14 February 2003, 2. 
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destruction.’353 This corresponds to the timeframe for CW disarmament; destruction 
must begin not later than two years after the Convention enters into force for the State 
Party and finish not later than 10 years after the convention enters into force.354 The 
convention indicates that this does not preclude States from destroying CW at a faster 
rate.355 The destruction of CWPF follows similar obligations. Concerning the costs of 
CW disarmament Article 4 mentions that the costs of CW destruction must be met by 
states Parties.356  
3. The Scope of Chemical Weapons Disarmament Under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention 
Chemical warfare has multiple aspects and CW disarmament has many ramifications. 
Numerous activities are therefore covered by the CW disarmament regime and fall 
under a multitude of disarmament obligations. Following the presentation of the basic 
disarmament obligation the scope and object of the disarmament regime must be 
defined before disarmament can be envisaged.  
  CW and CWPF are defined in great detail in Article 2, ‘Definitions and 
Criteria,’ along with other significant terms used in the Convention. These detailed 
definitions delimit what the obligations of Article I apply to.357 Concerning the 
disarmament of CW they indicate what to declare and what to destroy. The article 
applies only ‘for the purposes of this Convention’, implying that these definitions 
apply to all provisions of the CWC, but also that they do not apply to the Annexes 
which have their own definitions and criteria.358 The criteria used for the definition of 
CW are examined later among the characteristics of the CWC. It can be remarked that 
such a long and precise article to define a term in a convention’s is unusual.359 
However, the detailed definition of what falls under the scope of the CWC can be 
considered to be an improvement specific to the CW disarmament regime.  
  Concerning the scope of the CWC in light of its member states’ obligations 
the convention uses an extensive set of criteria to determine the responsibility of a 
State Party over CW or CWPF. CW or CWPF owned or possessed by a State or ‘in 
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any place under its jurisdiction or control’ (the criteria not working cumulatively) 
entitle this State to declare and eventually destroy these CW and CWPF. The 
realization of possession or ownership or jurisdiction or control avoids loopholes 
which may be used by States for not taking responsibility over CW or CWPF. This 
especially applies to CW stationed or abandoned on the territory of another State, or 
CW on a State Party’s territory but owned by a State not Party to the Convention.360 
Member states are involved with the disarmament of their own CW but also of CW 
simply located on their territory.361  
  The responsibility criterion is particularly useful concerning old and 
abandoned CW in areas where no member state has territorial jurisdiction or control. 
The criterion obliges States to take responsibility and remove their weapons from 
these places. It also solves the problems related to formerly sea-dumped or buried CW 
which are discovered. Finally CW which are discovered after the initial declaration by 
the State Party must be ‘reported, secured and destroyed’ like any other CW.362 The 
temporal scope of the CWC therefore extends beyond the time allocated to states to 
declare their CW capabilities and, it can be assumed, beyond the destruction period in 
case new CW are discovered. 
  Various activities related to chemical warfare fall under the scope of the 
CWC, although not all of them result in disarmament obligations. The CWC scope is 
wide but varies according to certain obligations. Member states must declare and 
specify the ‘precise location, nature and general scope of activities’ of ‘other 
facilities’, that have been ‘designed, constructed or used…primarily for the 
development of CW’.363  All dual-use complexes and facilities are covered by this 
obligation but do not result in disarmament. In 2003, eight States had declared 25 of 
these facilities.364 
   There are other exemptions in the material scope of the CWC. Article 4 
exempts old and abandoned weapons from the destruction obligation; they are 
submitted to an obligation of report and information to the extent that it is possible.365 
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Land-buried and sea-dumped CW also do not fall under the scope of the obligations 
of Article 4.366  
4. Other Obligations Related to the Disarmament of Chemical Weapons 
The destruction obligation is the central aspect of the CW disarmament regime. 
However, there are other key obligations which form an integral part of the CW 
disarmament regime and are necessary to its accomplishment. These other obligations 
therefore have a direct bearing on the disarmament of CW and complete the 
destruction obligation set out in Article 1.  
  Once the CWC enters into force its member states must declare their CW 
capabilities. Under Article 3, ‘Declarations’, member states must provide an initial 
declaration within 30 days of the entry into force of the Convention for that State.367 
The initial declaration separates the CW possessors States from other States Parties; 
Article 3 is described as a ‘sorting article,’ 368 it identifies which are the ‘have’ and 
‘have-nots. This is therefore quite decisive from a disarmament perspective since only 
states having declared CW are considered possessors and fall under the CW 
disarmament regime.  
   The scope of declarations under Article 3 is quite extensive and demanding 
for CW possessors. The initial declaration covers CW but also CWPF, old and 
abandoned CW, which are defined according to the criterions and definitions of 
Article 2. Concerning CWPF, similar declaration obligations apply under Article 3. 
  CW States must ‘specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed 
inventory’ of their CW,369 in accordance with the Verification Annex.370 The 
obligation to declare CW depends on the application of the responsibility criterion 
mentioned above. Consequently States must report the CW and CWPF located on 
their territory, even though they are owned or possessed by another State. States 
which possess or own CW or CWPF located ‘under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State’ must report them as well. 371 Ideally, declarations between the 
‘Territorial’ State and the possessor or owner State (‘Abandoning’ State) would 
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overlap. An agreement between them must be reached to determine which of them is 
responsible for the removal and destruction operations,372 as it is currently the case 
between Japan and China. This overlap can be seen as a way to cross-check the 
declarations and see if they correspond. It also ensures that no CW or CWPF is 
forgotten in case not all CW States are members of the CWC. 
 Old and abandoned chemical weapons are covered by the CWC; they also 
must be declared and ‘all available information’ on them provided.373 However, these 
are exempted from the obligation to provide a plan of destruction, and nothing is said 
on the closure of old plants.374  Article 3 does not apply to any CW and CWPF under 
the responsibility of a State before 1946. It has other exemptions from the initial 
declaration for sea-dumped and buried CW (CW already disposed of) as long as the 
latter remain buried. The decision to exempt these CW is ‘at the discretion’ of the 
State Party.375 Finally under Article 3 transfers of CW and ‘equipment for the 
production of CW’ must also be declared.  
  Article 3 is relevant only when considered with the objectives set out in 
Article 1 and the definitions of Article 2, which are necessary for the declarations. 
Together, Articles 2 and 3 determine the scope of the obligations under Article 1.376  
  The declaration obligation directly relates to disarmament since it determines 
which states fall under the CWC disarmament regime. Its successful implementation 
also gives an estimate of the global chemical warfare capability and of that of each 
member. It therefore determines the destruction effort which can be expected under 
the CWC disarmament regime. Furthermore for the concerned states the declaration 
obligation extends beyond the initial declaration, to more specific disarmament 
declarations. 
  States having declared possession of CW must submit three more declarations 
on their destruction activities. The first contains detailed annual plans for CW 
destruction which must be submitted ‘not later than 60 days before each annual 
destruction period begins’; the plans include the stocks to be destroyed during the 
destruction period.377 An annual declaration on the implementation of the plans for 
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destruction must be submitted by the State within 60 days following the end of each 
destruction period.378 A final declaration at the completion of the whole destruction 
process is required.379 States which join the convention after its entry into force must 
begin the destruction process ‘as soon as possible.’380 
  The declaration obligation extends to riot-control agents, although they only 
have an indirect interest for CW disarmament. Their ‘chemical name, structural 
formula and Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number’ must be specified, 
and the declaration must be updated within 30 days of any change.381 At this point 
there is a discrepancy in the convention; it authorizes chemicals and precursors for 
‘law enforcement purposes’ but only riot-control agents are defined and subject to 
detailed declaration.382 It means that chemicals other than riot-control agents may be 
used as long as it is for law enforcement. But there is a risk that CW may be used, 
‘legitimized’ by the purpose of law enforcement.383 In this case the difference 
between the objective definition (riot-control agents) and the subjective definition 
(purpose) creates a loophole. The author understands that this loophole may affect the 
destruction obligation, which may overlook the disarmament of certain CW once they 
are labelled as law-enforcement agents.  
  Other disarmament obligations are triggered by the initial declaration under 
Article 3. Following this declaration, CW possessors must provide a ‘general plan for 
destruction’ for CW and CWPF in accordance with the relevant parts of the 
Verification Annex.384 The general plan for destruction reflects the State’s approach 
to the destruction effort; it 
 
  shall provide an overview of the entire national chemical weapons destruction  
  programme of the State Party and information on the efforts of the State Party to  
  fulfill the destruction requirements contained in this Convention385 
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 It will therefore reveal if a State is well-prepared to destroy its CW or not, or if it will 
require assistance for disarming. Some States have been late in providing a 
destruction plan, which causes delays and exposes difficulties related to 
destruction.386 
  Article 3 is significant for the disarmament goal. It is the starting point of the 
disarmament ‘process’ and makes member States responsible for providing correct 
information.387 It is unclear whether non-compliance with this obligation leads to 
sanctions. Article 3 therefore marks the beginning of destruction obligations for CW 
States.388 Once CW are declared they are ‘immobilized’, the possessor State is 
prohibited from moving them, except to a destruction facility.389 
  Article 3 also marks the starting point of international verification activities,390 
indicated with the obligation of CW possessors to provide access to their CW and 
CWPF for international verification and monitoring. Following the initial declaration 
on CW possession, States must provide immediate, on-site and unimpeded access to 
all CW, which are ‘subject to systematic verification.’ 391 Access to CW and to the 
locations where they are stored or destroyed 392 is meant to verify the declarations 
submitted by the States.393  
  There are other obligations directly relating to CW disarmament and which do 
not relate to Article 3; among them is the human safety and environmental protection. 
A general obligation of safety towards people and of environmental protection must 
be respected during all operations involving CW.394 CW possessors are also 
prohibited from resorting to certain destruction methods that are harmful to the 
environment.395 Furthermore cooperation is expected between the States Parties for 
information and assistance concerning methods and technologies ‘for the safe and 
efficient destruction of CW’.396 This cooperation takes the shape of bilateral 
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agreements, or occurs ‘through the Technical Secretariat.’397 As the difficulties of CW 
disarmament will show these requirements have turned out to be major obstacles in 
the disarmament of CW.  
5. The Disarmament of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities 
The disarmament obligations concerning CWPF are very similar than those on CW. 
They are contained in Article 5, ‘Chemical Weapons Production Facilities’. It applies 
to all CWPF which are subject to an initial declaration. These are subject to 
systematic on-site verification and imply an obligation for States to provide access to 
the facilities.398 A general obligation of destruction399 and the corresponding 
declarations400 are specified. Destruction of CWPF must also respect the safety of 
people and the protection of the environment.401 The relationship with other, similar 
agreements (on verification and destruction of CWPF) follow the same rules than 
agreements under Article 4,402 as do the costs403 and the deadlines for destruction.404  
  The main differences with Article 4 relate to the specificities of CWPF. 
Article V requires the immediate cessation of activities at CWPF and their closure.405 
It prohibits the construction of new facilities or the modification of ongoing activities 
in existing facilities.406 The only accepted exception is for the use of such a facility 
‘for purposes not prohibited under the Convention,’ following a decision of the 
OPCW, and under certain conditions.407 Conversion of facilities for authorized 
purposes is therefore allowed, as long as the facility cannot be re-converted into a 
CWPF.408  A recent decision has allowed such conversion.409 
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6. Other Obligations Relating to Chemical Weapons Disarmament. 
There are other articles relating to CW disarmament and which also determine the 
scope of the CW disarmament regime by defining which activities are authorized, 
must end or be controlled. Article 6, ‘Activities Not Prohibited Under This 
Convention’, sets out what the civilian chemical industry is permitted to do or not to 
do under the convention. These activities are of no direct concern for disarmament 
activities as long as they fall within the purposes authorized under the convention.410  
 Article 7, ‘Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, 
Including Sanctions’ solves non-compliance problems. It is described as the ‘principal 
safeguard to protect States against violation of basic obligations by other States 
Parties.’411 It contains a variety of measures which can be adopted ‘internally’ by the 
OPCW against states parties,412 but also by the UNGA or the UNSC if they constitute 
breaches or threat to international peace and security.413 The subsequent relationship 
between the OPCW and UN institutions, especially the UNSC, has been a source of 
concerns. The wording of the article and the respective competences of the 
institutions have caused fear of concurrence or overlaps between the institutions 
mandated with enforcing the CWC obligations.414 This relationship is not yet defined, 
which raises questions about international sanctions, including on disarmament 
matters. Whether sanctions related to disarmament correspond to sanctions for breach 
or threat to international peace and security remains undetermined.415  
  Article IX on challenge inspections is of the utmost importance in the 
CWC.416 It allows for intrusive on-site inspection at any facility in a State Party on 
very short notice. The State cannot refuse the request, which is made by another State 
and authorized by the Executive Council. This possibility is useful for resolving 
suspicions, questions or concerns about compliance, as long as the request is well 
founded and not abusive.417 Although it does not relate to CW disarmament 
specifically, it is in theory a very powerful tool for verifying compliance and  
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enforcing the provisions of the CWC on a reluctant State. It is also one of the most 
original innovations of the CWC and the first of such verification instrument.418 
7. Verification Activities  
Verification activities relate to the CW disarmament regime with which they are 
interrelated. The CWC verification regime is a broad topic calling for a separate 
study, although part of this regime is directly related to disarmament obligations. 
  The Verification Annex is the technical counterpart of the legal obligations 
contained in the Articles of the CWC. As its name indicates, it was drawn up for 
verification purposes; its provisions are established to facilitate knowledge, 
documentation and access to the activities imposed under the Convention. 
Verification and implementation go hand in hand; the verification system testifies that 
the CWC is implemented; it is directed as much towards successful implementation as 
towards satisfactory verification. 
  The verification of CW and CWPF disarmament is embodied in Parts IV and 
V of the CWC Verification Annex, respectively. Parts IV and V correspond to the 
obligations in Articles I, IV and V. The Verification Annex provides the technical 
details and necessary guidelines to implement the obligations. It is therefore quite 
technical, thorough and dry. The Verification Annex introduces specific vocabulary in 
relation to CW and CWPF matters, which is not used in the Convention’s Articles. 
  Part 4 (A) of the Verification Annex, ‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons and 
its Verification Pursuant to Article 4’ contains the requirements for CW declarations, 
storage facilities, destruction and verification. It clarifies the contents and purposes of 
the declarations of CW, the transfers and plans for destruction under Article 3 and 
their format.419 It also details measures for securing and monitoring storage 
facilities.420  
  Concerning the destruction obligation the Annex details the principles and 
methods for destruction (how to destroy), the order of destruction (steps of the 
process) and the contents and mandatory provisions of plans (final and annual).421 In 
that respect the Verification Annex is therefore significant for the destruction process. 
Furthermore the deadlines, intermediate and final, as well as the process to extend 
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them, are described.422 The verification measures themselves are also explained in 
great detail; they include inspections, visits, monitoring, reports, instrumentation and 
equipment.423   
  The verification of CWPF corresponds to Part 5 of the Verification Annex, 
‘Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and its Verification Pursuant 
to Article 5’. It is similar than Part 4 although its scope is generally wider since it 
includes CWPF but also destruction facilities, converted facilities, facilities the 
purpose of which is not prohibited under the convention, and transfers and receipt of 
CW production equipment.424 
  Part 5 describes the contents, purposes and format of the declarations on 
facilities. As with CW, facilities must be declared by the owning or possessing State 
Party, but also by the State Party on whose territory they are located.425 It provides 
principles, methods and guidelines for the maintenance of storage facilities.426 All 
verification requirements also apply to facilities not to be destroyed immediately but 
which are first temporarily converted into chemical weapons destruction facilities.427  
The conversion process is greatly detailed; many safeguards against misuse of 
facilities or their re-conversion into activities prohibited by the convention are 
offered.428  
  Concerning destruction, Part 5 also specifies plans for destruction, which 
includes general and annual plans (the order of destruction), as well as reports on 
destruction to be submitted.429 Final and intermediate deadlines corresponding to 
destruction periods are also set forth in the Annex.430 The verification process of all 
facilities is detailed at the end of the Annex.431  As with the verification of CW 
disarmament, verification of the destruction steps, the closure, the conversion of 
facilities and all related documents, monitoring procedures and equipment are 
provided for in the Annex.  
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  There is some criticism that the Verification Annex is too detailed in some 
areas but not detailed enough in others where precision is needed.432 Yet the 
Verification Annex appears to be satisfactory for determining what is expected of 
States Parties and provides good guidance for implementation of the convention. 
  An entirely different aspect of the verification regime concerns the 
relationship between the verification of disarmament under the CWC and other, 
similar disarmament agreements on CW. The convention organizes this relationship 
with these other agreements (bilateral or multilateral) which may exist between its 
States Parties in matters of CW disarmament and storage verification. The CWC 
adjusts with these agreements to ‘avoid unnecessary duplication.’433 The CWC and 
other CW disarmament agreement complement each other towards the same goal,434 
yet the other agreement must not ‘affect’ the State’s Party’s obligation to declare 
CW.435 The intention is to avoid disarmament done covertly or unaccounted for. 
Therefore the Organization must be kept ‘fully informed’ and has a right to monitor 
the implementation of those parallel agreements. In the author’s opinion it implies 
that the CWC has precedence over these agreements. The OPCW would then have a 
‘coordinating’ role, harmonizing the implementation between the various 
conventions. Since the other agreements cannot be contrary to the CWC, the OPCW 
has authority on CW matters. The CWC is therefore the standard norm on CW 
matters and other agreements must agree with it. Such precedence limits the potential 
and interest of an extended comparison between the CWC and similar instruments 
controlling CW. Although alternatives exist, among multilateral instruments, the 
CWC remains the main instrument to achieve CW disarmament. This role of the 
CWC can be attributed to its uniqueness and originality in the international law of 
arms control. The characteristics of the CWC disarmament regime highlight this 
specific role and status of the CWC.  
D. Characteristics of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
The CW disarmament regime is mostly the product of the 1997 CWC. Its main 
obligations relating to disarmament have been examined; comments on the 
characteristics of the CWC are now called for. These comments are introduced as 
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remarks on this regime and how it stands out in the international law of arms control. 
The characteristics of the CWC highlight the significance and the originality of the 
CWC in the international law of arms control, and more specifically what makes the 
CW disarmament regime so unique. 
1. Definitions of the terms used by the Chemical Weapons Convention 
A first comment can be made on the CWC’s use of extensive definitions which 
clearly delimit its object and scope. Definitions are an original and practical 
improvement from other arms control and disarmament instruments, which do not 
usually define their object. In the case of the CWC definitions are necessary in light of 
the proximity between civilian activities and prohibited chemical warfare activities. 
  Article II offers an extensive definition of CW, which ‘together or separately’, 
include toxic chemicals, their precursors, munitions, devices and equipment 
‘specifically designed’ to be used as or serve CW purposes.436 ‘Toxic chemicals’ and 
‘precursors’ are also defined in detail.437 The definition of binary weapons includes 
their ‘key components’ and other ‘multi-components systems.’438 All these 
components are considered CW and fall under the CWC disarmament regime. They 
are further detailed in Part I of the Verification Annex and in articles 3 and 4.  
  In order to define CW the convention uses both an objective criterion based on 
toxic properties of chemical agents, cumulated with a subjective criterion, the ‘general 
purpose criterion’.439 According to the objective criterion CW and similar toxic 
chemicals are listed in three ‘Schedules’ contained in the CWC Chemicals Annex. 
These scheduled chemicals are prohibited and fall under the disarmament obligation 
regardless of their purpose, as they are considered CW and cannot be used for any 
other purpose. The subjective, general purpose criterion is a novelty and a 
characteristic of the CWC. It defines as CW all chemicals, even inoffensive, which 
are used for a CW purposes. These chemicals also fall under the definition of CW and 
under the CW disarmament regime. The cumulative criteria make for an extensive 
definition and imply that the definition of CW is not limited to the chemicals in the 
Schedules. Non-scheduled chemicals used for CW purposes are therefore defined as 
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CW. The schedules only have an illustrative value; they do not define the full scope of 
CW. 440 
  CWPF are similarly defined in the CWC; they are the ‘second fundamental 
definition’ of this Article.441 With CW they are the main object of the disarmament 
regime; they must also be declared and destroyed.442 CWPF comprise ‘equipment and 
constructions, including buildings’, ‘filling equipment and facilities’, ‘assembly lines’ 
and ‘loading lines.’443 By this definition whole complexes are likely to fall under its 
scope including facilities not directly involved in CW production. The criterion used 
to define CWPF is less subjective than the one used for CW; it is based on the product 
coming out of a facility, not on the purpose of the facility.444  
  Old CW are also defined in the convention; they are CW produced before 
1925-which are exempted from the definition of CW- or CW produced between 1925 
and 1946.  According to Article II and the corresponding part of the Verification 
Annex,445 if the Technical Secretariat declares the latter old and ‘deteriorated to the 
extent that they can no longer be used as CW’, they are exempted from the 
disarmament obligation. The authors of the CWC commentary describe the definition 
of old CW as a ‘sorting mechanism,’446 exempting some weapons from destruction. 
The Technical Secretariat determines the condition of the weapons, the threat they 
pose and therefore their qualification as a CW.447 However, they must still be 
declared.448 In the author’s view it is important that this ‘sorting out’ is not the 
responsibility of the State Party but that of the OPCW since it exempts some CW 
from the disarmament regime. 
  ‘Abandoned Chemical Weapons’ are defined as CW which have been 
abandoned on the territory of another state; they also fall under the scope of the 
convention and the disarmament obligations.449 They may be old CW and belong to 
both categories. This detailed article is important for it determines the responsibilities 
between the ‘Territorial’ State (on whose territory the weapons were abandoned) and 
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the ‘Abandoning’ State (which abandoned the CW). If both are CWC member states 
the Abandoning State must destroy abandoned CW following their declaration and 
removal, according to arrangement or agreement with the Territorial State.450 If only 
the Territorial State is a member state and has not succeeded in obtaining the removal 
of the weapons within two years of the entry into force of the CWC, it must destroy 
the weapons abandoned on it territory itself.451 It is only if the Abandoning State is 
member of the CWC and its weapons are located on the territory of a State not party 
that it is exempted from destruction obligations.  
2. The Cut-off Dates and Deadlines of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention 
The convention operates according to cut-off dates which determine if and when 
obligations apply to a State Party. Various definitions rely on these dates which act as 
an excluding or including criteria. For example it excludes old weapons and weapons 
which cannot be properly accounted for from the definitions, and exempts them from 
the disarmament obligations. 
  The year 1925 is the first cut-off date. It exempts any CW and CWPF 
‘designed, constructed or used’ before then from any of the convention’s 
obligations.452 CW and CWPF designed, constructed or used between 1925 and 1946 
are subject to an assessment by the Technical Secretariat and fall under less stringent 
declaration requirements. It is expected that much information is not be available on 
those CW and CWPF and that many have deteriorated and/or been destroyed since;453 
member states must only provide information on old CW ‘to the extent possible’.454
  The years 1977 and 1985 are the cut-off dates for land-buried and sea-dumped 
CW, respectively. The first date, 1977, marks the end of land disposals. It apparently 
corresponds to and is explained by ‘a particular case of land disposal.’455 The second 
date, 1985, agreed upon during private talks, has been called ‘the most obscure 
element of the [sea-dumping] exemption’ by commentators on the CWC.456 CW 
disposed of before those dates are exempted from destruction obligations. As 
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difficulties of disarmament will show, this exemption may be criticized. Many CW 
disposed were a threat as well as a significant disarmament task for states.457 The 
most important cut-off date remains the entry into force of the Convention, which 
varies for non-original States Parties, and triggers time periods for declarations and 
submission of information. 
  The Convention uses many precise deadlines for compliance with its 
obligations. Declarations, verification, destruction and inspections are submitted to 
deadlines counted in days or years. Some deadlines are very short, for example 30 
days for submitting the initial CW declaration following the entry into force of the 
CWC, or 60 days for the annual destruction plan to be submitted for each destruction 
period. It can be assumed that such short notices imply preparation by member states 
before the entry into force of the CWC.458 However, it can be noted that the final 
deadline for CW and CWPF destruction, April 2007, binds all member states equally 
even though some acceded to the CWC after its entry into force. 
  There are intermediate deadlines that CW possessors must respect throughout 
their destruction program. For destruction purposes, CW are divided into three 
categories which correspond to the three Schedules used to classify CW and their 
components.459 Therefore Category 1 corresponds to Schedule 1 chemicals, which is 
the crucial Category of CW from a disarmament perspective as it contains CW and 
the most dangerous toxic chemicals.  
  The destruction of Category 1 chemicals is bound by strict deadlines 
corresponding to four phases. 460 The first phase must start within two years of the 
CWC’s entry into force; the second, third and fourth correspond to five, seven and 10 
years after the entry into force of the CWC. At these landmarks, 1%, 20%, 45% and 
100% of Category 1 CW must be destroyed, respectively. Therefore Phase 1 
corresponds to two years after the entry into force of the CWC and by then CW 
possessors must have destroyed 1% of their Category 1 chemicals. The last phase 
corresponds to the entire destruction of Category 1 chemicals, according to the 
CWC’s maximum 10-years final deadline.461 The destruction schedule of Categories 2 
and 3 chemicals are much looser as the chemicals are less hazardous. The destruction 
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must begin within a year of the CWC’s entry into force, and is to finish five years 
after the entry into force. The respect or violation of these intermediate destruction 
deadlines (two, five, seven and 10 years) are a good marker to determine where CW 
possessors stand in their disarmament obligations. 
  Upon the conclusion of the CWC, however, Goldblat has criticized the CWC 
for being silent on the fact that states had freedom over the order of destruction, and 
that such an order of destruction ‘does not take into account the qualitative aspects of 
chemical weapons.’462 States also criticized this small weakness.463 The author agrees 
with this criticism as the Convention therefore allows member states to disarm the 
less toxic chemicals first while Category 1 CW, the most pressing concern, are 
disarmed last.  
  The CWC deadlines can be extended at the request of member states in case 
exceptional circumstances keep them from complying with their obligations on 
time.464 The conditions, requirements and process for extension are detailed in the 
Annexes corresponding to the CW and CWPF disarmament obligations. It is the 
author’s belief that the possibility of extending disarmament deadlines can be directly 
attributed to the difficulties expected from CW destruction.465 As the disarmament 
difficulties will show, most CW possessors have anticipated and now experience 
delays and difficulties in destroying CW.466 
  The definitions, cut-off dates and deadlines underline the distinction of the 
CWC from other arms control agreements. Other agreements, except the BWC, which 
imposes a nine-month disarmament period, do not impose any deadline for the 
achievement of disarmament. Similarly they do not provide detailed and extensive 
definitions of their terms.  
3. The Use of Subjective Criteria in the Chemical Weapons Convention 
A general comment can be made on the use of subjective criteria in the convention. 
Two such criteria are “purpose” and “intent”, which are used in addition or instead of 
objective criteria (based on chemical characteristics such as toxicity or lethality) in 
order to define CWC terms.  
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  The criterion based on purpose is used with varying degrees for the definitions 
of precursors,467 CW components (munitions, devices and equipment)468 and 
CWPF.469 It is expressed in the CWC’s wording such as ‘manufactured in order to’ 
for precursors, ‘designed, constructed or used for’, for CWPF, and ‘specifically 
designed’, for munitions, devices and equipment. Similarly the definition of CW is 
founded on the ‘general purpose criterion.’470  
  According to this criterion, material built for CW purposes corresponds to the 
‘activities/purposes prohibited under the convention’ and is subject to declaration and 
destruction.471 This subjective criterion defines CW according to the intent or the use 
that is made of toxic product which does not in itself answer the definition of a CW. 
The criterion classifies as CW any substance when is it intended or used as a means of 
chemical warfare; such substances subsequently fall under the scope of the 
convention’s disarmament regime. For example, precursors manufactured to be part 
of a CW must be declared and destroyed. Yet ‘the same chemical, produced for non-
prohibited purposes, would not need to be declared nor destroyed.472 Therefore 
components or facilities not meant for CW purposes are not considered as a CW or 
CWPF. The CWC commentators note that objective, technical characteristics such as 
toxicity no longer have relevance in the CWC.473  
  The purpose criterion serves as a limit to include or exempt chemicals from 
the convention’s scope.474 Application of the criterion also extends the scope of the 
CWC, and therefore the disarmament regime. The criterion allows for interpretation 
and modification of the CWC’s definitions according to eventual developments and 
progress in chemical technologies, and serves verification purposes.475 Chemicals 
which are harmless or unknown today shall fall under the definition of CW according 
to the ‘purpose’ criterion. Once they are produced or used for a CW purpose, they are 
subject to declaration and destruction obligation. The convention is therefore 
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potentially adaptable to circumstances and future developments in the chemical 
field.476 From a disarmament perspective it prolongs the life of the CWC well beyond 
the last destruction deadline.  
  The criterion based on ‘intent’ follows a similar logic. CWC member states 
are allowed a certain leeway with dangerous chemicals and the facilities producing 
them as long as they act with intentions not violating the Convention. This applies 
particularly to dangerous chemicals such as riot-control agents. They are similar to 
chemicals constituting CW, and their use is allowed as long as they are not intended 
to be used ‘as means of chemical warfare.’477 
  The criterion based on intent also makes the CWC flexible and adaptable to 
circumstances. In addition it is a safeguard for the chemical industry which can 
conduct its activities within the limits set by this criterion. For example dual-use 
activities intended as ‘activities not prohibited under the convention,’478 comply with 
the CWC. This also determines which chemical activities fall under the scope of the 
CW disarmament regime, depending on their intent. 
  Finally activities authorized under the convention also fall under a quantitative 
threshold criterion of one ton per year,479 which applies to dangerous chemicals 
normally prohibited. Once a member state can justify the production, possession and 
use of these unauthorized chemicals (i.e. for purposes not prohibited by Article 6), 
CWPF or other facilities are only allowed to produce, possess or use those chemical 
up to the one ton threshold every year.  
  The CWC uses subjective criteria for an extended scope and to avoid 
loopholes. The afore-mentioned responsibility criterion used to determine a state’s 
responsibility over their CW and CWPF is similar. Altogether these criteria define the 
CWC’s scope and set the boundaries of the CW disarmament regime by 
distinguishing what is allowed from what is prohibited.  
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4. Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
The CWC seeks to achieve universality; this key goal is stated in the convention itself 
and in numerous OPCW documents.480 Concerning the CWC, the intent of universal 
adherence to the CWC is reaching a treaty which does not exclude any state from its 
benefits.481 Universality in this context is therefore strictly limited to the adherence to 
the CWC.  
  Universality is justified from the chemical industry’s perspective, as every 
state with such an industry under its jurisdiction or control has a potential CW 
capability.482 There are also numerous other benefits from participation in the CWC, 
including assistance and protection against CW use,483 trade, cooperation and 
development in the chemical field.484 
  From a security perspective, universal adherence to the CWC principally 
ensures no State will ever acquire and/or use CW, and remedies the CW threat. In that 
respect universality is based on the grounds that if all states are members of the CWC, 
the risk of seeing CW produced or used no longer exists.485 CW disarmament directly 
improves the security of states.486  
  Finally it can be suggested that in light of the broad adherence to the CWC, it 
is difficult for a state to remain outside of it.487 States may seek CWC membership if 
only to avoid suspicion about their CW capabilities and international isolation. Before 
the CWC entered into force, it was suggested by the US representative to the CD that 
a state remaining outside the CWC would be isolated.488 Universality was therefore 
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already sought before the CWC was opened for signature;489 currently efforts are 
being made to ensure universal adherence to the treaty. 
  The CWC is an ‘open’ international treaty and all states are entitled to adhere 
or accede it. 490 Participation is sought and even encouraged; it is made easier with the 
principles of representation and balance between the CWC member states.491 
Furthermore, as a non-discriminatory treaty, all its member states have the same rights 
and obligations.492 
  Although universality of the CWC is a key goal, some aspects of this goal can, 
in the author’s view, be criticized. As it is presented, it is suggested that universality 
of the CWC will result in its successful implementation. It appears that supporters of 
universal adherence to the CWC focus on participation in the convention and that 
universality is considered equal with and is assimilated with compliance. In the 
author’s view such a shortcut is wrong and universality is not synonymous to a 
successful CWC, especially its disarmament goals. A comment can also be made on 
the fact that despite the importance of this goal, universality is not defined in the 
CWC. 
  Firstly supporters of universal adherence to the CWC seem to assume it would 
automatically lead to compliance. To a certain extent this is a logical assumption; 
acceding states and member states of the CWC agree to be bound by its provisions 
and abide by them. It is also an international legal obligation for states to abide by 
their obligations under international law.493 However, the experience of the CWC has 
shown that adherence does not always result in successful implementation and 
compliance.494 This may be due to external circumstances making compliance 
impossible,495 or intentionally through deliberate breaches of obligations. Secondly, 
from a disarmament perspective, universality appears to be remote from the goal of 
CW disarmament, as there are only six countries directly concerned with the CWC 
disarmament regime.  
                                                 
489 Ibid, 42. 
490 Hyltenius, n 13, 2 and Errea, n 12, 24-26. 
491 Errea, n 12, 24, 25-9. 
492 Hassan Mashhadi, ‘The Cost of the Chemical Weapons Convention for the Developing Countries’ 
(1993) 16, Disarmament, 79. 
493 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 may 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 
26 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
494 Lisa Tabassi, (International Symposium: cooperation and Legal Assistance for the Effective 
Implementation of International Agreements, The Hague, 7-9 February 2001). 
495 Dahinden, n 164, 272-3. 
  
82 
82 
  The first aspect of the criticism has important implications; universality may 
not be corroborated with compliance, which raises question about the enforcement of 
the CWC obligations. Universality without compliance can undermine the authority 
and strength of the treaty and affect confidence in it. It is the author’s view that 
compliance is more important than adherence and this criticism raises the question of 
whether universality should not be less important than efforts towards better 
compliance.  
  This criticism also relates to the goal of CW disarmament. It is the author’s 
belief that from a disarmament perspective, participation based on the quality of a 
state (CW possessor) and compliance are more relevant than greater participation in 
the convention. Participation based on the identity of states appears more adequate 
than efforts towards universal adherence. A criterion for participation could be 
member state’s CW potential. Adherence to the CWC could be limited to states with 
former or existing CW capabilities and states with a significant chemical industry. 
Membership to the CWC should therefore be less intent on universality and more on 
compliance of a more limited number of states.  
  Concurring with this criticism is the growing awareness that universality is no 
substitute to compliance. It appears to the author that while universal adherence is still 
sought, current efforts also focus on compliance with the CWC. It is underlined that 
universality without compliance is ‘a hollow accomplishment’.496 Compliance, until 
recently assumed to happen with adherence to the CWC, is now underlined as a 
separate goal, to be achieved in parallel with universality.497 
  Difficulties in complying with the convention have to an extent separated 
compliance from universality. In other words, the treaty can be universal but will not 
necessarily be complied with. Universality, though it is presented as one of the main 
goals of the CWC, is not sufficient on its own; compliance is paramount to 
universality.  
  An analysis of two alternatives to universality; a system of two-step treaties 
and the provisional application of disarmament instruments will be made at the 
conclusion of this study.498 Overall this debate raises questions about the necessity of 
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seeking universal adherence to the CWC and of applying similar provisions to all 
states parties. 
5. The Principles of Non-Discrimination and Balance 
A final comment can be made on the CWC non-discrimination and balance principles. 
Non-discrimination means that the convention binds equally all its States parties to 
the same legal obligations; no state or group of states is favoured or has more 
restrictions than another. It expresses the principle of balance between conflicting 
interests of various groups of states.499 For example, economic interests differ 
between developed and developing States. Developing states are intent on respecting 
the sovereign equality of its members in terms of chemical development and refuse 
trade restrictions following adherence to the CWC.500  
  The non-discrimination principle is expressed in the representation in the 
OPCW Executive Council, which is based on equal geographical representation of all 
regions of the world and on the importance of the States’ chemical industry.501 
According to the negotiators of the CWC, the Convention meets this objective of non-
discrimination.502 
  From a disarmament perspective however, non-discrimination is only relevant 
among CW possessors, which are bound by the same disarmament obligations. 
However, as with universality, non-discrimination holds limited meaning since the 
situation of States in terms of CW capabilities is unequal and therefore discriminatory 
in the first place. CW possessors and non-possessors fall under very different 
obligations (declaration, systematic verification and disarmament for the former) and 
therefore a distinct treatment. Furthermore the situation among CW possessors is 
similarly different and the resulting disarmament effort varies dramatically. Out of 
181 CW member states there are six known possessors. Among them Russia and the 
United States possess 98 percent of the global CW capability; the CW disarmament 
regime is necessarily discriminatory.  
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6. Conclusions On the Characteristics of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention 
The CWC stands out from other arms control agreements in numerous respects, with 
its use of subjective criteria, definitions and its non-discrimination and balance 
principles. The CWC disarmament regime is altogether very complex. However, it 
can be commented that little is said by the treaty that relates directly to the CW 
destruction process, which includes a destruction plan, a method and the adequate 
resources. This appears as a deficiency since the CWC is primarily a disarmament 
treaty. The overall impression is that the treaty is mostly silent on the destruction 
process. 
  While this could give states leeway in disarmament matters, it can also be seen 
as a severe weakness in the CWC. One of the main difficulties CW possessors 
encounter in the destruction process is the development of a CW destruction plan and 
more specifically the choice of an adequate destruction method.503 This concern was 
underlined at the very beginning of CW negotiations and shared among both experts 
and negotiators.504  
  Overall the CWC remains a very original and unique treaty, if only because it 
is the first real disarmament treaty banning an entire category of WMD.505 As such it 
is a novelty among arms control and disarmament agreements. A number of authors 
have pointed out that the CWC was ‘unprecedented’, ‘unique’ and ‘the first of its 
kind.’506  The CWC is also original because it is the first verifiable arms control 
instrument,507 with intrusive and extensive verification mechanisms which were never 
agreed on in other agreements, especially with the possibility of challenge 
inspections. These observations on the CWC only reinforce the contrast with other 
arms control agreements and especially the BWC, which has also been labelled the 
first disarmament treaty but remains weak in comparison.508  
                                                 
503 Chapter 3.  
504 SIPRI (ed) Chemical Weapons: Destruction and Conversion (1980) 2.  
505 Hyltenius, n 13, 1-2. 
506 Ibid, 2. 
507 Wagner, n 228, 16. 
508 Marie I. Chevrier, ‘Strengthening the International Arms Control Regime’, in Raymond A. Zilinskas 
(ed), ‘Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense’ (2000), 149, 150. 
  
85 
85 
Section 2: Chemical Weapons Disarmament Imposed Upon States 
Disarmament efforts are mainly the result of a voluntary commitment to conventions, 
politically or legally-binding instruments among consenting states. Another way to 
achieve CW disarmament is without the consent of the State or group of States which 
is to be disarmed. Imposed disarmament can result from peace treaties inflicting 
disarmament measures on other States, as sanctions following a war or as security 
measures to avoid another war. It can also result from sanctions imposed collectively 
by an international body, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), on a State 
which has breached international peace and security.  
A. Chemical Weapons Disarmament imposed by peace treaties  
Disarmament measures can be imposed by peace treaties, often as sanctions following 
a war. For example, arms and/or troops limitations can be imposed on a State 
responsible for starting a war or a vanquished State. Types and quantities of 
armaments can be reduced and the acquisition of certain arms prohibited.509 Peace 
treaties are another type of instrument that can be envisaged to ban CW. What 
differentiates them from other treaties, regardless of their multi- or bilateral form, is 
that they impose disarmament measures, as opposed to being undertaken freely. 
  There are a number of historical cases of disarmament measures imposed by 
peace treaties. The Paris Agreements on the Western European Union or Protocols to 
the 1948 Brussels Treaty embody such measures.510 The third Protocol, on the Control 
of Armaments, includes the unilateral renunciation of CW by the Federal Republic of 
Germany among the prohibition on manufacture of certain weapons imposed by 
Members of the Western European Union. Annex II of the Protocol provides an 
extensive definition of the prohibited weapons and their production facilities similar 
to that used in the CWC.511 A similar example of disarmament measures imposed as 
sanctions following a war is the CW disarmament of Japan. Following WWII US 
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occupational forces supervised the disarmament of the Japanese Imperial Forces’ 
chemical warfare capability.512 
  International armed conflict now being outlawed by the UN Charter, 
theoretically this former method is no longer valid. Since armed conflicts can no 
longer take place under international law, sanctions following conflicts should not 
take place. However, as long as treaties imposing disarmament existed, they offered 
the advantage of being legally- and often politically-binding upon the vanquished 
state upon which they applied. Breaches of disarmament obligations would be easily 
identified and sanctioned.  
B. Chemical Weapons Disarmament Imposed by the United Nations 
Security Council  
CW disarmament can be imposed by the UN as part of its mandate to ensure and 
maintain international peace and security. Disarmament measures can be imposed by 
the UNSC against a State as sanctions to threats or breaches to international peace and 
security. The only such case so far is the forced disarmament of Iraq following its 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The UNSC called for the cessation of the conflict, the 
withdrawal of Iraqi forces and imposed a series of sanctions against Iraq.513 When 
these requests were not complied with, military force was used on Iraq by an 
international coalition. From the military’s perspective it was greatly feared CW 
would be used on troops.514 
  The imposed disarmament of Iraq took two forms. The first was the targeting 
of Iraq’s chemical and biological capabilities by striking facilities known or suspected 
of concealing CW (and BW) activities, during Operation Desert Storm.515 The success 
of the strikes on CW capabilities is controversial; they might not have been as 
effective as it was first thought.516 The second was the disarmament by the UN 
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Special Commission (UNSCOM), mandated by UNSC Resolution 687.517 Its mandate 
was to remove, dismantle and destroy Iraq’s CW capabilities (as well as its ballistic 
missile capability), which was fulfilled.518  
  UNSCOM inspectors were forced to withdraw from Iraq in December 1998. 
In 1999, following UNSC Resolution 1284, the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) replaced UNSCOM to pursue 
the disarmament mandate under Resolution 687.519 Resolution 1441 reaffirmed Iraq’s 
obligations to comply with UNSC resolutions, and reintroduced inspectors in Iraq.520 
In spite of a reinforced mandate, the lack of cooperation from Iraq, together with 
heavy international pressure did not allow UNMOVIC to fulfil its mandate.521 
UNMOVIC did not discover the expected CW.522  
  It is difficult to draw conclusions from UNMOVIC and UNSCOM in terms of 
failure or success. Both missions were plagued with countless obstacles; from Iraq but 
also from the States which gave their most support to the UNSC resolutions.523 
Questions remain about Iraq’s CW capabilities, as only UNSCOM found and 
dismantled Iraq’s CW. Most issues about Iraq are highly political, especially the 
recent developments with UNMOVIC and the resulting military conflict in 2003. Yet 
there are numerous lessons and difficulties to learn from the disarmament of Iraq. 
  It can be noted that UNSCOM’s dismantling of Iraqi CW capabilities is the 
first multilateral, cooperative CW disarmament effort, as the CWC was not in force 
then. Such an experience, compared to conventional disarmament, underlines the 
potential of imposed disarmament. 
   The imposed CW disarmament of Iraq by UNSCOM is significant for the 
current CW disarmament regime. The disarmament operation itself is useful in terms 
of practical destruction experience. More specifically the UNSCOM experience with 
CW disarmament uncovered difficulties which can be expected of CW disarmament, 
whether conventional or imposed.  
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  The UNSCOM experience highlighted the technical difficulties of CW 
destruction operations. A safe and affordable destruction method, but also CW 
transportation and waste treatment were the main issues of Iraq’s CW disarmament.524 
On the one hand it turned out Iraq already had a good experience with CW 
destruction. On the other the destruction task was both significant and technically 
complex due to leaking munitions and technical, safety-related incidents among other 
things.525 The difficulties of CW disarmament under the CWC have largely confirmed 
this difficulty.  
  Another key difficulty was the absence of cooperation from the Iraqi 
government regarding its weapons capabilities. The disclosure of information was far 
from satisfactory. It was incomplete, obtained with great difficulty, and often did not 
reflect the truth.526 Compared to other capabilities information on CW and on missiles 
was more easily granted or available,527 easing UNSCOM inspections, destruction, 
and verification activities.528 The lack of cooperation was underlined as an 
unavoidable downside of imposed disarmament, as opposed to disarmament willingly 
consented to.  It also reflected the need for cooperation and CBM in disarmament. 
 The human factor also played an important part in disarmament. Scientists 
shared responsibility in the disclosure of information and in the cooperation for 
destruction with UNSCOM.529 Ensuring the security of scientists, but also promoting 
exchanges and integration in the international scientific community were another 
necessary aspect of the success of imposed disarmament.530 However, it can be noted 
that although they contributed to disarmament, scientists also shared the responsibility 
for the development of CW.531  
 Finally the international support displayed for UNSCOM’s task turned out to 
be an essential element for the success of CW disarmament.532 The fact that 
USNCOM was multi-disciplinary has also been underlined as an improvement to 
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learn from.533 This has raised the question of an international multi-disciplinary 
structure for disarmament, such as an international disarmament agency.534  
  In retrospect there are many differences between a structure such as 
UNSCOM and a disarmament treaty, even though they seek a common goal- peace 
and security through the removal of weapons. Imposed disarmament implies coercion, 
and requires sufficient leverage to persuade a State to accept being disarmed. It also 
implies a shift in responsibility from the disarmed state to an international body. The 
latter becomes accountable for the disarmament results and necessarily operates under 
much pressure.  
  Despite these drawbacks, in the author’s view imposed disarmament has great 
potential as an alternative method of disarmament, as the UNSCOM experience has 
shown. It could deal effectively with cases of non-compliance with or failure to meet 
international legal obligations.535 This is not without difficulties as it requires that a 
violation of conventional obligations constitute a threat or breach of international 
peace and security. However, once such threat or breach is qualified, it justifies the 
release of considerable means to re-establish peace and security. The use of force is 
the most visible, but an international inspection team with a disarmament mandate can 
also be envisaged. Therefore if a State is a danger to international peace and security 
because it seeks or possesses weapons, imposing the removal of weapons is a 
possibility. Although this suggestion is overly simplistic, a mandate for imposed 
disarmament holds considerable long-term interest.536 Authors have expressed interest 
in preserving such capacities and experience, and in using the UNSCOM model in the 
future.537 
  The concept of disarmament imposed by the UNSC calls for caution as it 
raises questions about the role and involvement of the UNSC in the CWC. A risk of 
abuse remains in the recourse to the UNSC in case of violation of the CWC. A breach 
of the prohibition to use CW can result in a complaint to the UNSC which can 
eventually adopt sanctions.538 The UNSC can subsequently adopt disarmament 
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measures as part of its mandate to re-establish peace and security and prevent the use 
of force. However, it is uncertain whether the possession or the failure to disarm CW 
constitutes a breach of international peace and security. If such was the case, the 
UNSC would be allowed to act and impose disarmament in a number of situations.539 
In the case of Iraq, possession, refusal to disarm and the invasion of Kuwait justified 
measures by the UNSC involving the use of force. This raises the highly controversial 
question of whether the possession of CW sole and the refusal to disarm be sufficient 
to justify similar measures. The worst application of this interpretation would lead to 
actions taken under the UNSC mandate for minor CWC violations. Again this raises 
the question of whether seeking or possessing CW constitutes a threat or breach of 
international peace and security. Another side of this question is whether, and if so, 
how the violation of a disarmament treaty justifies measures of imposed disarmament. 
  A strong international reaction can be expected in case CW are used, although 
the same reaction in case a state violates its CW disarmament obligations appears 
very uncertain. Some authors appear to extend violations of the prohibition of the use 
of CW to other CWC violations, resulting in similar reactions.540 For example the 
acquisition of CW would be considered a ‘breach of the international peace.’541 In the 
author’s opinion such a step is unlikely, even though both the use, acquisition of CW 
and failure to complete CW disarmament are equally violations of CWC obligations. 
This matter relates to what constitutes a threat to or breach of international peace and 
security. Whether all violations of the CWC constitute such threat or breach is a 
debate beyond the scope of this paper.  
  More generally there are limits to enforcing CWC obligations. The UNSC can 
be blocked by the veto of a permanent member. The OPCW has only limited means to 
deal with violations of the CWC. Although the CWC contributes to maintaining 
international peace and security, it does not have the mechanism to maintain or 
enforce it directly. Imposed disarmament raises questions about what powers 
disarmament treaties should provide for and whether they should provide the means to 
be enforced. 
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Section 3: The Current Situation of Chemical Weapons Disarmament 
Instruments  
Following the presentation of the current legal obligations which constitute the CW 
disarmament regime, a brief overview of the current state of the CW disarmament 
regime is provided. Firstly, the international institutions involved in the CW 
disarmament effort are presented. Secondly, the current situation of the OPCW is 
examined, focusing on particularly the recent crisis it came across.  
A. International institutions related to Chemical Weapons disarmament 
The OPCW relates to various other international institutions which also contribute to 
CW disarmament, and especially the UN. The UN pursues disarmament to a certain 
extent with its goal of “General and Complete Disarmament”.542  Mainly the UN 
seeks to ensure international peace and security and for that purpose supports the 
removal of all means of warfare. CW disarmament therefore contributes to the goals 
sought by the UN and in that regard the OPCW works hand in hand with the UN.  
  The relationship between CW disarmament instruments and the UN is two-
way. On the one hand the UN helps and supports international arms control and 
disarmament agreements, mostly with resolutions affirming the authority and 
importance of such instruments.543 On the other hand, disarmament instruments 
contribute to the UN goals. 
  The relationship between CW disarmament and the UN goals has been 
expressed in various ways. The preamble of the CWC reaffirms its contribution to the 
‘realization of the purposes and principles’ of the UN.544  It also affirms the 
determination to ‘act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.’545 The CWC 
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has been identified as a core treaty for the achievement of the UN mission.546 The 
relationship between the UN and the OPCW is embodied in the 2001 Relationship 
Agreement, which institutionalizes the relationship of cooperation and assistance 
between the UN and the OPCW.547 Finally at the occasion of the CWC First Review 
Conference the OPCW strongly reaffirmed the CWC contribution to the UN 
purposes.548 
  However, the role of the UN in CW disarmament must not be over-estimated. 
Although the CW disarmament regime is associated with the objectives, principles 
and purposes of the UN, CW disarmament remains a narrow and specific area of the 
international law of arms control. The matter of CW disarmament is the mandate of 
the OPCW only. In the author’s view in spite of the UN’s considerable resources, it 
has a widespread mandate and is not focused on disarmament. It can be suggested that 
effective disarmament calls for a lighter and preferably independent structure but 
nonetheless with sufficient technical and financial means. 
  Other institutions contribute, to a limited extent, to the disarmament of CW. 
The main institutions are the World Health Organization and the multitude of national 
peace research institutes and arms control agencies. Other multilateral and bilateral 
agreements also contribute to CW disarmament. Yet the OPCW remains the main 
institution for CW disarmament and the only one likely to achieve concrete results.  
B. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Internal 
crisis 
The CWC and its international organization are the main components of the current 
CW disarmament regime. However, they have met obstacles. The OPCW has suffered 
a major internal crisis in 2001, which is an example of such obstacles. Although this 
crisis is not directly related to the CW disarmament regime, it has affected the running 
of the OPCW.  
                                                 
546OPCW, Universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
<http://www.opcw/html/db/univers_r_frame.html> at 8 July 2005.  
547 Agreement Concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, signed on 17 October 2000; OPCW decision C-VI/DEC.5, 17 May 
2001; see also UN resolution A/RES/55/283 (2001). See also OPCW ‘Relationship Agreements’, 
<http://www.opcw.org/html/db/legal/rel_agree.html> at 8 July 2005. 
548 Report of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Review the 
Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (’First Review Conference’), 28 April-9 May 2003, 
OPCW document RC-1/5 (9 May 2003), 4, 24; OPCW Annual Report 2003, C-9/5 (2004), 1. 
  
93 
93 
  This unexpected crisis started with the open criticism of the OPCW Director-
General’s running of the Organization by the United States, namely his decision-
making and his allocation and spending of funds.549 The criticism came mostly from 
the US, a brusque reversal from earlier praise of the Director General’s work, which 
had been corroborated with the unanimous re-election of the DG for a second term.550 
The US and a few other States attempted to push the DG to resignation during the 28th 
session of the Executive Council with a no-confidence motion.551 Although this 
failed, a Special Session of Conference of the States Parties was convened in 2002 
and resulted in the removal of the Director-General and the nomination of another 
instead.552  
  The 2001 crisis illustrates the vulnerability of arms control agreements to 
circumstances and to political pressures. Such a crisis also has serious political 
considerations and implications for the international law of arms control.553 From a 
disarmament perspective the crisis has both affected the CWC’s authority and 
strength and affected the financing and functioning of its disarmament tasks. The 
crisis was mainly financial: the OPCW financial organization, its allocation of 
funding and planning and its deficit were questioned.554  
  The financial aspects of the 2001 crisis raise a central question about the 
importance of the CW disarmament regime among the OPCW verification activities. 
In particular, the budget and funding of inspections activities has turned out to be a 
sensitive topic.  
  On the one hand, the verified and timely destruction of CW is a priority, but 
on the other it does not have the same relevance for all States Parties. As a 
consequence it is considered that it should not benefit from all the resources.555  This 
position appears well founded as a majority of states is not concerned with activities 
related to CW disarmament, and the OPCW has only a limited budget for a wide 
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scope of activities, supplemented with an increasing amount of work.556 The 2003 
OPCW annual report has underlined the fact that verification activities takes up ‘a 
substantial portion of the resources’, and verification concerns mostly CW destruction 
facilities.557 An initiative has been launched to optimize verification activities at those 
facilities.558  
  In turn it raises the question of whether the CWC is primarily a disarmament 
treaty, or a non-proliferation, cooperation, assistance or trade organization treaty. 
There is clearly a contradiction between the disarmament purpose of the treaty and the 
fact that only a very limited number of member states are concerned with 
disarmament efforts. This throws doubt yet again on the validity of global 
participation and adherence to the CWC. Different priorities affect perceptions on 
how the funds should be allocated, where and for whom they are most needed. A 
convention with a universal ambition and broad membership such as the CWC 
necessarily opposes conflicting interests among its participants. Regardless of these 
considerations, the focus on financial issues in the OPCW is the symptom, common in 
international organizations, of lack and uncertainty of financial contributions.  
  Concerning the authority of the CWC in terms of disarmament, the OPCW 
internal crisis seemed to have had only an indirect effect. Disarmament problems are 
largely national problems, international inspections are without a doubt a necessity for 
a successful verification system, but they are not the States’ responsibility. The 
financial problems of the OPCW led to a reduced number of inspections compared to 
what was planned,559 but is it in fact a common occurrence.560   
  The OPCW was mostly affected in terms of credibility concerning its internal 
functioning and independence from political pressure and financial blackmail. In that 
regard, a positive reversal occurred, with the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Administrative Tribunal decision Bustani v. OPCW. The removal of the Director 
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General was considered a breach of the terms of his employment contract.561 More 
importantly, the Tribunal reaffirmed the importance of the political independence of 
international civil servant and condemned the political interference by States. The 
decision is also the first one involving the removal of the head of an international 
Organization.562 
Conclusion: Chemical Weapons Today: the Practical Results of 
Disarmament Instruments 
This study concludes with an overview of the results of the CW disarmament regime. 
Evaluation of the CW disarmament regime is mostly based on information provided 
by the OPCW annual reports, which provide the official information on the activities 
of the Organization and on the implementation of the CWC. Under the section 
‘chemical demilitarization’ of annual OPCW reports, the destruction of CW, old and 
abandoned CW but also all related facilities, is reported. Other OPCW documents 
regularly update or complete the annual reports. 
  As of July 2006, out of 65 declared CWPF, 55 had been ‘certified as destroyed 
or converted for peaceful purposes.’563 Concerning CW, over 19 percent of the global 
CW stockpile had been verifiably destroyed.564  
  In 2004, the main CW possessors, Russia and the USA, had destroyed over 
1% and 24% of their Category 1 CW stockpiles, respectively, thereby meeting the 
CWC destruction deadlines.565 India had destroyed more than 45% of its ‘declared 
Category 1 CW’ and its entire Category 2 CW, therefore meeting its obligations ahead 
of its intermediate deadlines.566 The unnamed State Party had destroyed 35% of its 
declared Category 1 stockpiles. Albania, had not started destruction at the time of the 
report,567 nor had Libya.   
  Generally, although the annual reports put a positive face on the results of CW 
disarmament, there are clearly difficulties in disarming CW. In spite of the progress 
on the destruction of CW noted in the annual reports, destruction deadlines had to be 
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extended. In 2003 three requests were approved for the extension of deadlines for the 
destruction of Category 1 CW. Russia’s and the USA’s final and intermediate 
deadlines were extended.568 The unnamed member state’s intermediate deadlines were 
also extended, therefore postponing the final deadline. 
  Concerning the OPCW verification activities and especially inspection 
activities, the 2003 report concluded that the Organization had met its goals and 
achieved an extensive inspection schedule which roughly corresponded to the planned 
and budgeted schedule. In 2003 there was a difference between the inspections 
planned (and budgeted) and those which were conducted, marking reduced 
verification activities. The difference was explained by the ‘decrease in the number of 
operating CW destruction facilities over what States had predicted.’569 In 2003, nine 
CW destruction facilities operated, four of them continuously. 
  Although annual reports point out difficulties of implementation of the CWC, 
to the author that it offers an optimistic view of the CWC implementation. Some 
information on CW disarmament must be considered carefully or re-considered in 
light of other sources of information on CW disarmament. For example, the causes for 
the reduced verification activities are overlooked. If fewer inspections were needed, it 
suggests that disarmament activities were insufficient, hence the reduced number of 
inspections. The report failed to explain why some destruction facilities did not 
operate and only mentioned ‘past delays in destruction activities.’570 Finally the ‘cash 
shortfalls’ which impeded the OPCW functioning and affected its inspection activities 
are not elaborated.571 
  There are other sources of information on CW disarmament based on the 
national chemical demilitarization programs of CW possessors. For example, the US 
General Accounting Office provides a rather grim evaluation of the chemdemil 
program and concludes that two intermediate and the final 2012 destruction deadlines 
cannot be met if destruction proceeds at this pace.572 This conclusion reflects the 
general trend that CW disarmament is becoming harder, not easier to achieve. 
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   Although progress in CW disarmament cannot be denied, difficulties 
mentioned in the report (financial, frequently unmet deadlines, slowing down of 
destruction operation, declaration of enormous amounts of CW) suggest that CW 
disarmament does not meet the expectations expressed at the entry into force of the 
CWC. It is worth noting, however, that reforms are under way, especially concerning 
verification of CW destruction.573 
  Current CW disarmament activities are largely the result of the CWC. The 
legal regime on CW disarmament is a recent creation and a novelty in the field of 
arms control. The current CW disarmament regime therefore has a conventional 
origin and except for earlier peace treaties, imposed disarmament remains 
exceptional. Conventional and imposed disarmament both work well to a certain 
extent. It seems inappropriate to favour one over another, as they correspond to 
different situations; the respective advantages of each should be considered on a case-
by-case basis. To the current day, however, the study of the disarmament of CW 
corresponds to the study of the CWC’s successes and failures. Such a study 
automatically results in a general appreciation of the CWC and call for a critical 
examination of the causes for the difficulties hindering the disarmament of CW and 
the implementation of the CW disarmament regime. 
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Chapter 3: The Difficulties of Chemical Weapons Disarmament. 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the difficulties related to the implementation of the CW 
disarmament regime. Once the CW disarmament regime has been detailed and the 
disarmament task expected of CW possessors identified, the implementation of the 
disarmament regime will be examined. The implementation of the CW disarmament 
regime points out the practical difficulties of CW destruction, in accordance with the 
effective and result-based study of the CW disarmament regime. It also determines 
whether CW disarmament is successful or if it fails. 
 In that respect the aim of this chapter is to highlight the gap between the CW 
disarmament regime of the CWC, the theoretical aspect of disarmament, and its 
practical results in terms of CW destruction. Many of the difficulties encountered in 
implementation have been overlooked or unanticipated in the drawing up of the 
CWC. There is clearly a lack of norms in disarmament matters to deal with all the 
situations encountered and the OPCW offers poor guidance on how to apply existing 
norms.  
 This assessment of the results and difficulties of CW disarmament takes place 
at a crucial time, during the CWC’s ninth year of existence. Disarmament operations 
are well under way since the entry into force of the CWC in 1997 and are supposed to 
be completed by April 2007. Unfortunately up to the present day only 15% of the CW 
disarmament task is completed.574 Existing difficulties clearly hinder the disarmament 
of CW. 
  The author adopts a very ‘hands-on’ approach these difficulties, since they are 
mostly of technical nature. This approach is justified by the fact that commentary on 
CW disarmament or on the implementation of the CWC often overlooks the practical 
aspects and difficulties of CW destruction. Information on CW disarmament mostly 
comes from scientific and military sources; as a consequence it has a strong technical 
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connotation but is sometimes incomplete. A general overview of the difficulties of 
CW disarmament is provided, illustrated with specific case studies.  
 Two types of difficulties plague the disarmament of CW. The first type, 
examined in the first section, it corresponds to technical issues hindering the CW 
disarmament process and which mainly affect the two largest CW possessors. These 
difficulties are finding a satisfactory destruction method and meeting the CWC 
conditions of CW destruction. The second type, examined in the second section, 
relates to the feasibility of CW disarmament in light of the delays and financial 
problems. These difficulties are linked with the previous technical difficulties of CW 
destruction. 
Section 1: The Technical Difficulties of Chemical Weapons Disarmament 
The first difficulty of CW disarmament is finding and adopting a CW destruction 
method that achieves the purposes of CW disarmament while meeting the 
requirements imposed by the CWC. Finding and adopting a CW destruction method is 
both technically and politically difficult; it is a hopeless compromise between 
conflicting interests.   
A. The Purpose and Scope of Chemical Weapons Destruction Methods  
The first difficulty encountered by CW possessors is finding a suitable destruction 
method to destroy CW and CWPF. The Convention obliges them to provide 
destruction methods for their CW and CW facilities.575 The method must be 
mentioned in the destruction plans576 and in declarations of destruction activities 
(annual and final declarations).577  
 Finding a destruction method is crucial; the implementation of the CW 
disarmament obligation depends on the existence of a suitable method. It is necessary 
to eliminate CW and fulfil the goal of CW disarmament. As a result the CWC is 
implemented and complied with, and the CW threat removed. Therefore the matter of 
CW destruction methods is a key aspect of the disarmament of CW that cannot be 
overlooked. Nevertheless, methods must meet certain requirements to serve their 
purposes.  
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 Firstly a destruction method must be comprehensive to encompass all CW 
capabilities. Either a single suitable method must be found for an entire CW stockpile, 
or a method must be found for each type of CW. Accordingly with the scope and 
intended results of the disarmament of CW,578 the method must extend to CW agents, 
but also to munitions and CW facilities.579  
 Secondly a destruction method must be final and irreversible; it aims to 
destroy or transform CW into harmless, non-toxic products which cannot be used for 
warfare.580 Before the CWC was concluded a disarmament expert explained that  
 
 The goal of destruction of CW agents is to make these compounds unusable for 
 military purposes and to reduce their high toxicity so that they are no longer a hazard 
 to man and to the environment.581  
 
 A similar definition has been adopted in the CWC; the destruction of 
chemicals must be done ‘in an essentially irreversible way’ and result in a product 
‘unsuitable for production’ as well as unusable as a CW.582 The corollary of an 
irreversible destruction method is that it cannot be reversed to make other CW.583 
Furthermore it implies that in case conversion is preferred over destruction, the 
conversion of destruction by-products must also be irreversible. 
 These requirements create difficulties as existing destruction methods are 
often a two-step process. The completion of the first step results in dangerous by-
products.584 It does not correspond to the destruction of CW since it does not convert 
them into harmless products. A second step is therefore necessary to complete the 
destruction of CW.585 It can be noted yet again that there is a disagreement about the 
interpretation and extent of the definition of destruction.586  
 Finally, CW disarmament is intended to be definitive, which distinguishes it 
from the replacement of old CW with new CW or the renewal of CW stockpiles with 
modern CW. Replacement implies disarmament measures but its purpose is not the 
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disarmament of CW. It can be concluded from these requirements that a destruction 
method ensures that CW possessors no longer have CW or the means to produce 
them.  
 CW destruction methods must meet various obligations and verification 
requirements which are detailed in the CWC and Verification Annex;587 these are 
looked into later in this study. However, in spite of this states remain free to 
determine how they destroy CW and CWPF;588 guidance on CW destruction methods 
appears, in the author’s view, very poor. The few requirements imposed by the 
Convention only set boundaries on what CW possessors may do.  
 Before the current CW destruction methods are looked into, previous 
experiences of CW destruction using early methods are examined. Early destruction 
methods are a useful background to the current difficulties with CW destruction 
methods. 
B. Early Chemical Weapons Destruction Methods  
CW disarmament activities took place before the CWC was concluded. They were 
mostly voluntary initiatives from CW possessors to get rid of their own or other 
states’ weapons. The destruction methods used then were very different from the 
destruction methods envisaged under the CWC and used today. 
1. Types and Uses of Early Destruction Methods. 
The destruction of CW and CWPF was a national effort before it was an international 
obligation.589 In the past CW possessors often destroyed part of their own CW 
stockpiles become useless, especially old, unusable, leaking or out-of-date munitions. 
Most obsolete agents and munitions dating back to World War I were destroyed that 
way.590 Similarly states also disposed of old CW to renew or replace CW stocks with 
newer CW; for example with the more efficient nerve agents, and later with binary 
munitions.591  
                                                 
587 Verification Annex Parts IV (A) and V, paras 37-70 on verification of CW, paras 43-86 for CWPF.  
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591 Ibid, Ooms, n 44, 125 and General Accounting Office Report, ‘Chemical Demilitarization: Funding 
Status of the Chemical Demilitarization Program’, GAO/NSIAD-99-232R, July 1999, 1. 
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  In the context of disarmament imposed by peace treaties and especially 
following World War II, the CW of vanquished States were also destroyed.592 This 
type of disarmament was mostly conducted directly by occupational forces which 
would undertake the disarmament operations themselves, or under their authority and 
supervision.593  
  There is therefore a considerable experience of CW disarmament, a few cases 
of CWPF dismantling and destruction,  and some cases of conversion.594 
Unfortunately early experiences of CW disarmament hardly contribute to finding an 
appropriate CW destruction method. Because of the legacy of defectively destroyed 
CW they are counter-productive and set a bad example.  
  Early CW destruction methods were sea, lake or river-dumping, land burial, 
open pit burning or burning at sea.595 Sea-dumping and land burial were the most 
common and simplest methods and were extensively used. Incineration methods and 
especially open-pit burning and burning at sea were also often used, in particular for 
mustard gas.596 These methods were then accepted as safe and reliable.597 
2. The Drawbacks and Consequences of Early Chemical Weapons 
Destruction Methods 
Early CW destruction methods were rudimentary and unsatisfactory in many respects. 
They had numerous drawbacks and negative results; today they are unacceptable 
under the CWC disarmament regime. 
  For the most part, early methods ignored both environmental and human 
safety preoccupations. Disarmament operations were conducted carelessly. For 
example, the safety of the workers was not well ensured and the impact of CW 
disposal on nearby populations and on the environment damages was overlooked.598  
  Early CW disarmament efforts were unsatisfactory and hazardous both at the 
time of disarmament operations and well after CW disposal operations took place. 
                                                 
592 Chapter 2 ‘Imposed disarmament’. 
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The drawbacks of these disarmament efforts mostly became apparent soon after 
disarmament operations. Today these defectively disarmed CW are not a threat in 
terms of chemical warfare but they are a contemporary issue as they continue to create 
a human and environmental hazard.  
  Sea-dumped CW are sometimes found by fishermen. The Japanese, American 
and Australian experiences with sea-dumping have resulted in accidental recoveries of 
old munitions by fishing boats,599 and numerous accidents,600 decades after the sea-
dumping operations. Similar cases with CW dumped in the North and Baltic Seas 
occurred.601 Sea-dumped CW are also a concern in terms of marine pollution.602 
 The Japanese experience of CW dumping at sea illustrates well the downsides 
of this method.603 American occupational forces supervised the disposal of Japanese 
CW, a few miles off the coast of Japan. Unfortunately in parallel to US operations, 
similar operations were being carried out covertly by the Japanese without the 
knowledge and supervision of the US forces. No prior impact study was done, the 
planning was flawed, the dumping standards were violated and inspections were non-
existent.604  This experience resulted in numerous casualties due to careless handling 
of munitions and in latter accidental recoveries.605 
  Not all former sea-dumping operations pose immediate or known problems. 
The hazards depend on the properties of the CW agents; some do not deteriorate well 
and do not lose their toxicity with time.606 Yet most sea-dumped CW are now 
harmless; the agents have dissolved, lost their toxicity and the munitions have 
corroded. Many CW, especially when dumped in deep water or in concrete casings, 
remain buried at the bottom of the sea.607 However, some dumping operations were 
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conducted carelessly. For example munitions dumped in wooden casings have drifted 
from the dumping sites.608   
  Land-buried CW also create later problems yet they better preserved and more 
harmful than sea-dumped CW. As with sea-dumped CW, they are accidentally 
recovered and create human and environmental hazard, and chemicals can leak and 
pollute water and soil.609   
  Historical cases of recovery of buried CW occurred in the former Federal 
Republic of Germany and in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.610 More recently in the 
US, the Spring Valley near Washington is undergoing a massive operation of soil 
removal and decontamination as a consequence of buried CW dating back to the First 
World War.611 The extent of the consequences for human health is as yet 
unmeasured.612  
  CW disposed of using early methods are a significant issue today. Early 
destruction methods being defective, they do not result in the complete and 
irreversible elimination or destruction of CW. As a result they postpone the 
disarmament of these defectively destroyed CW to a later date and create the need for 
a ‘re-disarmament’ of these CW.613 Defectively destroyed CW which are discovered 
must be removed, secured and destroyed again.  
  The supplementary disarmament effort is quite demanding technically and 
financially and adds to the already heavy CW disarmament task.614 It may be 
technically complex since recovered CW require special caution for their handling 
and disposal.615 It requires international cooperation and assistance to determine 
responsibilities and compensate damages.616 Overall the recovery, removal and 
disposal of defectively destroyed CW have similar implications than CW destruction, 
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plus specific difficulties relating to their access and to the technical properties of 
obsolete weapons.617 They remain a complex and significant issue.618  
  It is difficult to anticipate and plan the size required disarmament effort; CW 
may be recovered at any time and there is much uncertainty and missing information 
concerning former disposal operations.619 The precise records of these operations and 
the identities of people responsible are either non-existent or no longer available. 
Some operations were done covertly620 or were unreported.621 As a result many CW 
are unaccounted for; the disposal sites, types and quantities of CW are often 
unknown.  
 The environmental and human safety drawbacks from defectively disarmed 
CW are uncertain. Long term exposure to CW, and especially to nerve agents, has 
unknown effects.622 The long-term effects of CW on the environment are not known 
either, nor are they measurable; they could be permanent and irreversible.623 In the 
meantime, defectively destroyed CW create hazardous zones and cause concern for 
states and for the affected communities.624 
 Finally, buried and dumped CW raise other issues such as evidence to 
substantiate allegations of former CW capabilities, of CW disposal –covert or not- or 
abandonment in other countries, of violation of disposal rules and of lack of 
information to the public.625 Defectively destroyed CW can be a sensitive issue 
between former belligerents.626 
3. Cases of Defectively Destroyed Chemical Weapons. 
There are numerous cases of early CW disarmament operations using former 
destruction methods that have had a negative impact at a later date. The cases of CW 
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dumped in the Baltic Sea and of CW buried in China illustrate the implications related 
to defectively disarmed CW. 
  The Baltic Sea was a dumping site for old European and Soviet CW dating back 
to the First World War. A special working group of the Helsinki Commission, the 
body mandated with implementing the Helsinki Convention,627 studied chemical 
munitions dumping in the Baltic Sea and released two reports on this topic.628  
  Concerning the CW disarmament operations, the reports reveal defective sea-
dumping operations, involving careless and random dumping at un-chartered 
locations, and cases of munitions thrown overboard during transportation to the 
dumping sites.629 Yet other CW munitions were disposed of in the hold of ships which 
were deliberately sunk, thus preventing chances of later recovery.630  
  Concerning the potential hazards caused by CW disarmament operations the 
first report concludes that the risk caused by chemical munitions to people is rather 
limited and the risk of pollution or any significant damage to the marine environment 
‘unlikely’.631 There are known, random occurrences of CW recovered by fishermen, 
sometimes causing injuries. Yet the report underlines that it is most likely the fishing 
activities during which CW are picked up which create the risk for fishermen.632  
   Today the three known former dumping sites in the Baltic are marked. 
Precautions and guidelines for fishermen exist for CW findings.633 Finally 
international cooperation results in studies, sampling and analysis at former dumping 
sites, and a broad diffusion of information to the concerned population.634  
   The recovery and handling of formerly dumped CW are the main threats 
underlined by the studies on the Baltic Sea dumping. According to the reports the 
overall outcome of early disarmament operations in the Baltic Sea is not alarming and 
no cause for great or immediate concern in terms of human safety and environmental 
protection. It can be remarked, however, that none of the efforts on old and 
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abandoned CW in the Baltic Sea result from the application of CWC provisions and 
that these precautions are the result of a regional agreement on environmental 
protection.  
   Similar sea-dumping operations have been carried out in the White, Barents 
and Kara Seas where significant amounts of mustard gas and lewisite were disposed 
of by the former SU. As opposed to the Baltic Sea, no precise knowledge of the sites 
and munitions dumped is available. It is suspected that the degradation of the 
chemicals has led to hazardous zones, that degradation could eventually enter and 
contaminate the food chain.635 Unfortunately while there is much speculation about 
the potential damage of these dumping operations, little information is disclosed to 
support these suspicions.636  
  The main example of recovery of buried CW is the Japanese CW abandoned 
on Chinese territory, which highlights the problems relating to buried CW.637 Many 
buried CW have been found on Chinese soil, and have caused incidents and 
casualties. A 1999 Memorandum of Understanding deals with the buried CW.638 
According to a 2003 agreement a destruction plant must be built to destroy the CW, at 
Japan’s expense.639 In spite of this cooperation numerous technical and political issues 
remain unresolved.  
  The weapons are now stored in an unsafe and unsecured storage in 
warehouses; such storage is vulnerable to attacks and theft.640 Cooperation concerning 
the damages and technicalities related to CW recovery is insufficient. For example, 
Japanese tribunals are reluctant to compensate and offer damages to Chinese 
individuals affected by these CW.641 Finally according to the interpretation by 
Japanese courts the bilateral agreement is not retroactive.642  
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 The CWC is largely silent on defectively destroyed and recovered CW. Some 
of these CW fall under the definition of old CW, in which case they are treated as 
toxic waste.643 Other discovered CW fall under the CW disarmament regime; they 
must be declared shortly after their discovery and destroyed like other CW.644 
Unfortunately the CWC cut-off dates exclude and exempt dumped or buried CW from 
these disarmament obligations.645 As a consequence CWC member states have no 
obligations concerning their defectively destroyed CW. It is the author’s view that in 
respect of early disarmament efforts the CWC disarmament regime is lacking as it 
offers little guidance on the matters of defectively destroyed CW. It is the decision 
and responsibility of the concerned states to agree on CW disarmament measures, and 
to cooperate and implement them to effectively re-disarm defectively disarmed CW. 
C. Modern Chemical Weapons Destruction Methods 
The legacy of early CW destruction methods, among other factors, spurred the need to 
find new CW destruction methods. New CW destruction methods can be partly 
attributed to increasing preoccupation with environmental protection and human 
safety, although the exact start of efforts to seek new destruction methods remains, to 
the author’s knowledge, unclear.646  
1. The Necessity of Finding a Satisfactory Chemical Weapons 
Destruction Method 
Increased scientific and technical knowledge about pollution and environmental 
health contributed to a new approach to CW destruction.647 The exact effects and 
hazards of chemicals on human health and environment were not fully known or 
understood. 648 However, concerns increased over the potential damages of chemical 
demilitarization.649 For example, in the context of bilateral cooperation, the open-pit 
burning method was opposed by the SU for environmental reasons and abandoned.650 
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Furthermore public awareness and concerns about the dangers of early methods 
resulted in a strong opposition to such methods.651  
   This new approach to CW destruction methods occurred in the late 1970’s, 
and influenced the negotiations on CW disarmament.652 Before then, financial matters 
and urgency were the main preoccupations in chemical demilitarization over safety 
and environmental considerations.653 Early CW destruction methods were abandoned 
and subsequently prohibited in the CWC disarmament regime;654 at the same time 
chemical demilitarization programs sought and developed new destruction methods. 
 As a result of this new approach CW destruction methods must meet safety 
and environmental standards and requirements, and the public usually knows of and is 
involved in the disarmament process. Early destruction methods cannot meet these 
standards and requirements, if only because of their environmental damage.655 Early 
destruction operations were also a strictly military matter and not subject to public 
scrutiny. Although today all the information concerning disarmament operations is 
not disclosed, 656 most CW possessors involve the public in the chemical 
demilitarization process. In turn chemical demilitarization must often meet conditions 
of efficiency and of accountability. 
   There is a clear need to replace early CW destruction methods with 
environmentally safe and harmless, but also effective and reliable methods. Finding 
such methods is challenging in many respects. Destruction methods require a 
substantial research and development effort; they are technologically complex and 
their development is time-consuming. They are also financially onerous and must 
therefore meet financial and ‘political’ requirements in concerned states before they 
can be adopted.  
  In comparison to early destruction methods, modern CW destruction methods 
are far more complex and call for a different, planned approach to CW disarmament. 
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A detailed study of CW destruction methods is beyond the scope of this study; the key 
issues related to CW destruction methods are briefly introduced. 
  The US’ experience with CW disarmament is used throughout this part of the 
study as a basis for an overview of modern CW destruction methods. The USA is in 
the lead in the area of CW destruction methods. It is also the second largest CW 
possessor, and most information on CW destruction is available public knowledge.  
2. Experimentation With Chemical Weapons Destruction Methods: the 
United States’ Choice of Incineration 
The USA had considerable experience with CW disarmament; it was undertaken 
before the conclusion and entry into force of the CWC.657 A comprehensive chemical 
demilitarization (‘Chemdemil’) program started in 1985, aiming at eliminating US 
CW.658  The US Department of Army was mandated with the destruction of all CW 
stockpiles. The Chemdemil program included research and development of alternative 
destruction methods in order to meet national requirements on health and 
environmental safety.659 Early destruction methods were excluded by safety and 
environmental protection preoccupations. Incineration was chosen as the most 
suitable CW destruction method in the USA and was intended as the only method for 
US Chemdemil.660  
 The decision process to select and adopt a destruction method will be 
presented before examining CW destruction methods, as it provides insight into the 
difficulties of CW disarmament. The US National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) of 1969 obliges every federal agency to take into account the environmental 
impact of decisions. Accordingly the Army must consider environmental concerns in 
its decisions, inform the public, and identify alternatives to achieve its goal which are 
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environmentally safer.661 With regard to CW destruction methods, although NEPA 
does not impose the adoption of the environmentally preferable method, it requires 
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) before a destruction project can be adopted 
and similar statements (Supplementary, Draft Programmatic and Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statements) throughout the adoption process.662 
 The absence of any of these statements is ground for legal actions against a 
decision on a destruction method, which has happened with incineration.663 Other 
grounds for legal actions include the selection of a contractor, trial runs, public 
disclosure of information and various environmental, operation and disposal 
permits.664 The acquisition of the environmental and transportation permits necessary 
for destruction is particularly vulnerable to local and political moods.665 The permits 
allow the CW destruction facilities to operate and include threshold emission 
standards and waste-storage limits.666 Without permits, destruction activities may be 
postponed or simply not take place. 
 Various levels of the US administration are involved in the CW disarmament 
process. Decisions largely rest at the federal level yet they are specific to each site and 
made on a case-by-case basis for each CW destruction facility.667 Congress is 
involved in the Chemdemil decisions at the national level; it authorizes projects, 
releases funding and through various commissions and examines Chemdemil 
results.668 
 Following this decision process, incineration was adopted as the only method 
for the Chemdemil program in a 1982 decision by the US Army (made public in 
1988).669 With this method, chemical agents would be incinerated and the remaining 
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metal parts of munitions decontaminated.670 The incineration process was first 
evaluated and assessed at the ‘pilot’ CW destruction facility, the Johnston Atoll 
Chemical Disposal System (JACADS), which was the model for the eight mainland 
destruction facilities.671  
 Experimentation with incineration also took place in Tooele, Utah, with the 
Chemical Weapons Munitions Disposal System built in 1979.672 The first full-scale 
CW destruction facility using incineration was also built there in 1993, based on the 
lessons and experiences from the JACADS and Tooele pilot plants. 673 The Johnston 
Atoll plant has recently been dismantled, having completed its entire destruction 
assignment.674  
 The US Chemdemil strategy was to build a destruction plant at each of the 
eight mainland CW storage sites for on-site destruction, using incineration.675 
Unfortunately the incineration method was met with strong public opposition from the 
very beginning of the Chemdemil program. Public protests, but also national 
regulations on the transportation and destruction of dangerous chemicals,676 forced the 
US Army into seeking other, safer methods of disposal from the early 1990’s.677 
Today four of the eight destruction sites use (or will use when the destruction plants 
are operational) alternative methods to incineration, such as neutralization, 
biodegradation and oxidation of chemicals.678  
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 Incineration remains the object of a constant tug-of-war between supporters 
and opponents and is frequently used as a political bargaining chip.679 The population 
living near storage sites and environmental groups oppose the method, arguing a 
danger to public health and environmental hazards.680 Countless technical difficulties 
have also fuelled opposition to the method, from minor incidents to plants shutdown 
and delays due to a slow destruction pace. 
  Supporters of the method argue the swiftness of the process and with it, 
compliance with the CWC deadlines. Furthermore, incineration is an operational, 
available, efficient and affordable choice. It is said to be the ‘most technologically 
advanced’ method, and that it is less dangerous than CW storage.681 However, storage 
being a very poor alternative, in the author’s opinion this last argument appears 
unconvincing. In spite of the controversy over the incineration method it appears 
unlikely to be replaced, for lack of any suitable alternative. 
  Information on other CW possessor’s destruction methods is much sparser. 
Russia encounters specific difficulties in finding a destruction method.682 Like other 
CW possessors it has attempted and discarded a number of methods.683 It finally 
settled for a two-step solution, thermo-chemical neutralization,684 which involves the 
detoxification of chemical agents followed by incineration.685 The method also deals 
with munitions.686 It is thought to meet environmental, safety and effectiveness 
requirements and to be ‘extremely reliable.’687 Yet since methods vary for each type 
of CW,688 alternative methods must be sought for certain agents which require a 
specific treatment (lewisite for example). Russia has also looked into conversion 
methods.689 
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  The choice of a destruction method, and more generally the operation of 
CWDF is clearly a recurring problem for CW possessors. In addition to the technical 
challenges there are political and economic interests involved which may affect the 
disarmament process. Most preoccupations blocking the destruction process are 
domestic, and occur at the national or infra-national level. In the author’s view these 
issues are quite remote from the CWC disarmament regime and are not, theoretically 
an international concern. However, they eventually affect the CWC since they can 
influence compliance with it.  
  Issues relating to disarmament occurring at the domestic level should not be 
neglected; they have become an international concern. More cooperation and 
concerted efforts concerning destruction methods is called for. Unfortunately the 
CWC is mostly silent on the matter of destruction methods and provides little 
guidance.  
3. Alternative Destruction Methods 
Because of the difficulties in finding and adopting a suitable CW destruction method, 
new methods have been looked into to replace or corroborate existing methods. The 
degradation, biodegradation, photochemical degradation, chemical degradation and 
cryofracture destruction methods have been considered and experimented in the 
US.690 Tow out of four alternative destruction methods to incineration have been 
selected for destruction facilities.691 Other methods envisaged included destruction by 
nuclear explosion,692 and a method developed by Australia involving electrical 
current.693 Russia studied thermo-chemical and photo-chemical destruction of CW 
agents; thermo-technical destruction; thermal destruction, destruction by underground 
nuclear explosions, and biodegradation for liquid chemical agents.694 None of these 
alternatives was satisfactory. 
  Alternatives methods have numerous downsides. New methods are time and 
resource consuming.695 Numerous phases are required before adoption, including 
research and development, testing, plant construction, environmental impact studies 
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and safety and health studies,696 among other legal and technical requirements which 
must be fulfilled before a destruction plant is operational.  
  As the CWC deadlines (often already extended) for the achievement of CW 
destruction approach, CW possessors cannot afford to expand their choice for CW 
destruction methods. Unless it can meet a certain destruction rate, the adoption of a 
new destruction method would further delay the disarmament process, not to mention 
increase costs.  
4. The Question of Conversion 
The matter of CW destruction methods brings up the conversion debate. The debate 
focuses on whether conversion of CW (and their by-products) into products usable for 
commercial purposes should be attempted instead of destroying them. Conversion is 
made possible due to the dual-use nature of chemical products.  
 The conversion process is similar to destruction, with the difference that by-
products can be used for peaceful, authorized purposes. The outcome of the debate is 
somewhat unclear, yet it appears that most arguments oppose the conversion of CW 
or their components into commercial products,697 mostly because it is not profitable.  
  The question of conversion is more suited to former CWPF, which can be 
converted into CWDF or into facilities performing authorized activities.698 The CWC 
allows such conversions on a case-by-case basis, provided certain precautions and 
conditions are met.699 The intent is to ensure that converted facilities cannot be 
reverted and used for CW production.  
  An example of former CWPF conversion is the authorization for Libya to turn 
its CW Rabta plants into facilities conducting peaceful pharmaceutical research.700 
However, this decision was also based on political consideration; it was intended as 
an incentive for other states to join the CWC, with the possibility to convert instead of 
destroying.701 This was believed to help ‘universal adherence’ to the CWC.702   
                                                 
696 General Accounting Office Report, ‘Issues Related to DOD’s Management’, GAO/T-NSIAD-95-
185, July 1995, 9-10;  
697 Contra Lohs, n 189, 67-76. 
698 Chemical Weapons Convention art V paras. 12-14; Verification Annex Part V, paras. 18-25, 58-63. 
699 Verification Annex Part V paras 64-69 for the conversion procedure and paras 70-72 for the 
conditions of conversion. 
700 Conference of the States Parties, ‘Request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to Use the Chemical 
Weapons Production facilities Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 1 and Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory 2 
(phase II) in Rabta, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for Purposes Not Prohibited Under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention’ , ninth session, decision C-9/DEC.9  (30 November 2004), 1-2. 
701 Lois R Ember, ‘Altering a Treaty’ (2004) 82 (43), Chemical and Engineering News, 13. 
  
116 
116 
  In the author’s view such a leap seems simplistic and overlooks the 
motivations behind a state’s refusal to join the CWC. Furthermore there are few states 
suspected of having a CW capability.703 It seems unlikely they would have many 
CWPF to destroy, and CWPF destruction does not seem to be the main reason to 
justify refusal to join the CWC. Rather, it is the intrusive inspections and declarations 
of peaceful chemical activities and the opening of its chemical industry to 
international scrutiny which is the greater obstacle, in spite of confidentiality 
guarantees.704 
  Concerning the destruction of CWPF, there is little public information about 
the facilities and the methods for their destruction or dismantlement. We do know 
about early CWPF destruction methods based on the decontamination of equipment 
and facilities, followed by dismantlement.705 This procedure was costly, lengthy and 
required qualified personnel.706 Depending on the toxicity of the chemicals involved, 
costs, precautions and requirements were expected to vary according to each 
facility.707 
  It appears that CWPF do not pose major difficulties in terms of disarmament. 
The CWC destruction obligation extends to production facilities, filling and assembly 
lines, yet the overall number of facilities directly concerned by the obligation is 
limited.708 Today there are few remaining facilities which have not been either 
destroyed or converted; the best part of the CW facilities disarmament obligation has 
been met.709 The destruction of remaining CWPF which are temporarily converted for 
other purposes is postponed until CW destruction is completed. The disarmament of 
CW is the most pressing and preoccupying matter.  
Conclusions can be drawn on CW destruction methods from the early methods 
to modern, elaborate methods. Firstly, a destruction method is a necessary condition 
for CW disarmament; it cannot be dismissed as a solely technical matter. In the CWC, 
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states which fall under disarmament obligations are obliged to have a destruction 
plan, which includes a disarmament schedule and a method.710 They must specify how 
they intend to meet the destruction obligation and its requirements. The realization of 
CW destruction relies on finding and operating an effective method of destruction. 
 Unfortunately information on destruction technologies is sparse and spread; it 
is usually very technical and calls for scientific knowledge. Although these 
considerations seem very far-flung from the international law of arms control, and 
from the CWC, the details of CW destruction methods correspond to the convention’s 
implementation; however technical, they are an indispensable aspect of a 
disarmament instrument. These aspects of the CW disarmament regime are usually 
overlooked in publications on CW disarmament. In the author’s view information 
about CW possessor’s progress and efforts with destruction methods should be made 
public and displayed in the OPCW annual reports in greater detail. The difficulty of 
finding a suitable CW destruction method is further complicated by the requirements 
that a method must meet to be accepted by both the CWC and national standards. 
Section 2: The Requirements of the Chemical Weapons Disarmament 
Process 
The destruction of CW must meet environmental protection and human safety 
requirements imposed by the CWC711 and yet must be completed within its deadlines 
and at reasonable costs. These requirements are difficult to meet; they complicate CW 
destruction and are often contradictory. 
A. Environmental Protection and Public Safety Obligations  
Environmental protection and public safety from the potential risks of CW destruction 
are crucial requirements. A destruction method cannot be adopted and operated unless 
it meets these conditions. Environmental protection in CW disarmament is the 
requirement that is most difficult to meet.712 
1. The Sources of Environmental Protection and Safety Obligations. 
The disarmament of CW has been influenced by the growing preoccupation with 
environmental protection and human safety in chemical demilitarization. This 
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preoccupation can be largely attributed to public awareness of and concern over 
chemical demilitarization activities within CW possessors.713 It was agreed in the 
CWC negotiations that disarmament must take into account environmental protection 
and safety.714   
  The preoccupation with environmental protection and human safety in CW 
disarmament operations has been expressed in various disarmament instruments. 
Research was conducted in the context of bilateral efforts to find a safe and 
environmentally sound CW destruction method, resulting in reciprocal visits, 
cooperation and exchange of information.715 The 1990 Bilateral Disarmament 
Agreement imposed environmental and safety conditions on CW disarmament:716 
 
 Each Party, during its destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to 
ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each party shall destroy 
its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and 
emissions. 
 
Member states were also expected to ‘cooperate regarding methods and technologies 
for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons.’717 This agreement was 
followed by the Weapons Destruction and Non-Proliferation Agreement, which 
concentrated on cooperation and assistance for weapons destruction.718 Bilateral 
efforts focused on technical matters relating to CW destruction and were a significant 
contribution to safe CW destruction methods.719 
 Similar provisions have been adopted in the CWC. Environmental and safety 
obligations are spelled out in Article VII on National Implementation Measures which 
states a general obligation of ensuring the safety of people and of environmental 
protection. 
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 Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Convention, 
shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other states parties in this regard 
 
The same obligation is found in articles on CW and CWPF disarmament; destruction 
must ensure the safety of people and protect the environment.720 This general 
obligation is detailed in the Verification Annex. It extends to all activities relating to 
CW destruction, namely CW transportation, sampling and storage, along with the 
destruction of CW and CW facilities.721 Finally, the CWC explicitly prohibits the use 
of early, hazardous disarmament methods, ‘dumping in any body of water, and burial 
or open-pit burning.’722 It can be noted that a significant part of the international 
assistance for CW disarmament is focused on helping states find an environmentally 
safe destruction method.723 
 Concerning CWPF, the concerned states must provide ‘safety/security 
measures to be observed during the destruction of the facility in their detailed plans 
for destruction.’724  Concerning CW, the general plan for destruction must provide the 
national standards ‘for safety and emissions that destruction must satisfy.’725  Finally 
the detailed annual plans for destruction must include ‘a detailed description of the 
products of destruction’, but also the ‘method of their ultimate disposal’ for each 
facility.726  
  Unfortunately the precise contents of the obligations on human safety and 
environmental protection are not detailed further in the CWC. It is up to the 
concerned states to adopt environmental and safety standards and then abide by them. 
The fulfilment of these obligations can therefore vary greatly between CW possessors, 
and it is uncertain whether they can all guarantee sufficient environmental protection 
and human safety. The CWC and its Verification Annex remain vague and 
unsatisfactory concerning environmental and safety requirements; there is no 
normative standard.  
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  Other international instruments on environmental protection and human safety 
from chemical activities provide norms and standards.727 These conventions usually 
restrict the use, release and dumping of hazardous chemicals. They can act as 
guidelines yet they are not specifically related to CW-matters. To a certain extent the 
UN is another source of international norms for environmental protection and 
supports environmental protection in disarmament activities. A series of resolutions 
have been adopted, entitled ‘observance of environmental norms in drafting and 
implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control.’728 The resolutions 
include the CWC; unfortunately yet again little is said about the contents of ‘the 
relevant environmental norms’ which must be referred to. Other UN documents on 
the topic include Secretary-General’s reports.729 
 In spite of the variety of sources imposing environmental protection 
obligations on CW disarmament, the contents and implementation of this obligation is 
problematic. Firstly, it can safely be said that CW disarmament is not totally 
environmentally safe; it necessarily results in waste, emissions and pollution 
regardless of the method used.730 Secondly, disarmament must not be too damaging to 
the environment but cannot be postponed until an environmentally safe destruction 
method is found, in order to comply with the CWC destruction deadlines. The 
destruction schedule and the environmental protection norms must adjust to one 
another so that the application of one does not undermine the authority of the other. 
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 Environmental protection is one the most important conditions that CW 
destruction methods must meet.731 Yet how states ensure ‘environmental protection’ 
in CW disarmament remains vague.732  Other conventions on environmental 
protection provide guidelines but CWC member states remain free to determine their 
own level of environmental protection. Furthermore the relationship between the 
CWC and these conventions is undetermined. According to the CWC, CW possessors 
are free to choose any destruction method as long as they meet environmental 
protection and human safety conditions. However, in the author’s view this freedom 
can also be explained by a lack of norms. There seems to be a contradiction between 
the importance of the obligation to ensure environmental protection and the absence 
of norms to ensure environmental protection. Finally there is little, if any, precedent 
of environmental protection in disarmament.733 
2. Measures for Environmental Protection and Safety 
Environmental protection and human safety in CW disarmament resulted in the 
adoption of measures and precautions to meet these obligations.734  Early 
environmental protection measures were implemented before the conclusion of the 
CWC. They included the treatment of the CW decomposition products, as opposed to 
their dissemination in air or water.735 Other measures were the detoxification of CW 
before their elimination,736 and the regulation of emissions according to national 
standards.  
  Today environmental protection measures in CW disarmament include the 
control of chemical emissions with pollution abatement systems (according to 
national emission standards),737 the treatment of waste, of toxic end-products and of 
by-products of CW destruction.738 There is clearly progress in the protection of the 
environment in CW disarmament and destruction operations are more controlled. 
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However, information on environmental protection remains scarce and is very 
technical.  
  Concerning the safety of people, the toxic hazards of CW disarmament require 
the protection of workers involved in the destruction process and of the people living 
in the vicinity of CW destruction or storage facilities. The toxicological dangers from 
CW destruction are numerous, including substances to be destroyed (before and 
during the destruction process), the products resulting from the destruction process 
and the final products.739  Measures to meet the obligation of human safety in CW 
disarmament include medical preparation and emergency preparedness plans.740 
Finally human safety is directly linked to environmental protection, the safe 
environment being a condition for public health.741 
  There is a double edge to the preoccupation with human safety and 
environmental protection in CW disarmament. On the one hand, protection of the 
environment, populations and workers from the effects of toxic chemicals is a 
qualitative improvement of the CW destruction process. On the other it lays a heavy 
burden on the destruction task.742 The environmental and safety requirements narrow 
the number of suitable destruction technologies.743 This difficulty only increases as 
national environmental protection standards rise and become harder to meet.744 These 
standards tax and slow the disarmament of CW and verification and monitoring 
activities.745 In addition, the requirements of environmental protection generally  
increase the costs of disarmament, to the extent that ‘[W]hen arsenals are as large as 
those in Russia and the United States, the environmental costs of disarmament can 
become prohibitive and considerable opportunity costs arise.’746 These obligations 
conflict with other requirements as they affect the rate of destruction and cause 
delays. 
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3. Case Study: the Destruction of VX 
The case of VX destruction illustrates common technical and political difficulties of 
CW disarmament, and especially compliance with environmental protection and 
human safety obligations.747 The disarmament of VX also highlights issues related to 
CW storage, transportation and the public opposition to CW disarmament. A series of 
engineering articles closely follows the destruction of VX at the US CWDF in 
Newport and provides regular, updated information on this destruction process.  
 VX is a well known, highly volatile and very dangerous nerve agent, which 
constitutes 4% of the US declared CW stockpile.748 The adopted destruction method 
for VX is neutralization, which theoretically meets environmental and health 
protection standards. Unfortunately there are several downsides and difficulties to the 
chosen destruction method. 
 A key difficulty in VX destruction is the waste resulting from CW destruction, 
or ‘hydrolysate’, which is toxic and hazardous. In that respect the adopted method is 
insufficient to consider VX destroyed according to the CWC definition of destruction. 
Therefore treatment of the waste is necessary;749 unfortunately there is no 
environmentally safe final disposal method. The issue of the VX waste treatment is an 
example of the difficulties of CW disarmament. 
 The public opposition to the disposal of toxic substances influences the CW 
destruction process. With VX, the burial and dumping of the treated hydrolysate has 
been proposed.750 The US Army, after advice from the EPA, has concluded that the 
destruction of VX and of its hydrolysate is safe except for its final disposal in river.751 
Despite studies and assessment of VX treatment and final disposal methods,  the 
public opposes VX destruction plans;752 arguing that CW destruction and waste 
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disposal are hazardous for the environment and public health. The US government 
appears unable to overcome local opposition to the destruction of VX by-products. 
More generally, although disarmament is generally welcome, the public usually 
adopts a ‘not in my backyard’ response to CW destruction issues;753 the local 
population does not want to see disarmament taking place anywhere near them. 
 Until a satisfactory method is found for the final disposal of VX, its 
destruction can continue only to a certain extent. CWDF are only allowed to store a 
certain quantity of waste products on-site.754 When this storage threshold is reached, 
destruction will eventually have to be interrupted until a satisfactory final disposal 
solution is found.  
  The disarmament of VX is mainly stalled because of national environmental 
and health requirements and norms. For example, the destruction of VX has been 
interrupted on the grounds that its waste was flammable and therefore hazardous.755 In 
the author’s view in that respect there is a discrepancy between the CWC 
disarmament obligations and national environmental and safety standards. As a result 
the disarmament process is slowed, for example the toxicity of VX waste has 
interrupted the CW disarmament process.756  Unfortunately, according to the CWC 
definition of destruction, it is not complete without the final disposal of the 
hydrolysate. 
 The case of VX destruction also highlights the debate opposing CW 
transportation to on-site CW destruction activities and storage, although it is not 
specific to VX or to the US. The US chemdemil strategy is founded on on-site 
storage, destruction and treatment of CW and their dangerous products, including 
waste. This strategy is supported by the actors involved in CW disarmament, the local 
population, the Army, environmental groups and politicians. Although it requires 
building costly CWDF at each storage site, it avoids the problem of transportation. 
 The transportation and storage debate is complicated. It can be related, if not 
attributed, to the difficulties of CW disarmament and specifically to the delayed 
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completion of CW destruction. Alternative solutions are called for because the 
disarmament of CW is slow and difficult. 
  The choice between on-site storage and transportation is sensitive. On the one 
hand, as with chemicals, transportation of CW and their by-products is both hazardous 
and difficult. Furthermore transportation of CW is prohibited by US laws; the only 
possible exception requires authorization from a presidential order. The transportation 
of CW by-products –or partially destroyed CW- is strictly regulated,757 
 The transportation of chemicals remains a sensitive issue in the USA. 
Alternative CW destruction methods involving CW transportation have been 
proposed. In the case of VX, transportation is desirable because of the lack of proper 
waste treatment and disposal method; unless hydrolysate can be moved and stored 
off-site, the destruction of VX must be interrupted. Studies assessing the safety of CW 
or CW waste transportation, handling and shipping have been conducted.758 However, 
these are not conclusive and the alternative methods are systematically blocked by 
politicians.759  
  On the other, there are risks related to the storage of large amounts of 
dangerous chemicals and on-site storage is increasingly criticized. On-site storage is 
against the current US national security policy, which advises against the 
concentration of dangerous chemicals at a same site. It exposes ‘sitting ducks’-
facilities with dangerous chemicals- vulnerable to attacks or theft.760 The storage of 
CW waste products is considered particularly vulnerable to such threats.761 In the case 
of VX, its destruction waste being hazardous, its storage before final disposal equals 
to the storage of CW. Unfortunately off-site treatment implies transportation of the 
CW destruction products. 
  This debate is significant for the disarmament of CW because at stake are a 
faster destruction rate and a reduction of the Chemdemil costs. If CW are transported, 
fewer destruction facilities must be built and operated, and a smaller number of 
specialized facilities could achieve higher destruction rates. It also presents important 
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financial advantages. Specialized on-site treatment and disposal facilities would no 
longer be needed and waste treatment could be assumed by private contractors, easing 
the Chemdemil budget. 
 In the author’s view it is uncertain whether the issues of transportation and 
storage could have been anticipated during the CWC negotiations. The US experience 
with CW destruction before the conclusion of the CWC provided some insight on the 
difficulties to come. For example, the matter of CW transportation is clearly an issue 
which eventually affects timely and successful disarmament. In that regard, the CWC 
negotiators could have adopted a more firm guideline on CW transportation and 
prohibited it altogether. Furthermore, a provision on the transportation of CW by-
products and waste would have also been desirable; unfortunately the CWC is silent 
on the matter. 
 Environmental protection and human safety obligations are an inherent part of 
the CW disarmament regime. However, it is difficult to define and enforce them since 
there is clearly a lack of norms on the matter. There is no globally accepted standard 
for environmental protection and human safety from international convention and the 
CWC only provides loose guidelines. The case of VX destruction illustrates this 
difficulty, among other technical and political difficulties which hinder the 
disarmament of CW. 
B. The Costs and Delays of Chemical Weapons Disarmament 
Costs and delays are the other major difficulty in CW disarmament;762 they are 
directly related to issues of environmental protection and human safety. The 
disarmament of CW must be affordable and meet a certain destruction rate. These are 
essential aspects of CW disarmament; unfortunately timely disarmament at reasonable 
costs is a great difficulty.  
1. The Costs of Chemical Weapons Disarmament  
Disarmament costs relate to the destruction activities themselves and to the 
verification of destruction by the OPCW. The 2003 OPCW financial crisis shows that 
verification costs are an issue as they take up a substantial part of the organization’s 
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budget and are likely to increase.763 However, these costs are not looked into as they 
concern the OPCW and its internal functioning; they do not have a direct impact on 
the CW destruction process. 
  The costs of CW destruction affect CW destruction methods and the progress 
of CW disarmament activities. Firstly, the investment required for a given destruction 
method influences its adoption. Secondly the high costs of CW destruction affect CW 
possessors by often keeping them from meeting their disarmament obligations, 
impending on compliance with the CWC obligations. Before the CWC was concluded 
the issue of high costs was expected; as Lohs clearly pointed out, ‘destruction costs 
will by far outstrip the production costs’.764  
 The costs of CW destruction are enormous and all aspects of chemdemil 
programs are expensive. For example, the US allocation for chemical 
‘demilitarization’ (for national programs only) for fiscal year 2002 was US$ 1,105 
billion. An idle destruction facility costs US$ 1 million per week.765 The construction 
of a destruction plant costs US$ 1, 5 billion,766 regardless of design, equipment and 
operation.767 CW storage for a year costs US$ 15 million.768 The amount of funding 
necessary is one explanation among others for cost-related difficulties. CW 
disarmament requires a significant investment followed by sustained and regular 
funding. Unfortunately CW possessors struggle to obtain enough funding for 
chemical demilitarization programs.  
 The causes explaining insufficient funding are numerous. Early in chemdemil 
program, the necessary funding is not well estimated. Some states do not have a 
general plan of destruction before ratifying the CWC, and therefore no financial 
estimation of the destruction process. For example, such is the case with the late 
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adherence of Libya to the CWC in February 2004,769 and also with the disarmament 
of Russian CW.770 Poor initial cost estimations have led to funding diversion and 
shortcuts during CW disarmament operations.771 The lack of funds does not 
necessarily imply unwillingness on the part of governments to fund chemical 
demilitarization. Rather, poor cost estimates and program planning result in 
insufficient allocated funds.772  
 The costs of CW destruction have also increased dramatically. CW 
disarmament has turned out to be much more expensive than initial estimations,773 
and costs have not decreased, as it was first thought.774 Re-evaluated cost estimates 
are also expected to grow further.775 
 Costs are unpredictable and hard to estimate because of unexpected difficulties 
leading to extra costs, for example, accidents, technical and legal problems and 
various mishaps increase costs.776 The difficulties do not usually result directly in cost 
growth; it is the delay caused by the difficulty which in turn results in supplementary 
costs, usually not estimated or anticipated.777 The lack of sufficient funding allocated 
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to disarmament has delayed and extended destruction schedules.778 Other financial 
problems include diverted funds, the failure or poor allocation of funds. Finally, the 
SIPRI partly attributes cost increases to the growing public awareness of the risks 
involved in destruction operations, as well as to the need for safety measures.779  
 The case of the Pueblo destruction site in Colorado illustrates cost-related 
difficulties and their consequences on the destruction process. The construction of the 
Pueblo destruction plant should have begun in 2005 and cost US$1, 5 billion by its 
completion in 2011.780 US$150 million were expected for fiscal year 2005,781 but was 
reduced to US$5 million and later increased to US$ 50 million. This funding allowed 
construction to begin but was insufficient to buy equipment or operate the facility.782 
Furthermore there was concern that not enough funding would be provided to 
complete construction.783 Uncertain funding results from political tussles, for example 
over the chosen destruction method.784 In turn, insufficient funding, along with other 
minor difficulties, provides the opportunity to voice grudges on political and financial 
decisions, and fuel public opposition to CW disarmament.  
  Most CW possessors suffer from funding shortage for CW destruction. 
International assistance attempts to support CW destruction; it plays a significant role 
for the progression of CW disarmament. The most important financial assistance 
program is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), created by the 1991 US 
Nunn-Lugar legislation. It provides financial assistance to former Soviet Union 
members to secure, destroy and ensure the safe transportation of their WMD.785 CTR 
funds are released upon the completion of conditions by the receiving State.786 
Although there are various beneficiaries, the bulk of CTR funds are spent in Russia.787 
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  International assistance for CW disarmament is also affected by the difficulties 
of CW disarmament. In the case of CTR assistance, the conditions for releasing and 
obtaining CTR funds are often not met or certified. They have been loosened or 
waived a number of times both to avoid destruction schedule delays and funding 
interruptions.788  
 International financial assistance is often necessary for the completion of CW 
disarmament;789 some CW possessors rely entirely on such assistance. For example, 
in 2003 the CTR legislation was modified to extend to countries outside the former 
Soviet Union. As a consequence, Albania benefited from US$20 million of CTR 
funds over two years to destroy part of its CW stockpile.790 In the case of Albania 
additional assistance is expected, especially since new, formerly hidden CW 
stockpiles have been discovered.791  
 Financial assistance to Albania was also intended to avoid the late completion 
of CW destruction. Albania only declared its CW stockpile in March 2003 and had 
little time to complete its CW destruction given the deadlines provided in the CWC.792 
It was granted an extension of its three intermediate deadlines for the destruction of its 
Category 1 CW stockpiles.793 However, for Albania to complete CW destruction on 
time, international assistance was necessary.794  
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  International assistance for CW disarmament is provided via other channels, 
for example, the Group of Eight (G8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,795 dating back to June 2002. It funds 
projects, including disarmament projects, over a period of 10 years.796  
 The costs of CW disarmament are an issue in the CW disarmament regime; 
CW disarmament is clearly far more expensive than CW armament. Although this 
difficulty was expected,797 the destruction of CW is financially taxing and costs only 
appear to increase. The costs of disarmament are not mentioned as an obligation in the 
CWC; CW possessors must simply give the OPCW cost estimates of the destruction 
of CW.798 Some authors have suggested that the destruction of CW could be 
profitable, or at least result in products that can be used commercially. Unfortunately 
as the debate of conversion shows, there is little, if any, financial benefit from CW 
disarmament.799 Other authors have argued that the benefits of disarmament are non-
quantifiable and can be considered in non-monetary value.800 Concerning CW it is 
also the author’s belief that the benefits of CW disarmament are in terms of 
international security. Unfortunately the immediate expenditures required for 
disarmament can be daunting. Furthermore, to the author’s knowledge there is no 
inclusive study or publication on the costs of CW disarmament and the OPCW 
provides no information on such costs. In the author’s view although the lack of 
funding is only one among the causes of the difficult disarmament of CW, the author 
suspects, it is the most likely to make it fail, especially since costs can be linked with 
the delayed and late CW destruction of CW. 
 The question of CW disarmament costs relates directly to that of delays.801 
The cost difficulty affects the entire CW disarmament process by blocking or slowing 
destruction. Delays may be caused by lack of funding, and in turn delays increase 
costs, although more funding is no guarantee that delays will not occur. The US 
General Accounting Office (GAO) clearly identifies this vicious cycle between 
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increasing costs and increasing delays. For example some delays in the US 
chemdemil program are caused by insufficient funding;802 in turn it is believed that ‘if 
delays persist… program costs will rise substantially’ above previous estimates.803 In 
another example the GAO attributes delays in the destruction schedule to funds that 
have been transferred because of unfunded requests in certain areas of the chemdemil 
program.804  
2. The Delays Slowing the Destruction of Chemical Weapons 
Delays are another significant difficulty of the disarmament of CW. CW possessors 
only have a limited amount of time to eliminate their CW capabilities, unfortunately 
there are numerous delays. As a result it appears that the largest CW possessors fail to 
meet their CW destruction schedules and chemdemil programs rarely go according to 
plans. 
  There are numerous explanations for the delays in CW destruction; they are 
closely related to other requirements of destruction methods. For example, the US 
fails to meet its destruction schedule because of demanding environmental 
requirements,805 or funding shortfalls.806 Other causes include technical incidents and 
management issues.807 Interruptions and a slowed destruction rate result from these 
difficulties, which in turn postpone the entire destruction schedule.808 Unfortunately 
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delays are a major difficulty because usually they cannot be anticipated and 
remedied.809 
  Most CW possessors experience delays in meeting their disarmament 
obligations. Albania, Libya, Russia and an unnamed CW possessor have requested 
extensions for their intermediate destruction deadlines.810 However, some possessors 
do not experience delays. For example, India is the third largest CW possessor but has 
met its intermediate CW destruction deadlines and is expected to meet the final 
deadline in 2007.811 In spite of a late start, Albania is also expected to meet its 
deadlines even though it declared its CW on 2003 only.812 Libya has yet to develop a 
destruction plan and is expected to require an extension of the final destruction 
deadline.813 The last CW possessor-which remains unnamed by the OPCW- has also 
experienced destruction delays due to technical difficulties, and has requested an 
extension of its intermediate, 45% destruction deadline.814 Yet this state is still 
expected to successfully meet the final deadline in 2007.  
 The CWC disarmament regime could be considered successful from this 
perspective, since it is estimated that four out of six CW possessors will meet the 
final, non-extended deadline in 2007,815 although this view is not shared by all 
experts.816 However, Russia and the US are the main CW possessors and their 
disarmament matters most for international security. The main two possessors 
represent 97% of the world’s total CW capability.817 The difference between the four 
smaller CW possessors and the main two CW possessors can be attributed to the size 
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of CW arsenals. Whether it can also be attributed to different environmental and 
human safety standards is, to the author’s knowledge, uncertain as there is little 
information to base any comparison on. The two states the disarmament of which is 
crucial for the success of the CW disarmament regime encounter great difficulties and 
their CW destruction is both delayed and far behind schedule. 
The consequences of these delays are twofold. Nationally, chemical 
destruction deadlines or ‘milestones’ are missed and extended, in turn causing cost 
growth and program revisions.818 Delays also affect the general CW destruction 
schedule, which corresponds to the deadlines imposed by the CWC to destroy CW 
and CWPF.819 Therefore CW possessors do not meet their CWC deadlines, and must 
request their extension.820 For example, at its current destruction rate the US is not 
expected to meet its own national schedule and will also fail to meet the CWC 
intermediate deadlines.821 It is also estimated it will not meet the extended 2012 
deadline for the completion of its CW disarmament obligation.822 Russia is not 
expected to complete the destruction of CW within the deadlines imposed by the 
CWC either.823 
 Delays in CW disarmament therefore have serious implications for the CW 
disarmament regime as they threaten compliance with CWC obligations. From the 
point of view of legal obligations, delays are a flaw in the CW disarmament regime. 
While costs are a national issue, delays affect compliance with the CWC deadlines; 
too many delays will eventually result in a direct violation of the CWC. For example 
today the US schedules its destruction program beyond the CWC extended final 
deadline.824 On the one hand it implies realistic planning; on the other is it a ‘planned’ 
violation of the CWC obligations. Unfortunately the CWC final deadline cannot be 
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135 
135 
extended after 2012; furthermore the CWC is silent about sanctions or measures or 
the possibility to modify the extension regime.  
 The systematic delays in implementing the CWC disarmament obligations 
raise questions about the feasibility of timely CW destruction. In some cases, 
deadlines have been met and sometimes even beaten.825 Unfortunately such 
occurrences only happened with CW possessors with small CW arsenals. Was the 
destruction schedule realistic for the main two CW possessors? The final deadline for 
the main CW possessors is extended to 2012, which is now the ultimate deadline for 
completion of destruction.826 If the five-year extension of the final deadline had not 
been granted, CW disarmament would have had to be completed by April 2007. There 
is no chance that a State with a significant CW capability can meet this deadline.  
 The delayed implementation of the CW disarmament regime can be attributed 
to various reasons, namely growing environment protection, safety and costs 
difficulties which increased beyond expectations. However, it is difficult to say 
whether this could have been expected and eventually prevented.827 Delays can also 
be attributed to unfeasible deadlines. One possibility is that delays were expected but 
that in light of the difficult yet urgent conclusion of the CWC, negotiators agreed on 
setting basic norms only. The adjustment of these norms could be achieved later. This 
theory is supported by some negotiators of the CWC, according to whom the CWC 
must rather be concluded soon than never.828 Unfortunately this implies that some 
obligations of the CW disarmament regime are ‘still-born’ because they clearly 
cannot be met. It would equate to signing up to obligations impossible to comply with 
and in turn undermine the CWC authority. The delayed disarmament in the US and 
Russia appears to confirm this suggestion. 
 However, in retrospect an alternative choice to the CWC deadlines is difficult 
to envisage. A longer deadline might have removed the urgency of the CW 
disarmament issue. An undetermined or long-term deadline might diminish the 
urgency to deal with CW and furthermore deemphasize the goal of CW destruction. 
This would also justify why the final 10-year deadline is based on the entry into force 
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of the Convention, as opposed to the entry into force of the CWC for the concerned 
State Party. 
 A final comment can be made on the fact that delays are not specific to 
disarmament obligations. The implementation of other obligations is also difficult and 
delayed,829 for example, declarations on CW-activities,830 the adoption of national 
laws criminalizing CW-related prohibitions, and the designation of national 
authorities to implement the CWC.831 These implementation measures are met late or 
not at all. However, disarmament is the most pressing task of the CWC.832  
Conclusion 
A concluding comment can be made regarding the lack of information published on 
the details of CW disarmament, and especially from the OPCW. Information on CW 
destruction operations in CW possessors, but also their norms for CW disarmament, is 
sparse and most information published on the matter is technical. 
 Much secrecy remains surrounding CW disarmament, as indicated by the 
undisclosed information on Indian CW disarmament833 or with the anonymity of 
certain CW possessors. Despite its verification activities the OPCW remains mostly 
silent about the CW destruction process. As a result, an assessment of the difficulties 
of CW disarmament is hindered by the lack of information. 
 The experience of CW disarmament illustrates the numerous difficulties that 
can be expected of any kind of arms disposal. The disarmament of CW has turned out 
to be much more difficult than what was expected. Furthermore, the environmental 
and safety obligations and the deadlines envisaged in the CWC appear unrealistic, or 
else the completion of some conditions may well compromise the fulfilment of other. 
The obvious discrepancy between the CW disarmament regime and the difficulties 
experienced has shed doubt on the feasibility of disarmament according to the CWC 
disarmament obligations. 
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 The gap between the CWC disarmament regime and the practical difficulties 
of CW disarmament is expressed on many levels. It is firstly expressed with the 
sources of information on CW disarmament which are technical and remote from the 
primary sources of the CW disarmament regime. Secondly, many difficulties of CW 
disarmament have been overlooked during the CWC negotiations. These difficulties 
also show that some theoretical aspects of the CW disarmament regime are unrealistic 
and unfeasible. In that respect the CW disarmament regime of the CWC appears to be 
insufficient from an effective disarmament approach. Finally the difficulties of CW 
disarmament point to the question of whether the CWC is adequate instrument to 
achieve effective disarmament. 
 Before these questions are looked into with the evolution of the CW 
disarmament regime in the current international security environment, a case study of 
Russian CW disarmament is examined to illustrate the difficulties of CW 
disarmament and highlight weaknesses of the CW disarmament regime. 
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Chapter 4: The disarmament of Chemical Weapons Disarmament in 
Russia 
Introduction 
 Chemical demilitarization in Russia provides a good case study for the 
difficulties of the CW disarmament regime. Russia stands out because it is the largest 
CW possessor among CWC member states. It also encounters most difficulties in 
implementing its CW disarmament obligations. Finally, the Russian CW arsenal is the 
most threatening to international security. 
 This case study should be seen as a continuation of the difficulties of CW 
disarmament examined in the previous chapter.834 The Russian situation illustrates 
both the general difficulties of CW disarmament and specific problems encountered 
by a country with limited means for disarmament.  
 The scope of Russian CW disarmament difficulties extends further than the 
destruction of CW stockpiles; other related difficulties include the matters of CW 
storage, proliferation, terrorism, but also more general economic, environmental, 
social and political questions affecting CW disarmament in Russia. In that respect the 
disarmament of Russian CW is unique.   
  This case study aims at highlighting the answers provided in the CW 
disarmament regime to these difficulties. Russian CW require a significant 
disarmament effort; in that regard they present a great challenge for the CW 
disarmament regime. The two questions raised by this case study are the feasibility of 
CW disarmament in compliance with the legal obligations of the CWC and whether 
disarmament is the appropriate solution to the threat from Russian CW. In turn these 
raise questions about the participation to and modification of the existing CW 
disarmament regime. This case study further highlights the gap between the legal 
disarmament obligations and their application. Firstly the specific CW disarmament 
situation of Russia is examined, followed by the difficulties affecting the disarmament 
of CW.  
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Section 1: The Soviet chemical legacy 
A. The Soviet legacy and the imposing Russian chemical weapons 
arsenal 
Russia has taken up most of the Soviet treaty obligations following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (SU) in 1991.835 An agreement organizes the succession between the 
two States; it states that Russia is the main legal successor for Soviet obligations and 
therefore must meet Soviet disarmament commitments. As the former SU’s successor 
in international obligations and having inherited its entire CW arsenal, Russia is faced 
with a significant CW legacy and with an enormous disarmament task. 
 Russia has reiterated its willingness to follow Soviet efforts in the area of arms 
control and disarmament.836 In the area of CW it pursued negotiations towards a 
multilateral ban on CW, and undertook to abide by existing bilateral obligations. 837 
However, the transition was not entirely smooth due to the troubled context. 
Disagreements which existed between the US and the Former SU also blocked 
negotiations between the US and Russia and it took Russia another two years to 
complete the negotiation of the CWC.  
 Russia has been left with the entire Soviet CW arsenal located on its 
territory,838  which is the world’s largest CW arsenal.839 It includes a widespread 
production capability and a vast stockpile: 40 000 metric tons of CW agents have 
been declared to the OPCW, stored at seven sites spread across the Russian 
territory.840 The stockpile is composed of 32 000 metric tons of nerve agents stored at 
5 sites;841 the remainder consists of blistering agents stored at two sites.842 Most of the 
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nerve agents are filled in munitions (ready for use as CW); the remainder is stored in 
bulk containers.843  
Russia has also inherited a large quantity of defectively destroyed CW, which 
means there is another ‘dormant’ CW arsenal. There is no precise knowledge of how 
many CW have been disposed of using early destruction methods, or of the threat it 
might represent for the environment and the population.844  Beyond the CW arsenal, 
the Soviet chemical legacy comprises a ‘human legacy’, the collapse of the SU having 
left hundreds of weapons scientists unemployed.845 
The Soviet, now Russian, chemical arsenal remains a source of great 
suspicion. The quantity of CW, the development and possession of binary CW and the 
cessation of CW production are lingering issues.  
  The numerous estimates about the quantity of CW produced by the former SU 
and now owned by Russia do not concur. The estimated quantities of CW inherited by 
Russia vary from the declared 40 000 metric tons of chemical agents to 300 000 tons 
and it is sometimes estimated that over 200 000 tons still exist.846 It would mean 
Russia has not provided a complete declaration of its CW capability, which is a 
common opinion.847 There is much speculation as to whether Russia has declared the 
totality of its CW capability and about the quantity of CW it effectively owns.848 The 
size of the former Soviet stockpile is difficult to establish.   
  The SU has also developed binary CW, which also concern the international 
community.849 Binary CW are munitions composed of separate agents which become 
a CW when they come together upon use. They imply significant technological 
progress in chemical warfare.850 They are an important proliferation risk since it is 
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extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify and detect them.851 Russia is suspected 
of having developed and produced binary CW and not declared them.852  
  Finally there are suspicions that Russia has not ceased to produce CW and 
especially binary CW.853 However, in the author’s view there is hardly any support 
for this, both in terms of evidence and of justification or motivations. Russia has 
officially renounced the production of CW in 1987, and at the same time expressed 
the intention not to replace, and also to destroy its declared CW arsenal.854 In 
addition, with the prohibition of the use of CW and because of their negligible 
military value, no State has an interest in producing or retaining the capability to 
produce CW.  Finally Russia has the largest CW arsenal and has no reason to seek to 
acquire CW, especially in light of the difficulties it encounters to disarm CW. 
 Unfortunately doubts and speculation about the Russian CW arsenal have 
drawbacks. If Russia has not declared its entire CW stockpile, it is in direct violation 
of the CWC. It suggests non-compliance with its declaration obligations and also the 
concealment of CW with an unknown agenda or purpose. However, if the declared 
amount of CW corresponds to the reality, these allegations show a lack of confidence 
both between CWC member states and in the ability of the OPCW to detect violators 
of the convention.855  
 It is the author’s belief that the contradictory estimates about the Russian CW 
arsenal call for caution, and that suspicion about the former SU chemical capability 
must be considered in light of other factors. 
 Russia has inherited the Soviet culture of secrecy in military, and especially 
CW matters.856 In light of its traditional reluctance to share information on its 
weapons capabilities, little if any information on military matters is disclosed and 
such suspicions are likely.  
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  There was very little knowledge about earlier Russian CW capabilities unless 
information was submitted voluntarily (mostly in the context of bilateral talks).857 For 
example, during the CWC negotiations Russia’s firm position opposed intrusive 
international inspections and declaration of its CW capabilities.858 Other CW 
possessors had guessed that the Soviet CW capability was superior to their own.859  
 It is also likely no definite estimate of the Russian CW arsenal can be done 
and that if it were it would not be admitted.860 Divergences and doubts are likely to 
occur between any State’s declaration and other States’ assumptions about its CW 
capability. Furthermore there is no guarantee that information disclosed on the 
Russian CW arsenal is reliable and complete, hence the lingering doubts about the 
truthfulness of its declarations.861 However, a comment can be made about the fact 
that such secrecy is not specific to Russia or to CW. Few CW possessors are open 
regarding their CW capability.862 For example, the exact number of CW possessors 
remains uncertain.863  
 The example of Russia also highlights a general verification issue, namely the 
belief that a perfect or foolproof verification system is unlikely,864 and that the CWC 
declaration regime has loopholes.865  Although declarations are a vital part of the 
verification regime,866 a level of uncertainty must be accepted. In the author’s view 
remaining doubts should not undermine the importance of declarations, but their 
accuracy may be tempered. An evidently inaccurate or incomplete declaration of CW 
possessors’ capabilities should not be acceptable, yet it is difficult to say if it is a 
substantial violation of the CWC or not. It would depend on how much has been 
dissimulated, for what purpose and with what consequence. For example, it is 
possible that Russia itself was not aware of the extent of its CW capabilities. The 
                                                 
857 Julian Perry Robinson, ‘Chemical Warfare Capabilities of the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organizations: an Overview from Open Sources’ in SIPRI (ed) Chemical Weapons: Destruction and 
Conversion (1980) 9, 10, 28-30.  
858 Trapp, ‘Geneva Negotiations on Chemical Weapons’ in SIPRI Findings, n 131, 345. 
859 Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical Warfare Capabilities’ in SIPRI Findings, n 846, 39-40. 
860 Ooms, n 44, 123, 125. 
861 Feshbach, n 832, 4, 7 and Ooms, n 44, 123, 124. 
862 Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical and Biological Warfare’ in SIPRI Findings, n 2, 185. 
863 Ibid.   
864 Trapp, ‘Geneva Negotiations on Chemical Weapons’ in SIPRI Findings, n 131, 350. 
865 Krutzsch and Trapp, n 332. 
866 Myrdal, n 46. 
  
143 
143 
dismay and surprise expressed by Gorbatchev over the extent of the Russian CW 
arsenal concurs with this.867  
 In turn the example of Russia points to the issue of the ability to detect and 
respond to incomplete declarations, and casts shadows on the capacity of the OPCW 
to enforce CWC obligations. What can the OPCW do if a false declaration has been 
made? It may request clarifications, but in the author’s opinion the most obvious 
answer lies with the mechanism of challenge inspection.868 This mechanism should be 
used in case of suspicions about a state’s CW capability, but also in cases of suspected 
non-compliance with any CWC obligations.869 In the author’s opinion without such 
clarification, doubts about the full extent of CW capabilities may weaken the benefits 
of disarmament. However, this issue is not specific to CW, which may actually 
benefit from more openness and cooperation than any other WMD.870 Today Russia is 
left with a significant chemical legacy the extent and contents of which are not fully 
known. Such a large CW capability implies a great disarmament task ahead; it also 
remains a threat in many respects.  
B. The threats related to the Russian chemical weapons arsenal 
The Soviet chemical legacy is a worrying national and international security issue 
because of the characteristics of the Russian CW arsenal and because of other aspects 
of the chemical warfare legacy, namely the human legacy. The threats related to the 
Russian CW arsenal both complicate the disarmament of CW and at the same time 
stress the necessity and urgency of achieving it. 
1. The characteristics of the arsenal: unsafe storage and unsecured 
stockpiles 
The condition and characteristics of the Russian CW arsenal cause concern. It has 
suffered from the obsolescence and neglect of many post-soviet era structures. CW 
storage facilities (CWSF) are old, mostly located in remote areas of the Russian 
territory and largely uncared for.871 The quality of the storage itself is poor.  
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 Unsafe storage is dangerous because of leaking munitions. These create an 
environmental and health hazard to the local population (risk of pollution and 
contamination).872 They increase the difficulties of CW handling, destruction and 
eventual transportation.873 They are also a supplementary hazard for the workers 
involved in disarmament operations.  
 The CWC allows CW possessors to move munitions or make modifications at 
CWSF for the purpose of safe storage.874 It is not known whether Russia has done 
such maintenance but it appears unlikely. 
 Another characteristic of the Russian CW arsenal is its unsecured stockpiles. 
Security at the storage sites is lacking (in the buildings and in the surrounding 
perimeter) with insufficient surveillance.875 Finally the composition of the Russia CW 
arsenal (type of munitions and agents), even though it is not threatening in itself, 
greatly complicates the disarmament process. 876 
2. The chemical weapons proliferation threat 
Unsecured CW stockpiles are the cause of the main concern regarding the Russian 
CW arsenal.877 Russian CW are particularly vulnerable to theft or diversion and in 
that regard constitute a global proliferation issue.878 Unsecured CW storage means 
that agents and munitions are easily obtainable by whoever intends to threaten and, or, 
use them.  
 The current preoccupation is acquisition of CW by terrorists or States of 
concern.879  It is corroborated with the belief that CW are a choice weapon for 
terrorists, and with the fact that they are more easily stolen than produced.880 These 
concerns create an urgent need to remove these threats by destroying CW. In the 
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author’s view these threats should be seen as an incentive to pursue the disarmament 
of CW. 
3. The responses to the chemical weapons proliferation threat  
The proliferation of unsecured Russian CW is seen under different lights and different 
responses are envisaged; disarmament is only one of the responses but it is one of the 
choice solutions. 
 The U.S perception of the Russian CW threat depends on its national security 
interests.881 It considers small-size, light nerve agent munitions to be the type of 
weapon most vulnerable to proliferation and to terrorist use, and therefore the most 
important threat to its security.882 This opinion is shared by other states.883  
 The Russian perception of the CW threat varies according to the central 
government and the regions and local communities. From the government’s point of 
view, Russian CW must not be allowed to affect national security interests.884 They 
must not be available to groups or factions threatening Russian security. Furthermore 
CW themselves must not threaten the safety of the Russian population and 
environment. This latter preoccupation is shared by the regions and the local 
population potentially affected by the proximity of CW; it directly influences the 
disarmament of CW.885 
 According to the perception of the threat different responses are envisaged. 
The U.S response to the CW threat focuses on non-proliferation and disarmament. It 
results in financial and technical assistance to Russia through threat reduction or non-
proliferation programs. The best part of the assistance is directed at not letting 
Russian CW fall into wrong hands. Therefore the U.S favours securing CW stockpiles 
and storage sites, a strategy meant to address ‘external threats’.886 Out of five CWSF 
storing nerve agents, the two housing small munitions have been the object of U.S 
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assistance, 887 and of other states’.888 A reassessment of the US assistance in 2003 
revealed that efforts are limited to securing small munitions and need not extend to 
other nerve agent storage sites. 889 The justification is that heavy munitions and CW 
agents stored in bulk are unlikely to be stolen or diverted and do not pose a threat 
justifying securing efforts.890 
 The CW threat is also remedied with assistance in the construction of a CWDF 
at Shchuch’ye to destroy Russia’s nerve agent stockpile. This both meets U.S security 
interests and corresponds to the CWC disarmament obligations. It also agrees with 
Russian’s perception of the threat and with its spending priorities.  
 The U.S approach of securing CW stockpiles instead of favouring the 
completion of the CWDF is justified given the pace and difficulties of Russian CW 
disarmament.891 Also, because most Russian nerve agents are unsecured and 
vulnerable, securing them until disarmament is completed is a sensible effort.892 
Securing CW is an immediate, although partial, solution to the CW proliferation 
threat and addresses the US’ own security concerns. Russia consents with U.S efforts 
at securing CW yet they do not correspond to Russian disarmament objectives.893 
 Russia has a different perception of the threat posed by its stored CW. While it 
shares most of the U.S proliferation concerns,894 the two countries differ on the means 
to ensure security from that threat. The Russian government favours the destruction of 
CW to remedy the CW threat. It maintains that in the long run, its security from CW 
is ensured by their destruction.895 This approach also corresponds to the objectives of 
CW disarmament; only definitive, irreversible and complete destruction of CW 
effectively deals with the CW threat.  
 The matter of securing storage or destructing CW raises the question of how 
best to ensure security from the CW threat and about the role of disarmament in that 
matter. In Russia securing CW stockpiles as an alternative to disarming them is 
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considered. It raises the difficult choice of whether efforts to secure CW stockpiles 
should be pursued instead or perhaps to the detriment of destroying stockpiles.  
 Securing stockpiles is a quick and effective way to deal with the CW threat; it 
curbs and prevents proliferation and to a certain extent reduces this threat. 
Unfortunately it is not a permanent solution and does not fully guarantee security 
from the threat of theft, diversion and misuse of CW.896 Furthermore it fails to deal 
with the threats related to on-site storage.  
 A drawback of focusing on securing CW is that it becomes a permanent 
solution. If secured CW are deemed sufficient to ensure safety, CW destruction may 
be slowed, postponed indefinitely and never take place. Yet secure CW stockpiles 
only partly resolve the immediate threat but not the global, long-term security issues. 
In that respect efforts to secure CW stockpiles, unless corroborated with disarmament 
efforts, contradict and challenge the basic consensus of CW disarmament according to 
which there is no safety from CW as long as they exist. Finally since the CWC 
defines disarmament as an irreversible process, securing CW for an indefinite time 
instead of disarming them appears contrary to the aims of the CW disarmament 
regime; it would undermine the authority of the CWC.  
 In the author’s view in Russia efforts must stay focused on disarmament. It 
offers a permanent, definitive and credible solution to the CW threat and corresponds 
to the implementation of and compliance with disarmament obligations under the 
CWC. Ultimately, if CW are disarmed, it is not necessary to invest in securing CW.  
 Yet a drawback of disarmament without securing stockpiles is that unsecured 
CW stockpiles remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. In that respect disarmament 
may be seen as maintaining or increasing the risk of CW proliferation.  Although 
disarmament ends the CW threat, it is a lengthy and costly undertaking, especially in 
the case of Russia. 
 From an international security perspective these issues underline the overlap 
between disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. In theory these efforts do not 
exclude or cancel one another, on the contrary they are complementary and seek 
similar security goals. However, there are financial and political factors involved. The 
debate between securing CW stockpiles over favouring disarmament implies a choice 
between the two types of measures, since both are costly and time-consuming. As the 
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debate shows, these efforts compete in terms of financial and political support.897 
Even though a choice between securing or disarming stockpiles has not been stated in 
such terms so far by the US, this question should not be ignored, it. With the 
increasing financial difficulties and delays of CW disarmament such a choice is 
probable. 
 Regardless of the different approaches to the Russian CW threat, the 
destruction obligation under the CWC remains unchanged and Russia must proceed 
with its disarmament task. The CWC allows CW possessors to secure their stockpiles 
yet obliges the destruction of CW. Therefore it appears that measures securing CW 
storage are intended as a temporary and not a permanent solution to the CW threat. It 
is the author’s belief that the disarmament of CW should not be doubted or questioned 
as the primary endeavour of the CWC and as the only solution to the CW threat.  
4. The environmental and public health threats from chemical weapons.  
Another aspect of the CW threat relates to human health and environmental concerns 
caused by the proximity of CW. Although this is a localized threat and not a global 
security preoccupation, it cannot be ignored and has an impact on CW disarmament 
efforts. Ecologist Murray Feshbach qualifies the health and environmental legacy 
caused by hazardous materials near populations as an ecological disaster and believes 
that it affects the long-term development of Russia.898 Although the ecological aspects 
of CW in Russia are beyond the scope of this study, this threat affects the population 
living near CWSF, planned CWDF and on the CW transit routes.899  
Unfortunately the environmental and health aspects of the threat are uncertain. 
There is no exact knowledge about the long-term consequences of CW destruction, 
and environmentally safe methods are hard to find.900 It is possible that disarmament 
may cause more harm to the environment and population than CW storage does. Yet 
the proximity of CWSF and the dangers of CW storage are also a concern.901  
Because of this threat in Russia the public is afraid that the disarmament of 
CW is as harmful as their prolonged but undisturbed storage. However, this can partly 
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be attributed to a lack of knowledge or of information on the environmental and 
health aspects of CW.902 This uncertainty is reflected in the indecision of the Russian 
population on issues such as transportation and destruction.903 It is also reflected in 
the suggestion to postpone CW destruction until a suitable method is found.904 The 
population feels equally threatened by the proximity of CWSF and by CW destruction 
and transportation. In other words, all choices are poor and the least harmful solution 
is preferred.  
5. The disarmament task relating to defectively destroyed chemical 
weapons in Russia  
The legacy of defectively destroyed CW in Russia is another aspect of the CW threat; 
it relates directly to the environmental and health threat. Sea-dumped and buried CW 
result in environmental and human health hazards. 
Like other CW possessors, the former SU has used early destruction methods 
abundantly to dispose of old CW, especially following World War II. The former SU 
disposed of CW in the North, Barents, Baltic and Kara seas and buried CW in its 
territory.905 Sea-dumping and burial were the main methods and left a significant 
legacy.906  
Firstly, there is no precise information on how much CW were produced and 
disposed of and a precise account appears impossible. 907 It is estimated that Russia 
disposed of hundreds of thousands of tons of CW by dumping and burial, its own and 
that of other states, namely CW captured from or discarded by Germany.908 
Furthermore other states have dumped CW in Russian seas, and Russia buried CW in 
other states’ territories.909  
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Secondly, defectively destroyed CW are both hazardous and spoil resources, 
resulting in a public health disaster with generations of sick people and genetic 
diseases, long-term pollution with unknown effects, and numerous unsafe, 
contaminated areas unlikely to be developed.910 These chemicals are a threat to the 
environment and to people’s health.911 However, defectively destroyed CW are only 
one among many causes for what has been called by Powell the ‘ecocide’ in 
Russia.912 Nuclear waste, reckless dumping of industrial chemicals are other 
causes.913 It can be presumed by extension, that unsafe CW storage creates similar 
hazards.  
This legacy creates difficulties for the CW disarmament task as it requires a 
significant recovery and disarmament effort as well as adequate destruction methods. 
Unfortunately, to the author’s knowledge, hardly any information is provided on the 
disarmament of defectively destroyed CW in Russia.  
6. The human legacy from the former Soviet Union 
Another aspect of the CW threat comes from the ‘human’ legacy inherited 
from the SU, with thousands of former scientists with the knowledge and expertise of 
WMD.914 Like CW, the inherited and often idle human expertise is also subject to 
diversion; it can be ‘bought’ by states or organizations.915 Acquisition of chemical 
warfare knowledge through this human legacy is mostly a proliferation matter. The 
threat from former CW scientists indirectly relates to disarmament since it 
corresponds to the ability to produce CW, not the CW themselves. 
This threat cannot be remedied with international arms control and 
disarmament measures. It is mostly dealt with through international threat reduction 
and non-proliferation programmes providing financial assistance.916 These 
programmes employ scientists for peaceful, civilian research projects.917 However, in 
the author’s opinion, although such measures complete and concur with disarmament 
efforts they tax funding which could be spent on CW destruction. Finally, as the Iraqi 
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experience with CW disarmament shows, scientific expertise with chemical warfare 
could be diverted to benefit disarmament efforts.918 
Section 2: Russian chemical disarmament efforts 
A. Russian chemical weapons disarmament obligations  
Russia must destroy its entire CW capability (arsenal and production capability) as a 
result of its obligations under the CWC, yet its disarmament efforts began well before 
the CWC, with bilateral efforts.919 Multilateral and bilateral disarmament obligations 
are quite similar; they require the declaration of CW, a plan for their destruction and 
the obligation of environmental protection and human safety. Bilateral disarmament 
efforts also include verification and deadlines.  
1. The bilateral chemical weapons disarmament regime  
The elimination of former Soviet CW was pursued on multiple levels;920 bilateral 
negotiations between the US and the SU were undertaken in parallel with the CWC 
negotiations at the CD.921 Russia succeeded the former SU in bilateral relations but 
unfortunately these did not result in legally-binding obligations. Yet the progress 
made in the bilateral context, especially in the areas of inspection and destruction 
technologies has influenced the CWC and helped Russian CW disarmament. It is 
worth examining these bilateral efforts as they continue to contribute to the 
disarmament of CW in Russia.  
  The main bilateral instruments on CW are the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum 
of Understanding (M.O.U) and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.922 The 
M.O.U intends to build confidence between the two States and contribute to the 
conclusion of a multilateral CW convention.923 It has two implementation phases, and 
calls for exchanges of data and international visits at CW facilities. The 1990 Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement is a non-proliferation and disarmament instrument. Its main 
provisions are the cessation of CW production and the reduction of the US and SU’s 
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CW stockpiles to 5000 tons, using an irreversible destruction process. The time-frame 
for destruction is 10 years, with intermediate deadlines. 924  
  The M.O.U and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement are corroborated with 
implementing agreements and annexes.925 Other, related instruments on CW 
prohibition and disarmament impose specific implementation measures.926 Some of 
these instruments provide for technical cooperation between the two countries, in 
particular regarding destruction technologies.927  
  The outcome of bilateral efforts is both positive and disappointing at the same 
time. In some areas, progress made in the bilateral context has been significant and 
useful for CW disarmament, and has helped the conclusion of the CWC. The Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement largely influenced the CWC. Important progress was made in 
technical matters, especially destruction technologies and verification. Intrusive 
inspections, data exchange and reciprocal visits between the US and SU heavily 
influenced the CWC’s verification regime.928 Politically, bilateral efforts were 
important because they reflected the will of the main two CW possessors to disarm 
CW. Progress at the multilateral level was possible because issues were unlocked 
bilaterally. Bilateral efforts were also a political input to multilateral negotiations; for 
example, the main two possessors reduced the deterrent interest of CW before the 
conclusion of the CWC was made possible.929 Along with the support for a global 
CW ban, this built confidence in a global convention.  In that respect bilateral efforts 
directly contributed to the current CW disarmament regime. 
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  CWC obligations are largely inspired by and similar to that of bilateral 
instruments. In spite of the debate at the CD about the benefits or losses from bilateral 
efforts many CWC obligations would not have been reached without the gains from 
bilateral work. Overall, bilateral efforts contributed to CW disarmament by giving the 
US and SU a head-start in technical matters related to CW disarmament and by 
resolving politically sensitive issues. However, bilateral instruments stopped short of 
being a success. If success is based on the creation of a legal norm then bilateral 
efforts failed since the Bilateral Destruction Agreement was not ratified by either state 
party in spite of a simplified ratification procedure,930 and therefore is not legally 
binding. From a result-based perspective, although bilateral efforts contributed to the 
current CW disarmament regime, they did not result in encouraging CW disarmament 
results.  
2. The bilateral-multilateral relationship 
With the CWC in force, bilateral instruments have no impact on the disarmament 
process. The CWC has replaced bilateral commitments.931 However, the lengthy and 
delayed ratification of the CWC highlights the importance of bilateral efforts. It 
suggests that bilateral instruments can be an alternative to a multilateral instrument, 
should the ‘Geneva Process’ fail. It raises the question of whether a bilateral 
agreement could replace a global regime and be sufficient to deal with the CW threat? 
  Since the CWC is in force, this suggestion is theoretical and holds little 
immediate interest for the CW disarmament regime. Yet because the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement is between the two largest CW possessors, it also prompts the 
question of its impact for the disarmament of CW, had the CWC not entered into 
force? For example, in light of the Russian difficulties in CW disarmament, a 
provisional bilateral agreement, or provisional disarmament measures could be 
envisaged. It is the author’s belief that had the Bilateral Destruction Agreement 
entered into force before the conclusion of the CWC, the current disarmament of CW 
in Russia would not meet so many difficulties and delays. 
 The main drawback of bilateral efforts was that they were seen as a 
concurrence to multilateral efforts at the CD. They were denounced as undermining 
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multilateral work and short-cutting multilateral disarmament negotiations.932 For 
example other countries strongly opposed the bilateral proposal to maintain a 2% CW 
retaliatory capacity.933 
  There are ongoing bilateral efforts with agreements providing financial 
assistance, often under the aegis of threat reduction programs.934 Most, but not all of 
these agreements are between Russia and the US.935 Threat reduction programs are an 
important contribution to the multilateral regime through disarmament and non-
proliferation assistance. As a result, the disarmament of CW in Russia is still largely 
structured by the US-Russian bilateral relationship. 
  Russia has inherited a multi-faced CW legacy from the SU. Such a legacy is a 
difficulty for the disarmament of CW as it creates burdens and complicates the 
disarmament process. It is the author’s belief that many of these difficulties were 
either overlooked or not anticipated and in any case not dealt with by the multilateral 
CW disarmament regime. In that regard, more emphasis may be placed on the role 
and contribution of bilateral efforts. 
Section 3: The Difficulties of Russian Chemical Weapons disarmament 
The main characteristic of Russian CW disarmament is the difficulty Russia has 
meeting its disarmament goals. It has run into countless obstacles hindering the 
disarmament process. Although some were expected,936 many remain unresolved, 
even thought the CWC first two deadlines have been missed.  
The main difficulties are the lack of planning, the lack of a suitable destruction 
method and the environmental and safety requirements. These issues are interrelated 
and in turn spark other, parallel issues such as public opposition, the question of on- 
or off-site destruction and the further question of CW transportation. 
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The general difficulties Russia faces have mostly been examined above. Here I 
focus on the difficulties specific to Russian disarmament and on the aspects the author 
believes particularly difficult to overcome. 
A. The Lack of a Disarmament Plan for Russian Chemical Weapons 
Disarmament 
A first difficulty comes from the lack of disarmament planning. Russia is expected to 
adopt the necessary laws, name authorities, allocate funds and provide information 
about its intended disarmament task.937 The lack of planning reflects Russia’s lack of 
preparedness for the task of destroying its CW. 
1. Earlier, Unsuccessful and Discarded Disarmament Plans 
Earlier disarmament plans were adopted, with little success. Before the CWC was 
completed, a CWDF was secretly built at Chapaevsk, with the intention of moving all 
CW munitions there for destruction. The plan required CW transportation and the 
chosen destruction method left large quantities of waste.938 As a result of public 
opposition and environmental concerns the facility was closed and converted into a 
training centre.939 Further attempts to use it as an operational CWDF failed.940 This 
experience is considered to be a remarkable fiasco for Russian CW disarmament.  
In the context of bilateral negotiations the SU did not have a disarmament plan 
either, although a destruction method was sought.941 A program was proposed in 
1990, with various destruction options and intending to use a two-step destruction 
technology.942 Unfortunately only small quantities of CW were destroyed. It seems 
regrettable to the author that the experience gained through bilateral efforts and 
cooperation on CW destruction methods did not give Russia the much needed head-
start for the subsequent multilateral CW disarmament regime.  
                                                 
937 Federation of American Scientists, Chemical Weapons 
<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw.htm> at 31 January 2006. 
938 SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1991; Federation of American Scientists, 
Chemical Weapons <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw.htm> at 31 January 2006; Derek 
Averre and Igor Khripunov, ‘Chemical Weapons Disposal: Russia Tries Again’ (2001) 57 (5), Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 57-63. 
939 Lois R Ember, ‘The Shchuch’ye Dilemma’ (2005) 83 (45), Chemical and Engineering News, 19-24. 
940 Katsva Maria, ‘Russian Chemical Weapons: Proliferation or Destruction?’ (2002) 15 (1), Journal of 
Slavic Military Studies, 1-16. 
941 SIPRI Yearbook 1991, 98. 
942 Ibid, 99. 
  
156 
156 
The first real Russian destruction plan followed the Chapayevsk CWDF 
closure. It was largely influenced by the growing public concern about CW 
transportation and environmentally safe disarmament. A 1995 national decision, 
included in the 1995 Russian law on CW destruction,943 adopted the principle of on-
site destruction of CW at their storage sites,944 thus ruling out the transportation of 
CW. In 1996 a plan or ‘Programme’ was adopted by the Russian Duma,945 with 
objectives and priorities meeting the requirements of the law on CW destruction.946  It 
provided for the on-site destruction of CW at the seven CW storage locations.947 It 
designated the Ministry of Defence for eliminating CW, managing the relevant 
funding and informing the people affected by CW disarmament operations.948 
This plan failed on all counts, which was mainly attributed to the choice of a 
military agency to implement it.949 For example, the Ministry of Defence did not 
cooperate with and inform international donors. They became reluctant to provide 
more assistance given the opacity and lack of accountability under which it was spent 
and as a result, suspended funding.950 Nationally, not enough money was allocated to 
chemical demilitarization, and much of it was spent on securing stockpiles.951 The 
chosen destruction method chosen under the plan was met with opposition.952 
Generally, the Defence Ministry was criticized for having little expertise or interest in 
destroying CW, probably because it cared little for non-offensive military matters. It 
also failed to provide information to the population concerned by CW disarmament.  
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A new plan was adopted in 2001,in an attempt to remedy the difficulties and 
delays of the destruction schedule. It was also the opportunity to reorganize what had 
been until then a failed CW disarmament program and change Russia’s approach to 
chemdemil.  
A new civilian agency, the Russian Munitions Agency Firstly, was created and 
given the responsibility and authority over the CW disarmament program.953 
Although it did not entirely remove the military influence on decisions, this move was 
intended to remedy the mistake of choosing a military agency to head the CW 
disarmament program.954 Secondly, the 1996 resolution was amended and a new 
resolution adopted the modified destruction plan, authorizing and planning CW 
disarmament.955 The provision requiring on-site destruction was also amended.956 
The 2000 Programme differs from the 1996 Programme in many respects. The 
destruction time-frame was adjusted from 1995-2009 to 2001-2012.957 The number of 
CWDF changed from seven (corresponding to the seven CWSF) to three,958 implying 
the transportation of nerve agent CW from four CWSF to the single CWDF 
destroying nerve agents at Shchuchye, in southern Russia.959 The new plan also 
sought to cut costs while accelerating the disarmament process, with reduced 
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personnel, accommodation and infrastructure costs/expenditures to the necessary 
minimum.960  
 Under the new program the scope of CW disarmament activities was 
broadened to include the destruction or conversion of CWPF and measures to 
implement the CWC.961 Matters relating to funding, to the transfer of authority from 
the military to a civilian agency were also organized in the new plan.962  
 The new planning resulted in detailed plans for each of the three CWDF. The 
CWDF at Kambarka would destroy lewisite; it began operations in 2005.963 The 
Gornyi facility, which had its separate plan without U.S assistance, was completed 
and started operations in 2005, destroying lewisite and other blister agents.964 The 
Shchuchye CWDF was planned in two stages. The first would destroy artillery 
munitions stored at Shchuchye and Kizner; the second would destroy air-borne 
munitions from the Pochep, Maradykovskiy and Leonidovka CWSF.965 
 In retrospect it seems obvious that the planned Shchuchye CWDF facility 
cannot meet its goals. This facility illustrates the difficulties of elaborating and 
complying with a CWDF plan. The Shchuchye case is also crucial for CW 
disarmament since it is the only CWDF destroying Russian nerve agents. 
 In the framework of bilateral assistance or threat reduction programs, 
destruction plans were drawn up in cooperation with the US, focusing on the 
Shchuchye CWSF site. The construction of a pilot CWDF for Russian CW 
disarmament was envisaged; its design and construction was entirely funded by the 
USA. The negotiations on the Shchuchye facility began in 1994.966 The October 1997 
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initial joint schedule planned the start of operations by December 2004.967 
Unfortunately a series of obstacles slowed the design, postponed U.S funding and 
delayed the entire project.968 A new schedule was adopted in June 1998 with an 18-
months delay from the initial schedule.969 Additional obstacles and delays further 
postponed the beginning of destruction operations to 2008,970 and 2009,971 while 
assistance to build the facility increased to US$ 2 billion.972  
 Difficulties encountered with the Shchuchye CWDF cast doubts upon the 
feasibility of disarmament plans. The destruction of the CW stored at Shchuchye 
illustrates the delays and difficulties which can be expected. Russia’s initial 1997 plan 
was considered unrealistic by the U.S,973 yet Russia insisted on it destroying its CW 
ahead of the CWC schedule.974 As early as 1995, Russia was not expected to meet its 
CWC deadlines.975 Of the two million munitions stored at Shchuchye, 95% (or 5 600 
metric tons) is small munitions containing nerve agents (artillery rounds and rocket 
warheads) while the remaining 5% of the depot is phosgene.976 When the pilot CWDF 
is completed, the destruction capacity will be 500 metric tons a year. At that rate the 
Shchuchye munitions would be destroyed by 2017, but is full-scale CWDF is built at 
Shchuchye it could be done by the CWC extended 2012 deadline.977 Yet only 14% of 
Russia’s declared CW stockpile (and 17% of the nerve agent stockpile) would be 
destroyed by 2012. Ideally, for Russia to meet its destruction obligations under the 
CWC, additional CWDF would have to be built to increase the destruction rate. 
Unfortunately this is both time and resource-consuming, and in light of the difficulties 
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encountered by Russia, appears highly unlikely. Such a prospect clearly undermines 
the credibility of the CWC destruction obligations. 
 It can be noted that the information on disarmament plans provided by the 
Russian Munitions Agency differs slightly concerning the dates of completion and 
operation of CWDF. In addition, information from Russian officials varies greatly 
from that provided by US officials. Only information about the Gornyi CWDF, which 
was completed in 2002 according to planning, seems accurate.978 Operations for the 
destruction of Category 1 CW began in December 2002,979 at a destruction rate which 
allowed Russia to meet its first intermediate, although extended, deadline (1% of 
Category 1 CW) by April 2003.980 The destruction of lewisite at the Gornyi facility 
mostly corresponded to the plan, which provided that all CW stockpiled there would 
be destroyed by 2005, and can be considered successful.981  
 Recently the Russian CW disarmament plan was changed, unfortunately there 
is little information available on the causes or the outcome of this revision.982 
However, regardless of the adopted plan, it appears obvious that Russia cannot meet 
the final CWC destruction deadline in 2012. The best outcome for Russian CW 
disarmament would be its completion within a reasonable time frame, while meeting 
the CWC’s environmental, safety and irreversible destruction requirements. 
2. On- or Off-site Destruction and Chemical Weapons Transportation 
The question of on- or off-site destruction and the corollary question of CW 
transportation is another difficulty of Russian CW disarmament planning. On-site 
destruction at CW storage sites would require a significant effort since a CWDF must 
be built at each site. For obvious reasons, this option is abandoned in the current plan. 
 As of 2006 there is only one operational CWDF at Gornyi, one under 
construction at Shchuchye and a third planned at Kambarka.983 The Shchuchye 
                                                 
978 SIPRI Yearbook 2003, 656. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2003, ninth 
Session of the Conference of the States Parties; document C-9/5, 30 November 2004; Russian 
Munitions Agency, ‘Facilities of CW Stockpiling and Destruction (2003), 
<http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/objran2.html> at 31 January 2006.  
981 Russian Munitions Agency, Chemical Disarmament, ‘Facilities of CW Stockpiling and Destruction’ 
(2003), <http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/objran2.html> at 31 January 2006. 
982 ‘In October 2005, the Russian Government adopted a revised chemical destruction plan’ 
Foreign Affairs Canada, Chemical Weapons Destruction (2005) <http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership> at 31 January 2006.  
983 Russian Munitions Agency, ‘Facilities of CW Stockpiling and Destruction (2003), 
<http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/objran2.html> at 31 January 2006.  
  
161 
161 
facility has taken over a decade from the initial decision to the beginning of 
construction. The construction of five other CWDF in time to meet the CWC 
deadlines appears impossible, or would require a great investment from Russia 
combined with constant international assistance. 
The current planning, based on off-site destruction, raises the debate of CW 
transportation, on which the Russian population is undecided 984and the government 
unprepared.985 Transportation of CW to CWDF implies moving thousands of tons of 
CW agents and millions of munitions by rail over hundreds of miles, a transit which is 
particularly vulnerable to theft or diversion or attacks,986 and hazardous for the 
populations involved. In Russia, options including transport must be secure and call 
for a reform of the Russian transport system and infrastructure.987 In addition, the 
concerned regions need help from the central government. Finally, local laws 
prohibiting CW transit through towns must be modified to allow CW transportation. 
B. The Lack of a Suitable Destruction Method 
Russia must also find a suitable CW destruction method, which is another aspect of 
disarmament planning. The process of finding a suitable method began early but 
remains unresolved. Like other possessors, Russia consecutively considered 
incineration and underground nuclear explosions and discarded these methods for 
environmental and safety reasons.988 Caustic hydrolysis, the ‘universally used’ 
method for numerous chemical agents, was similarly discarded because the 
destruction process is not irreversible and results in lots of by-products.989 
 After much hesitation a two-step method was adopted in the former SU, which 
involved the intermittent detoxification of agents and incineration (or conversion) of 
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the by-products.990 The method was demonstrated in 1987 at Shikhany at the occasion 
of international visits.991  
 Contradictions remained regarding the two-step method. On the one hand, it 
was considered suitable by environmental and health standards but unfortunately, 
could not produce a sufficient destruction rate.992 However, it was proposed in 1999 
as the choice CW disarmament method for the new plan, but was opposed for 
environmental reasons.993 In spite of this a similar method has been adopted and is 
now used for disarmament of nerve agent CW.994 U.S assistance for the design and 
construction of the pilot CWDF at Shchuchye sought to ‘provide Russia with a proven 
technology to use at other CWDF,’995 and this method was confirmed as suitable.996 
However, confusion remains as to how and by what standard it was deemed suitable.  
 The difficulty of finding a suitable destruction or conversion method for the 
Russian arsenal remains unresolved. Although it is not specific to Russia, the poor 
condition and wide-ranging composition of its arsenal makes destruction difficult, 
because of the variety of chemical agents and especially because it includes large 
quantities of lewisite (and other, similar blister agents based on arsenic).997 Such CW 
agents require a specific method and further research efforts.998 In addition, there are 
leaking and damaged munitions, which makes their safe handling, emptying and 
transportation delicate.999  
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1. Public Health, Environmental Protection Requirements and Public 
Response to Chemical Weapons Disarmament 
Russia is obliged to find a disarmament method which meets environmental 
protection and public safety requirements.1000 The earlier part of this study shows that 
these are crucial, yet technologically and politically difficult requirements of the CW 
disarmament regime.1001 These issues are common for every CW possessor, yet in 
Russia they are further complicated by the existing environmental and health 
situation, and directly linked with public concerns with environmental and health 
protection. Such concerns are both a general society problem in Russia and a 
hindrance in the choice of a CW destruction method. 
 Russia inherited the former SU’s disastrous environmental and health legacy, 
which is largely attributed to military activities,1002 and also to early CW disposal 
activities.1003 Attention to environmental matters was mostly non-existent during the 
Soviet era.1004 With the collapse of the SU, the population’s awareness and 
preoccupation with environmental protection increased. The environmental and public 
health issues of CW disarmament first appeared in the context of bilateral efforts.1005  
  Influential environmental groups swayed public opinion and oriented 
decisions, including those related to CW disarmament.1006 As a consequence decisions 
related to CW disarmament were blocked by groups and by the population, partly 
because of their potentially harmful impact on the environment, but also out of 
mistrust for the central government’s projects.1007 However, information disseminated 
about the environmental and health effects of CW disarmament must be considered 
carefully and environmental groups are sometimes accused of misinforming the 
public to serve their own purposes.1008 
 As the Chapayevsk fiasco shows, public concern about environmental matters 
carries a lot of weight in Russia and can block the disarmament process. It has 
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blocked the adoption of the first Russian law on CW destruction.1009 It results in 
regional and local decisions and laws preventing CW destruction or transportation in 
regions where CWSF are located.1010 
 In order to avoid this difficulty the public is informed by official authorities 
about CW disarmament and how it might affect them. By providing accessible and 
reliable information, the intent is to rally support from the population and avoid 
political blocks. Poor provision of information was a failure of the 1996 disarmament 
Programme which the 2000 Programme has attempted to remedy.  
 International assistance for Russian CW disarmament also addresses 
environmental and safety questions and public information matters. A substantial part 
of the assistance is directly allocated to environmental and health studies, laboratories, 
or impact statements and part of the assistance supports efforts for informing the 
public on CW disarmament matters.1011  
 Environmental protection and safety are included in the Russian laws on CW 
disarmament,1012 and the Russian Munitions Agency is mandated with adopting the 
necessary measures to meet these obligations.1013 For example, units relaying 
information to regional centres ‘of the environmental monitoring system must be 
created in regions where CWDF are located’.1014 Measures to avoid excessive 
pollution must also be adopted, including measures in respect of pollution abatement 
systems, emission standards, controls of emissions, waste and the storage of waste.1015 
However, it has been commented that Russia simply lacked environmental laws to 
protect people’s interests and generally did not have adequate legislation on CW 
demilitarization.1016  
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 There is no full knowledge of the long-term effects of CW and CW 
disarmament on man and the environment and therefore no certain protection from it. 
There is no guarantee that permanent harm will not come out of CW disarmament. 
This explains the Russian proposal to postpone CW disarmament until sufficient 
protection can be offered, with legal guarantees and a satisfactory destruction method.  
 Environmental protection raises many questions yet the CWC provides little 
help to solve them. It is not an environmental protection instrument and has 
loopholes. The authors of the CWC were preoccupied with environmental protection 
and human safety but in the author’s view they did not consider how it would fit with 
environmental law. In Russia the fulfilment of these obligations is particularly 
difficult. To a certain extent it can be concluded that environmental and health 
concerns clash with CW disarmament. 
2. The Administrative Organization of Russia 
A final difficulty of Russian CW disarmament relates to its administrative 
organization. As a result of the decentralization following the end of the former SU 
the regions and local communities have lots of power. In spite of a move towards re-
centralization of power, the division of power between the regions and the central 
government gets in the way of successful CW disarmament. 
 Many decisions relevant to CW disarmament are adopted at the regional level 
or jointly with the federal centre and keep the central government from implementing 
its CW disarmament plans and from complying with its CWC obligations. There is 
clearly a lack of cooperation between the administrative levels. 
 Laws adopted by the regions contradict federal laws in the area of CW 
disarmament. For example, some regions have adopted laws prohibiting transit of CW 
through their territories, thereby excluding off-site disarmament and going against the 
national destruction plan.1017 Others have adopted laws prohibiting CW destruction 
altogether.1018 Some laws do not agree with national laws on CW matters, other 
directly oppose them.  
 Yet participation of the concerned regions is crucial.1019 The deliverance of 
destruction permits and environmental and construction permits depends on a working 
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relationship with the regions. The central government has attempted to remedy the 
problems by involving the regions and other actors concerned about CW disarmament 
in the process. This can be seen as a positive step and a democratic move; but it is 
really a political move intended to avoid local opposition to CW disarmament.1020  
 Cooperation between the regions and the central government was a key 
argument for the CWC’s ratification. The regions wanted investment and help with 
their infrastructure from the central government in exchange for their cooperation 
with the disarmament projects. CW disarmament is not usually welcomed by regions 
but in a context of economic drought it is seen as a development opportunity.1021 This 
should improve support for the government’s CW disarmament projects in the 
affected regions but help cannot be provided.1022 The central government has hardly 
enough funds to secure CW storage and pay its share of the disarmament costs; it 
cannot finance local development.1023 
 The Russian administrative organization complicates CW disarmament. In 
relation to CW, the regions want more political power and investment or guarantees 
for their development. The central government wants more cooperation, but the 
financial channel between them is dry. This issue is not entirely different from that 
encountered in the US between local communities and the federal government, 
although in the US it does not present such a difficulty. 
 The level of involvement of local communities and regions in disarmament 
decisions calls for a comment. Although they are affected by disarmament and must 
be involved and represented in disarmament decisions, this should not compromise 
the success of the CWC. Disarmament obligations are contracted among sovereign 
states; theoretically the CWC should not have to deal with the infra-national levels. 
Unfortunately the CWC is silent about the obligations of its signatories in respect to 
their component states. 
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C. Financing chemical weapons disarmament 
Financing CW disarmament in Russia has turned out to be a major problem and a 
decisive condition for its feasibility; Russian CW disarmament is a very costly 
undertaking.1024 There is a chronic lack of funding for the disarmament of CW. As a 
result Russian CW disarmament efforts are mostly funded with international 
assistance which is completed by Russia. 
1. Foreign financial assistance to Russian chemical weapons 
disarmament: the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 
 International assistance focuses mostly on the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) Programme, which CTR is the main and most diverse program for dealing with 
the CW threat.1025  
 CTR was initiated by two US senators Nunn and Lugar in 1991;1026 it was 
intended to reduce the threat posed by former soviet WMD.1027 The program 
authorizes the US Department of Defence (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE) and 
the State Department (State) to spend funds allocated by congress to help Russia 
secure, transport and destroy its WMD.1028 DOD has been designated as the executive 
for the programs. The objectives of CTR are to control, eliminate and secure 
WMD.1029 It primarily seeks to reduce WMD proliferation, and most funding is meant 
to curb the spread of weapons. Yet it includes disarmament efforts, among which 
assistance for CW disarmament.1030 
 CTR assistance began with former Soviet nuclear weapons and later expanded 
to other WMD. Russia is the main beneficiary since it poses the greatest threat and 
has inherited the bulk of the former SU’s WMD capabilities.1031 Other beneficiaries 
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include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and more recently, 
Albania and Libya.1032  
 The organization of the assistance is achieved through implementing 
agreements;1033 the main implementing agreement was signed on 30 July 1992.1034 It 
granted US$25 million for planning destruction and finding a destruction technology. 
A work plan on US assistance was concluded in January 1994 (mostly to cooperate in 
finding a destruction method).1035 Another was signed in April 1995, providing an 
additional US$ 30 million in Nunn-Lugar funding. This plan focused on 
environmental protection during CW destruction.1036  
 The financial assistance released through the CTR program is large. For 2003 
the estimated total funding to Russia was US$ 133.6 million for CW destruction 
assistance.1037 Russia’s ‘pilot destruction facility’ for nerve agents, Shchuch’ye, is 
entirely funded with US CTR assistance.1038 In 2002 US$35 million was allocated for 
this plant, and the funds were finally released in January 2003. Russia therefore relies 
very heavily on this assistance; the realization of CW disarmament depends on it.1039 
 The relationship between Russia and international donors financing CW 
disarmament is an unhealthy one. Firstly, Russia conditioned its ratification of the 
CWC upon the promise of international assistance to help it meet its disarmament 
obligations.1040  
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 Secondly, Russia has not always handled international funding well. The 1996 
Destruction Programme resulted in opaque spending, poor management and little 
accountability of international assistance. Donors expressed doubts and eventually 
suspended their funding.1041 Russia reacted by condemning donors for not meeting 
their obligations and public information on the matter accused international donors of 
keeping Russia from meeting its CWC commitments by holding back promised funds. 
 Thirdly Russia repeatedly fails to meet CTR conditions. There are six 
conditions for the release of CTR funds.1042 The main two conditions require that 
Russia establishes a plan for the destruction of nerve agents, and that all nerve agents 
be destroyed at the Shchuch’ye CWDF.1043 These conditions have not been met. 
Russia appears undecided between on- or off-site destruction of nerve agents yet it is 
also reluctant to transport CW because of the public opposition. Russia seems to be 
oblivious to the fact that conversion and on-site destruction violate the US-Russian 
bilateral agreement on assistance.1044  
 Another important condition requires that Russia pay its share of funding for 
CTR projects. When it fails to meet this condition, because of under-funded CW 
disarmament,1045 international assistance is suspended or the budgets cut, which in 
turn delays CW disarmament.1046 
 Because of these difficulties, CTR conditions have been waived. The U.S 
President has the authority to waive the conditions and release the CTR funds every 
year, for national security purposes.1047 It was recently proposed that CTR legislation 
should totally eliminate these conditions as they are never met.1048 The chronic 
difficulty of Russia in meeting the conditions imposed by the US Congress in the 
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umbrella agreement has threatened the existence of CTR assistance and with it the 
success of CW disarmament.1049 The extension of the umbrella agreement was 
threatened in 1999 and again in 2005. A key disagreement is the liability provision in 
the umbrella agreement, according to which Russia is responsible for any accident, 
even if the fault is American.1050 Russia refuses to cooperate and abide by conditions 
it deems unfair. Finally CTR is also encountering domestic resistance and scepticism 
in the US.1051  
 A more general difficulty relates to Russia’s attitude towards international 
assistance. It takes this assistance for granted, and has even criticized international 
donors for not meeting their financial commitments, while not keeping its end of the 
bargain.1052 Such problems can also be attributed to the poor presentation of CTR (and 
similar bilateral programs) to the Russian public, and to the lack of interest in 
them.1053 
 Finally, minor difficulties affect threat reduction programs; for example, the 
reluctance from Russia to provide access to sites which must be secured or 
monitored.1054 However, access to CW is not problematic and benefits from more 
cooperation from Russia, in comparison to other WMD.1055 
 The outcome of the CTR assistance for CW disarmament in Russia is 
mitigated and not all financial aspects of Russian CW disarmament are negative. 
Lessons have been learned from previous CTR assistance, and there has been progress 
in Russian CW disarmament funding. For example, the 2005 budget for CW 
disarmament was more than twice the 2004 budget.1056 In spite of difficulties, CTR 
assistance tends to increase and become more diverse.1057 Yet financial assistance is 
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complicated by economic and political factors. The economic situation in Russia 
greatly compromises CW disarmament. The political situation between the US and 
Russia is also unfavourable for international assistance and transparency between the 
two countries. Russia’s accusation that the US is attempting to disarm it, is one 
example of the perception of US involvement in Russian defence matters.1058 
Financial difficulties affect all CW possessors in their disarmament task but in the 
author’s view, in Russia it is probably the greatest obstacle to the achievement of CW 
disarmament.  
2. Other Sources of International Financial Assistance for the 
Disarmament of Russian Chemical Weapons 
There are other channels for international assistance, and although the US is by far the 
largest it is not the only donor.1059 Germany is ‘second largest donor’ and focuses 
primarily on CW destruction.1060 Other donors include the EU, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Italy, Britain, Netherlands, Canada, and Switzerland.1061 They provide 
assistance through separate bilateral agreements or programs, usually focused on 
single CW disarmament-related projects. Assistance may also be channelled through 
multilateral projects such as the G8 Global Partnership Program, another threat 
reduction program similar to CTR.1062 
 Not all financial assistance for CW is directed at CW disarmament. Threat 
reduction programs also focus on securing stockpiles and on reducing the chances of 
proliferation by employing or funding projects for former soviet WMD scientists.1063 
The ‘human’ legacy of the former SU is also a potential proliferation risk and a threat; 
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it is the object of numerous threat reduction programs.1064 The solution to that threat is 
the employment of the scientists and their redirection to peaceful research projects or 
occupations.1065 The main project in that area is the International Science and 
Technology Centre (ISTC), an international organization which redirects the expertise 
of former Soviet weapons scientists into peaceful scientific projects.1066  
 Such projects also meet difficulties, for example when the foreign assistance is 
taxed and not easily reimbursed.1067 Like assistance for CW destruction, it is difficult 
to estimate how much funding is received, how it is spent and if it serves the purpose 
for which it was allocated.1068 
 There is a great deal of uncertainty about the results of international 
assistance. It is difficult to assess how it contributes to Russian CW disarmament and 
predict the extent to which it will bring Russia closer to the realization of its CWC 
obligations, without straying too far from the CWC deadlines. Any influx of money is 
positive, but it does not guarantee that the CWC obligations will be met in time.  
 CTR and similar programs greatly contribute to Russian CW disarmament; 
without this help Russia would struggle even more. However, there may be a 
discrepancy between the changing international security environment and the 
commitments for assistance. More precisely, as the last part of this study will show, 
there are now doubts about the contribution of CW disarmament to international 
security. 
Conclusion 
Russia ratified the CWC with great difficulty and compliance with the CWC’s 
disarmament obligations was expected to be problematic. Because of the difficulties 
plaguing the disarmament of CW in Russia it was suggested that it should postpone its 
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ratification and wait until it had a satisfactory destruction method that would enable it 
to meet its obligations before committing to the CWC.1069 Russia eventually ratified 
upon the promise of foreign assistance to help it meet its disarmament obligations.1070  
 In spite of this condition the participation of Russia in the CWC was also 
questioned again after ratification. When it became obvious Russia could not meet its 
deadlines, it suggested that it would be wiser for Russia to follow its own destruction 
schedule.1071  
 Along with the USA, Russia was the main target for a CW ban. As the largest 
CW possessors these two countries have a special responsibility in the area of 
chemical disarmament.1072 Therefore the participation of Russia in the CWC is crucial 
and strengthens the CW disarmament regime. The drawback of this is that the 
difficulties of Russia greatly undermine the CW disarmament regime.  
 This has serious implications for the CW disarmament regime. On the one 
hand the withdrawal of Russia from the CWC may be considered.1073 This could be 
seen as a failure to enforce CWC provisions. On the other, if Russia cannot meet its 
disarmament obligations, a withdrawal may be better than a violation of the CWC.  
 The difficulties encountered by Russia in CW disarmament, in comparison 
with the US’s own delays and difficulties, suggest that the CWC conditions and 
deadlines are unrealistic. It seems obvious that the CWC disarmament obligations, 
especially the deadlines, are not adapted to the specific Russian situation and will not 
be met. A question yet unanswered in the CWC relates to the consequences and 
subsequent response should Russia fail to disarm or withdraw from the CWC. 
 Russia is clearly the most challenging of the CW possessors for the CWC 
disarmament regime. It threatens its success and points to grave flaws in the regime. 
The CWC provides little answers for the difficulties of the disarmament of Russian 
CW. Finally, it questions the role of the OPCW in disarmament.  
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Chapter 5: The Chemical Weapons Disarmament Regime in the Current 
International Security Environment 
 Two trends can be identified which undermine the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) and indirectly affect the effective disarmament of Chemical 
Weapons (CW). Firstly the CWC evolves in a changing security environment 
characterized by new threats, namely Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
terrorism, WMD proliferation and state sponsorship of terrorism. Secondly, as a result 
of these threats the role of traditional, multilateral arms control instruments such as 
the CWC in this changing environment is questioned. 
 The United States is at the front of this tendency. It challenges arms control 
instruments and favours alternative tools to fend off the new threat. It has begun 
reducing the role of traditional arms control instruments like the CWC in its arms 
control policy.  
 The overall debate therefore opposes two views: the United States’ and that of 
the supporters of a strong role for the CWC in international security. The analysis of 
both the United States’ and of the supporters of arms control instruments’ views seeks 
to clarify the role of arms control instruments, and especially the CWC’s. Thus this 
part of this study examines the relationship between the changing security 
environment and the CW disarmament process. The aim of this study is to provide a 
critical analysis of how this tendency affects CW disarmament and to what extent. It 
does not attempt to assess the new threat but focuses on the tendency to question arms 
control instruments and its implications and consequences for CW disarmament. 
 This tendency is not a light matter; it questions the substance of arms control 
instruments, their role in international security and the existence of the institutions 
designed to enforce them. The United States’ criticism of arms control instruments 
rightly highlights some weaknesses of the CW disarmament regime, but it also has 
serious consequences for the authority of such instruments and implications for the 
law of arms control. 
 Firstly the new threat which characterizes the changing security environment 
is identified, as well as the special situation of CW in this new environment. 
The second part of this study focuses on the consequences and implications of this 
tendency, and on the questions it raises for the success of CW disarmament.  
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The outcome of this debate, examined in the third part of this study, is that the 
consensus that arms control, and especially disarmament, is the only way to ensure 
international security is challenged. The fourth part of this study concludes this 
analysis by highlighting the CWC’s role in the current security environment and by 
proposing solution to strengthen this role.  
Section 1: The challenge of the current international security 
environment for the chemical weapons disarmament regime 
A. The Changing International Security Environment 
A series of events, specifically the September 11, 2001 attacks, have resulted in a 
change of perception of the threats to international security and ensuing security 
priorities have shifted from former to new threat. It is looked into from the United 
States’ perspective, whose arms control policy, as a superpower, influences arms 
control instruments. The United States identifies three trends affecting both its 
national and international security: 
 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, three scenarios pose significant threats to the 
security of the United States: (1) individual terrorists or terrorist groups; (2) nations 
harbouring or assisting terrorists; and (3) nations that produce weapons of mass 
destruction1074 
 
As a result the United States is preoccupied with three international security issues, or 
a threefold threat, (1) terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, (2) proliferation of WMD 
by states and (3) states suspected of WMD proliferation which also sponsor 
terrorism.1075 CW being a WMD they are therefore a key component of the new 
threat.  
 These three scenarios are intertwined, and various authors have established a 
link between WMD proliferation and terrorism.1076 The United States and other 
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western states are preoccupied with the threat of WMD acquisition and use by 
terrorists.1077 International organizations and institutions agree that this is a threat. For 
example, WMD proliferation is considered a threat to international peace and security 
by the United Nations Security Council.1078 Similarly, the United Nations Advisory 
Board on Disarmament Matters1079 and the United Nations High-Level Panel on 
Threat, Challenges and Change highlight the growing threat of WMD proliferation 
and terrorism.1080 These institutions are mandated with identifying and proposing 
solutions to the current threats affecting international security.1081 They now express 
and relay a general concern which agrees to a certain extent with that of the United 
States. The OPCW also acknowledges and stresses the reality and feasibility of the 
WMD threat, and especially of CW terrorist attacks.1082  
 Another characteristic of the new international security environment is the 
emergence and influence of new, non-state actors on the international scene, ‘in the 
form of transnational terrorist and criminal organizations.’1083 These new actors ‘place 
an increasingly important role in areas where weapons are easily obtainable and 
internal conflicts exist,’ thus heightening the threats relating to WMD.1084 Non-states 
actors disturb the international security environment and traditional arms control 
instruments. The most preoccupying type of non-state actors is the transnational 
terrorist group.1085  
 Traditionally only states are actors in the international security environment; 
they are the only subjects of international law, hence ‘arms control and disarmament 
addresses capacities and capabilities of states’,1086 and ‘parties to international 
regulations are states’.1087 In addition, historically, disarmament was intended as the 
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solution against CW use by states in inter-state conflicts. Non-state actors on the other 
hand, are not subjects of international law and are therefore, theoretically, not bound 
by it.1088 As a result arms control instruments like the CWC cannot address the most 
preoccupying actors in the current international security environment.   
B. Chemical Weapons in the Changing International Security 
Environment 
Traditionally CW are not distinguished from other WMD; they are usually considered 
together. This tendency is increasingly questioned by experts and academics. Previous 
analyses where WMD are regrouped under a single category are thought to explain 
the many disagreements over the assessment of the threat of WMD acquisition and 
use by non-state actors.1089 Categorization of WMD has resulted in flawed 
assessments and therefore a flawed perception of the threat. It is therefore important 
to separate CW from other WMD. In light of their specificities and differences WMD 
can be compared but they should not be assimilated. In the current security context, 
authors consider each WMD separately and conduct distinct threat assessments.1090  
In that regard it appears that CW stand out from other WMD in many respects; 
they both have a unique place in the law of arms control and pose a threat distinct 
from other WMD.1091  
From an international legal perspective, CW differ from other WMD since 
they are subject to the first comprehensive, verifiable and legally-binding 
disarmament regime. They also occupy a particular position in the new security 
environment as a specific threat. Experts usually consider CW to be a choice weapon 
for terrorists, and to be easy to obtain and/or, proliferate.1092 This fact is based both on 
experience and on the characteristics of CW.  
Experience of terrorist attacks shows that CW were the weapon most often 
used by terrorists.1093 As one author notes, it was not surprising that the first terrorist 
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attack was a chemical rather than a nuclear or biological attack.1094 The main terrorist 
incident involving CW is the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway by the 
apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo, which resulted in a dozen death and thousands of 
wounded.1095 Other terrorist attacks or attempts clearly show the preference for 
chemical and explosive devices,1096 for example in the cases of the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995 and the Bali and Istanbul bombings.1097  
CW are also considered a likely terrorist weapon because they are easy to 
obtain from vulnerable CW stockpiles and it is said that they can be produced with 
relative ease.1098 Acquisition of CW is possible from stockpiles, which are feared to 
be both ‘targets and loot for terrorists.’1099 When it comes to acquisition by 
production, some authors argue that radiological weapons are easier to use and that 
biological weapons are easier to produce than CW. However, most often CW are 
believed to be the likeliest terrorist weapon because they are easier to produce than 
any other WMD.1100 This is explained by the access to chemical warfare materials and 
technology, because of the dual-use of chemical warfare materials and because of the 
currency of such materials.1101  
In light of the special link that is claimed between terrorism and CW, some 
authors believe that not enough attention is given to CW.1102 Although CW are 
deemed attractive to terrorists, most of the attention is focused on nuclear 
terrorism.1103 This can be criticized since there is a consensus that nuclear weapons 
are much harder to obtain or produce than chemical weapons.1104 CW occupy a 
distinct place in the current international security environment, which calls for an 
attempt to determine the scope of the new threat in relation to CW. 
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C. The Scope of the New Threat in Relation to Chemical Weapons 
An OPCW expert points to the fact that terrorists do not need CW to conduct 
chemical attacks and that CW proliferation is not limited to movements of CW.1105 
The use of toxic chemicals on unprotected civilians causes similar damage to the use 
of a CW, and the transfer of toxic chemicals is equivalent to chemical 
proliferation.1106 Chemicals do not need to be weaponized, the release of toxic 
chemicals is sufficient to carry out an attack.1107 It implies that the scope of the 
proliferation and terrorist threat extends further than CW only and includes all toxic 
chemicals and their precursors. Because of the dual-use nature of the materials 
required for chemical warfare, the CW threat is widespread. The disarmament of CW 
therefore plays an important role in preventing the diversion and use of CW, yet 
disarmament is powerless concerning the misuse of non-scheduled chemicals.  
 Most CW precursors have such dual-use and are widely used in several 
chemical industries.1108 As a result efforts against the CW threat must cover a wide 
range of activities and facilities, most of which are peaceful and authorized by the 
CWC.1109  
 The extent of activities which must be controlled makes the enforcement of 
the chemical non-proliferation regime very difficult.1110 Attention is therefore called, 
for example, by the United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, to the 
need to safeguard facilities handling dual-use materials.1111 Another, related drawback 
of the dual-use of chemicals is that sometimes the distinction between peaceful, 
authorized activities and prohibited military activities is difficult.1112 Since many 
chemical activities can be related to the threat of chemical warfare, the scope of the 
CW threat is far-reaching and extends well beyond existing CW. 
 The disarmament of CW is one of many measures against the threat; it must be 
corroborated with CWC non-proliferation efforts. The focus of this study is limited to 
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existing CW stockpiles, which are dealt through disarmament efforts. The full scope 
of the CW threat: proliferation and acquisition of CW by other means than acquisition 
from existing stockpiles, is not examined. 
 However, this distinction is relevant in this study and non-proliferation 
measures are a major part of the CWC. The non-proliferation regime can be 
summarized briefly. It includes the regulation of transfers in chemicals, exports and 
import controls and the declaration, verification and monitoring of peaceful chemical 
activities authorized under the CWC.1113  
D. The Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Disarmament Regime in 
Light of the Current International Security Environment 
Two issues arise from the current security environment and from the specific place 
CW occupy in it. The first is the general tendency, led mostly by the United States, to 
question and criticize the role of traditional arms control instruments like the CWC. It 
is expressed in the United States’ new arms control policy, in which traditional arms 
control instruments have a reduced role. The second issue comes from the fact that the 
United States favours alternative arms control instruments over traditional instruments 
like the CWC to ensure security against the new threat.  
1. The Tendency to Criticize and Question Arms Control Instruments. 
The role of arms control instruments, namely multilateral disarmament and non-
proliferation treaties is challenged and diminished by the United States. It has become 
‘sceptical of traditional Cold War concepts and of arms control’, against the new 
threat.1114 As Newman notices, ‘arms control and disarmament traditionally 
understood- is increasingly seen by the US as ponderous at best and counter-
productive at worst’.1115 The United States’ position is that before the new threat, such 
instruments are powerless and have only a limited role. 
 The tendency to question arms control instruments ranges from scepticism to 
open criticism. For example, the United States suggests that these instruments should 
‘face today’s threats, not yesterday’s’.1116 In another example, Newman clearly 
identifies this tendency concerning the WMD proliferation threat: ‘the Bush 
                                                 
1113 Cipolat, n 35, 393-443 
1114 Newman , n 1076, 69. 
1115 Ibid, 59.  
1116 Mark A Groombridge, ‘US Views on Arms Control’ (Occasional Paper # 6, Department for 
Disarmament Affairs, 2002), 23.  
  
181 
181 
administration … appreciates the danger of WMD proliferation but has little faith in 
the ability of multilateral non-proliferation regimes to halt further spread’.1117 Arms 
control instruments are still deemed important but not sufficient and inapt at guarantee 
national and international security.1118 Finally, referring to the Geneva Process, 
Moodie highlights that ‘the old ways and old tools have not worked-at least not very 
well-in recent times’, which justifies a new approach to arms control.1119 
 The United States’ tendency to question arms control instruments is expressed 
in various instances. For example, it is expressed in the denunciation of traditional 
arms control instruments such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty or the proposed 
protocol to strengthen the BWC.1120 This was made obvious in the 2001 statement of 
then United States Secretary for arms control, John Bolton, concerning the protocol to 
strengthen BWC.1121 His virulent statement explicitly condemns the inability of 
traditional arms control instruments to detect violation and the damage they cause by 
allowing proliferators to pursue illegal activities without risks.1122 Furthermore the 
United States has named several countries suspected of violating their arms control 
treaty obligations.1123 The United States then named countries suspected of violating 
their treaty obligations. This tendency does not relate specifically to the CWC, which 
is perhaps even less affected than other arms control instruments (for example the 
BWC). However, as a traditional arms control treaty the CWC is also indirectly 
questioned and the value of CW disarmament for international security doubted.  
 As a result of this tendency the United States has reduced the role of arms 
control instruments; they are perceived as less important and reliance upon such 
instruments has been diminished.1124 The United States also distinguishes between 
states and non-state actors, by which is implied terrorists. The fact that the United 
States is mostly preoccupied with the threat from non-state actors supports the 
diminished emphasis placed on arms control instruments. This tendency marks a 
break with the practice of relying on such instruments to ensure international security, 
                                                 
1117 Newman, n 1075, 228-9. 
1118 Meng-Kin Lim, ‘Hostile Use of the Life Sciences’ (2005) 353(21), The New England Journal of 
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and with efforts to strengthen such instruments.1125 As a result such instruments are 
undermined and by extension so is the CW disarmament regime. This tendency can be 
seen as a characteristic of the current international security environment, in which the 
role and authority of traditional instruments are reduced.  
a. The United States’ arguments in support of its criticism of arms 
control 
To support its position, the United States’ main arguments are that such instruments 
are not complied with and fail to address the new threat. Another criticism is the fact 
that such instruments are not flexible. They therefore consider these instruments to be 
inappropriate to the current security environment. 
 Firstly the United States highlights that arms control instruments are not 
complied with by member states and that it is impossible to enforce them. It 
distinguishes, among member states of arms control instruments, those which comply 
with their legal obligations and those which do not. Among the latter some are even 
suspected of seeking WMD, of having WMD which could fall into the hands of 
terrorists and of sponsoring terrorism. These states are of great concern to the United 
States. More specifically, the US is preoccupied with states suspected of using 
participation in arms control agreements as a legitimate cover while they conduct 
prohibited activities.1126 The US suspects that some member states of the OPCW seek 
or possess CW.1127 
 The United States’ argument about non-compliance suggests that it assimilates 
a threatening behaviour with non-compliance with arms control instruments. It openly 
criticizes the inability of arms control regimes to detect such misuse and the 
subsequent violations of arms control obligations.1128 It also accuses other states of 
being unwilling to enforce compliance mechanisms when such misuse takes place.1129 
 In that respect arms control regimes are believed to be counter-productive 
since they cannot uncover violations, which increases the threat by allowing would-be 
proliferators to pursue illegal activities without fear of reprisals or sanctions.  
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With regard to CW, this criticism can be extended to disarmament obligations. States 
which do not comply with their disarmament obligations and are not sanctioned 
remain de facto CW possessors. These concerns reflect a criticism of the CWC’s 
verification regime rather than its disarmament obligations. In the author’s view 
although the verification regime may fail to uncover these new threat, it is efficient 
enough not to provide cover these new threats. 
b. The Resulting United States’ Arms Control Policy 
The tendency to criticize arms control instrument is the corollary of the United States’ 
current arms control policy. Its criticism results in a policy which no longer relies 
solely on traditional arms control instruments for ensuring its security. Instead it is 
characterized by preventive and pre-emptive actions (sometimes involving the use of 
force) and by reliance on other tools.1130 New tools include, for example: 
 
 proactive efforts to deter and defend against the threat before it exists…;  prevent 
 proliferators from acquiring WMD materials, technologies and expertise; and 
 effective consequence management to respond to the effects of  WMD use1131  
 
 Unfortunately CW disarmament appears to have a very limited, if non-
inexistent, role in the current United States arms control policy. None of the tools 
envisaged focus on existing arms control instruments or disarmament measures. With 
regard to CW disarmament, it appears to be more appealing to the United States to 
prevent a state from acquiring weapons than to disarm known stockpiles.1132 Such a 
policy does not favour CW disarmament and the success of the CWC disarmament 
regime. It suggests that either disarmament is not adapted to the threat, or that it is 
adapted but not given enough attention.  
 According to the United States’ position, arms control instruments are not 
adapted to the current international security environment. This is already suggested 
with the distinction between ‘today’s and yesterday’s threat’.1133 It should be 
remarked, however, that such criticism is often reiterated by the United States, but 
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hardly ever justified. How exactly arms control instruments fail to contribute to 
security is not explained in detail in the United States’ arms control policy. 
 The United States’ acts upon its position on arms control instruments; it is 
concretely reflected in reduced international cooperation and funding for CW 
disarmament.1134 Sufficient funding is vital for the success of CW disarmament.1135 
Currently, funding for ‘chemical demilitarization’- for securing CW stockpiles and to 
prevent the ‘brain drain’ of former weapons scientists, is being increased instead of 
being spent on disarmament activities.1136 The lack of support for CW disarmament is 
also expressed in the late payments to the OPCW and open criticism of the OPCW’s 
direction,1137 which eventually led to the removal of the Director General in 2001.1138 
The United States does not show any enthusiasm for the completion of CW 
disarmament. The sense of urgency which spurred the conclusion of the CWC, caused 
by the use of CW by Iraq in the 1980’s, is missing now.  
2. Alternative Instruments to Ensure Security in the Current Context: the 
Secondary Role of Disarmament. 
The United States’ new arms control policy reflects a shift of interest from traditional 
arms control instruments to ‘new tools’ for ensuring security1139 and it is largely based 
on such alternative instruments to ensure its national and international security. It 
does not suggest abandoning all traditional arms control efforts; it expresses its 
commitment to such instruments and reiterates its support for multilateralism.1140 
However, the United States also supports and encourages alternative means of 
ensuring security with new instruments which it now considers as, if not more 
important than traditional arms control instruments.1141 It is unclear whether the 
United States intends to replace arms control instruments with alternative tools; such 
tools are now a central part of its arms control policy.  
 Since they are considered to be more adapted to the current threat, these 
alternatives could threaten the success of the CW disarmament regime. The purpose 
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of these instruments is addressing and reducing the immediate WMD proliferation 
and terrorism threats.1142 As opposed to arms control instruments, which are 
traditionally treaty-based,1143 these instruments are politically-binding arrangements 
based on a voluntary and limited participation. They are often informal with few 
rules, allowing for flexibility. In the area of CW the main alternative instrument 
against the new threat is the Australia Group (AG). The AG is an informal 
arrangement, grouping 40-mostly western-countries, to regulate the exports of listed 
dual-use chemicals and biological materials.1144  
 In the author’s view such alternatives arrangements can be criticized on a 
number of grounds, and they undermine the CWC. Firstly, such arrangements and 
especially the AG, weaken confidence in the CWC.1145 Many CWC member states 
consider that the AG directly clashes with the CWC’s development, cooperation and 
trade objectives.1146 It is also criticized by developing countries for contradicting 
some of the CWC’s core principles, namely equal treatment and non-discrimination, 
guarantees offered by the CWC. Many commentators support this position. For 
example, the Indian representative at the CD during the CWC negotiations reminded 
the delegates that:  
 
 The legal arguments based on the principle of sovereignty, which justify the 
 continuation of  the Australia Group or of national export control measures which 
 violate the spirit of the CWC, have dealt a severe blow to the confidence placed in 
 industrialised States as honourable negotiating partners. 
 
He also points out another severe drawback that the AG can have on adherence to the 
CWC: 
 
 Why would signatory States not threatened by chemical weapons adhere to the 
 CWC, which places additional burdens on their civilian chemical industries, if the 
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 benefits of free  international trade and cooperation, unhampered by the Australia 
 Group or similar discriminatory arrangements, are not also available to them?1147 
 
In this regard, developing states expected the AG to be terminated upon the entry into 
force of the CWC: 
 
 Developing States were united in their belief that, as soon as they agreed to subject 
 themselves to the dictates and the stringent conditions of the CWC, they should not 
 be subject to any other arbitrary regimes such as the Australia Group.1148 
 
Finally, maintaining the AG is also in contradiction with the objective of universal 
adherence to the CWC. The AG and similar alternatives are not universal nor is their 
universal or even broad support sought.  
 It can be noted that such restricted participation is counterproductive to the 
United States’ official position according to which universality and multilateralism 
are essential against the new threat.1149 The United States both promotes universal 
adherence to existing arms control instruments against the new threat, and at the same 
time discards and replaces these instruments with alternative instruments based on 
selective participation. It highlights an inherent contradiction between the goals 
sought by the US, and also indicates that this current practice undermines their 
commitment to unilateralism.  
 Secondly, such alternatives clearly lack the legitimacy and credence traditional 
arms control instruments have. They have no verification mechanisms, which is a 
serious limitation since it is generally agreed that in order for disarmament to be 
effective, it must be verified.1150 They are also criticized because they are selective 
and are believed to skirt international law.1151  
 Generally these alternative instruments do not benefit from a broad support; 
rather, they are seen as dubious measures imposed by a minority of states.1152 Also, 
these alternative tools do not appear to be more adequate to deal with non-state actors 
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than traditional tools are. Finally these non-proliferation endeavours may have a 
negative impact on CW disarmament because there is a risk that more attention is 
given to such arrangements and less on complying with existing disarmament 
commitments. It is the author’s view that such arrangements question the security 
gains from disarmament. In light of these facts they do not appear advantageous in the 
current security environment; as Berdennikov points out, ‘there is no need for a 
coalition against the CW threat, it already exists.’1153  
 However, this criticism may be tempered; one use of alternative instruments 
such as the AG can be envisaged. Extended to disarmament purposes, these 
politically-binding and informal measures could act as confidence-building measures 
or even speed up CW disarmament while avoiding the traditional, formal and lengthy 
negotiating process of multilateral disarmament instrument.  
 However, such an alternative would be limited by the lack of authority of such 
instruments. Since they are voluntary and not legally-binding they cannot be enforced. 
Furthermore they do not meet transparent and efficient verification requirements. 
Today, from a disarmament perspective these arrangements are useless; none pursues, 
attempts, supports or contributes to disarmament in any way, when disarmament is 
believed to be a necessary complement to non-proliferation.1154  
 It can be suggested that instruments complementing the CWC disarmament 
regime are acceptable to the extent that they support its role. However, instruments 
which overlap but conflict with the CWC are not desirable. The CWC expressly 
authorizes and encourages bilateral or multilateral arrangements, if they concur with 
and do not compromise the CWC disarmament objectives.1155 It is unfortunate that 
there is no such alternative seeking CW disarmament. Instead, the tendency to 
question existing instruments and corroborate them with alternative tools negatively 
affects CW disarmament.  
Section 2: The Consequences and Implications of the United States’ 
Criticism for the Chemical Weapons Disarmament Regime  
The United States’ criticism of the role of arms control instruments has numerous 
consequences. While this criticism rightly highlights some weaknesses of these 
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instruments, it also undermines them and negatively affects the disarmament of CW. 
This section examines how the CW disarmament regime is affected by this tendency 
and what the CW disarmament regime can do to meet this threat.  
 Generally this criticism raises questions about the role of CW disarmament in 
the changing security environment. Is CW disarmament compromised or slowed by 
the changing security environment? Or is this challenge an incentive to improve the 
existing regime? If the challenge from new instruments negatively affects the regime, 
then to what extent does it do so? Can the impact of the threat on CW disarmament be 
measured at all? The new threat has serious implications for CW disarmament. 
 Throughout this section the tendency led by the United States is countered and 
the role of CW disarmament in the changing security environment is asserted. Again 
the United States is again at the front of the criticism of the role of arms control and 
disarmament instruments in international security. As a key player in arms control its 
criticism cannot be easily turned aside. 
 The first part of this section focuses on an urgent and hands-on issue raised by 
vulnerable CW stockpiles, which expose the threat of CW acquisition and use from 
existing and declared stockpiles. The question of CW pending disarmament is crucial 
and encompasses the matter of the new threats in the current security environment. It 
asks whether CW disarmament can remedy the new threat and be effective in the 
changing international security environment. This matter directly confronts the CW 
disarmament regime with the new threat. The second part of this section focuses on 
more general questions and implications that the United States’ tendency raises for 
arms control, and by extension, CW disarmament.  
A. The Threatening Situation of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Pending 
Disarmament. 
The new threat highlights a major weakness of the CW disarmament regime, namely 
the situation of CW stockpiles that are pending destruction. They are thought to be 
vulnerable and threatening and a majority of states is concerned with this matter.1156 
This concern is not new and was raised during the CWC negotiations.1157 However, it 
is now directly linked to the terrorism and proliferation threat since vulnerable CW 
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stockpiles are subject to theft, attack, diversion and eventual misuse before 
disarmament is completed.  
 The prevailing opinion on the matter is that terrorists will not wait until 
disarmament is finished to attempt to acquire CW.1158 The CWC is criticized, mostly 
by the United States, for being powerless and offering poor guarantees against this 
risk. There is a view that the CWC provides enough safeguards to ensure the safety of 
CW stockpiles until their destruction,1159 but it is generally thought that existing 
measures to secure and monitor CW stockpiles until their destruction are 
insufficient.1160 Such criticism further adds to the view that disarmament is inadequate 
for addressing current threats. 
 Existing measures to secure CW include the obligation to secure stockpiles 
and the prohibition to move declared CW before their destruction except to a 
destruction facility.1161 The CWC in fact obliges member states to secure CW; 
however, states have much leeway to implement this obligation: 
 
 Not later than when submitting its declaration of chemical weapons, a State Party 
 shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its storage facilities 
 and shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the facilities, except 
 heir removal for destruction’ (emphasis added). 1162 
 
Another key measure is on-site inspections of declared CW stockpiles.1163 The 
purpose of the initial inspection is to verify that stored CW correspond to the 
declarations to the OPCW; routine inspections ensure no CW is diverted, removed 
and that CW destruction is being carried out.1164  
 Unilateral efforts have also been made to secure CW stockpiles and reduce 
their vulnerability, with the intention to eliminate the potential threats of proliferation, 
diversion and terrorist use. Finally bilateral efforts also attempt to secure CW, mostly 
through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR). A part of the CTR funds 
                                                 
1158 Mashhadi, n 347, 1-5; 
1159 Hunt, n 160, 527. 
1160 Ibid. 
1161 Chemical Weapons Convention art 4 para 4. 
1162 Chemical Weapons Convention, Verification Annex, Part IV (A) para 7. 
1163 Chemical Weapons Convention art 4 paras 3-5. 
1164 Chemical Weapons Convention, Verification Annex, Part IV (A), para 41. See also Hunt, n 160, 
526 and Feakes, n 1150, 11, 16. 
  
190 
190 
for chemical demilitarization is spent on securing Russian CW stockpiles.1165 Other 
bilateral efforts include accounting and securing abandoned CW, for example 
Japanese CW abandoned in China.1166 
In the author’s opinion, to a certain extent, this concern and the resulting 
criticism seem well-founded; CW are vulnerable during the length of time that it 
takes to destroy them. This concern is borne out by the initial reluctance of some 
CWC drafters to oblige states to declare the possession of CW and the location of 
their stockpiles. They feared that the knowledge of CW stockpiles would make them 
vulnerable or cause temptation to seize them.1167  
The criticism that CW stockpiles are vulnerable and threatening appears 
justified in some cases, for example regarding former Soviet CW which are poorly 
guarded and secured. Also, the CWC is mostly silent on the situation of CW 
stockpiles until their destruction. Finally, the fact that CW are usually considered a 
likely terrorist weapon only reinforces this concern. 
The CWC thus appears to be a feeble instrument against this specific threat. 
Disarmament is a fool-proof measure because it is definitive and irreversible;1168 
unfortunately the benefits of disarmament are not immediate and therefore appear 
unsuitable against the current security concerns. It is also the view of the author that 
this grey, temporary situation of CW until their disarmament may be acknowledged 
as a deficiency in the CWC disarmament regime.  
However, if this criticism is sensible, two drawbacks can be identified. First, 
how to remedy the risk from vulnerable CW stockpiles remains an unanswered 
question; no alternative is offered to resolve or improve the situation of CW before 
their destruction. Furthermore is not certain, in the author’s view, that securing CW 
stockpiles is a fool-proof measure against the threat. Until disarmament is completed, 
the situation of CW is a statu quo. Secondly, as the case of Russian CW has shown, 
the disarmament of CW is indirectly affected by this criticism since efforts focus on 
securing CW stockpiles instead of disarming them.  
It can be concluded that there is neither adapted effort nor suitable solution to 
remedy this weakness. It is the view of the author that disarmament efforts should not 
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be undermined or abandoned for the sake of attempting to secure CW stockpiles. 
Instead this potential threat should spur disarmament efforts rather than replace or 
delay them with temporary measures such as securing stockpiles. 
Finally this weakness is not specific to CW; it is bound to occur with any 
disarmament task undertaken. Vulnerability to theft or illicit sale is an inherent risk of 
weapon possession and an unavoidable inheritance of the arms race, against which 
unfortunately disarmament cannot achieve immediate results. 
B. The Outcome of the New Threat on Chemical Weapons Disarmament: 
Questioning the Role of Arms Control Instruments in the Current 
International Security Environment and the Subsequent Impact on 
Chemical Weapons Disarmament.  
Questioning the role of arms control instruments and their ability to ensure 
international security in the current security environment is a serious matter with 
numerous implications. It doubts the authority and challenges the usefulness of such 
instruments for international security. It results in a debate about the extent to which 
arms control instruments contribute to international security, and which indirectly 
affects the CW disarmament regime. 
1. The Implications for Arms Control Instruments of the United States’ 
Criticism and How it Affects Chemical Weapons Disarmament.  
The tendency to question arms control instruments raises questions concerning the 
role of arms control instruments and whether instruments like the CWC are adapted to 
the current security environment. Can existing instruments reduce the new threat and 
if so, what is the role of disarmament against this threat? Is disarmament the solution 
to the current threat, and can such a threat be resolved with an international legal 
regime?  
 These questions hold great interest from a disarmament and international legal 
perspective. The role of disarmament for security needs clarification; these questions 
determine whether disarmament is useful for security, and if disarmament should be 
carried out with international legal tools. They also highlight whether there is a need 
to pursue traditional arms control tools, or on the contrary seek new disarmament 
tools. 
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 Firstly, the United States’ position sheds doubts on the adaptability of the CW 
disarmament regime to new circumstances, and by extension questions the flexibility 
of traditional arms control instruments. Only amendment of the CWC’s Annexes is 
possible,1169 and the modification process appears lengthy and complicated.1170 On the 
one hand, this is justified by a special need to ensure stability and preserving equality 
of rights and obligations.1171 On the other, arms control remains a highly moving field 
subject to both changes of technical and political nature. CWC members have only 
limited leeway to adapt the CWC to the new threat or changing circumstances.  
 The difficulty of modifying treaties and their limited flexibility to adapt to 
changing circumstances is characteristic of traditional arms control instruments.1172 
For example, beyond the authorized extension mechanism the CWC final 
disarmament deadlines cannot be modified when it is obvious that at the current 
destruction pace they cannot be expected to be met. This implies that the formal 
modification procedures- and by extension the formal, multilateral negotiating process 
of arms control instruments- do not offer sufficient flexibility.  
 In that regard in the author’s opinion the Geneva Process can be criticized in 
an area such as disarmament, which in the case of CW now clearly requires 
adjustments. Unfortunately it can be commented that the OPCW review conferences 
do not seem preoccupied with these matters.  It can also be suggested that perhaps it is 
not the most suitable negotiating process for disarmament treaties, as it is formal and 
lengthy whereas disarmament is a subject-matter calling for technical negotiations. 
For example, Bastanov, the Russian representative at the CD during the CWC 
negotiations, pointed out that the CWC negotiations lasted over two decades and that 
by the time they were concluded some provisions negotiated earlier did not 
correspond to the more recent context.1173 He also suggested then that ‘the world 
cannot afford to wait another 20 years for another militarily significant global arms 
control treaty’, since the ‘agenda is both wide and urgent.’1174 The Geneva Process 
does not appear to fit well with the urgent and time-consuming task of disarmament. 
 Unfortunately this task clashes with other priorities of the Geneva Process, 
namely broad representation and participation of states, the democratic process, and 
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allowing inputs from non-state actors concerned with arms control negotiations.1175 It 
can be concluded that successful and adaptable arms control instruments either 
require another elaboration and modification process than the formal and lengthy 
Geneva Process, or that means to modify and adapt a treaty must be found other than 
via the procedures provided by the treaty. In this regard, in light of the new threat, the 
criticism about the lack of flexibility of arms control instruments is accurate. 
However, even if the CWC was modified to adapt to new circumstances, the lack of 
definition of terrorism would remain a great obstacle impeding modification.1176 
 Secondly, this tendency also questions, indirectly, the usefulness of ongoing 
CW disarmament efforts. What should and can be done if, as the United States’ arms 
control policy suggests, an arms control instrument becomes useless or is no longer 
adapted to its environment? What should be done if an arms control instrument is 
deemed obsolete by its member states and especially in the current case, by a state 
with as much weight as the United States has? Should states no longer seek CW 
disarmament? Could this justify abandoning disarmament efforts and violating treaty 
obligations? If an arms control treaty no longer serves its purposes what is the impact 
for the existing instrument?  
 These questions are hypothetical only, since CW disarmament continues to 
play a major role in security. In addition, since states have ratified the CWC and are 
therefore legally obliged to disarm, this abandonment of the treaty is, legally, not an 
option. However, these questions have significant implications. Disarmament tools 
are thought not to be adapted to the current threat. This questions the basic principle 
according to which disarmament ensures security. If the basic principle is no longer 
accepted as true, could the CW disarmament regime simply become null and void and 
be abandoned? The resulting, major drawback for the success of CW disarmament is 
that the link between security and disarmament is increasingly tenuous; the arguments 
justifying CW disarmament are implicitly being challenged. Another drawback is that 
if arms control and disarmament instruments like the CWC are no longer supported 
and have little authority, a door is opened to violations and withdrawals from such 
instruments. The current tendency bears the risk that disarmament instruments are 
broken, or even denounced. 
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 Concerning the challenged link between disarmament and security, the United 
States’ criticism implies that disarmament does not ensure security, both because the 
original instruments are not adapted and because they are not well observed. It also 
appears to distinguish between support of the CWC, a traditional arms control and 
disarmament instrument, and reduction of the CW threat, as if the two objectives were 
conflicting. The view that disarmament is not seen as a means to ensure security 
explains why proposed alternatives do not include any disarmament provisions. It 
justifies the criticism of poor enforcement and the lack of support of arms control 
instruments. However it is the author’s view that security and disarmament should be 
realized concomitantly; they are not opposite but on the contrary complementary. 
Furthermore, both concerns can be solved with the successful implementation of the 
CWC, as opposed to undermining it with alternative instruments. 
 Unfortunately the current US approach has serious and probably long-term 
drawbacks. Diminished reliance, loss of confidence and the subsequent reduction of 
support for the CWC damage the credibility of international, legally-binding arms 
control instruments. It is also a disincentive for participation in such regimes. 
Weakened confidence in such instruments also reduces the incentive to comply with 
them, and  in turn non-compliance, diminishes confidence. Overall this criticism 
shows that treaties are not immune from political considerations, especially when they 
lose support from their key sponsor.  
2. Assessment of the Tendency to Question the Role of Arms Control 
Instruments in International Security 
An assessment of the United States’ position allows us to measure its impact on CW 
disarmament. In the author’s opinion the United States’ criticism on the suitability of 
arms control instruments against the new threat rightly underlines, to a certain extent, 
some limitations of arms control instruments. However, the intent of this assessment 
is not to determine whether the United States’ new arms control policy is correct or 
not.  
 Firstly the United States’ position is supported by the fact that disarmament is 
not always perceived as a positive contribution to international security. The UNIDIR 
lists six points opposing the benefits of disarmament, which concur with the 
questioning of arms control and disarmament agreements: 
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First, the arguments in favour of arms limitations are based on a set of assumptions 
about the relation between armament and war which may not be true. Second, because 
successful arms limitations imply a minimum mutual interest in the avoidance of war, 
such measures are altogether inappropriate in cases where this is absent. Third, because 
successful arms limitations imply at least tacit mutual cooperation … such measures are 
going to be more effective in times of decreasing tensions when they are less needed, 
and less effective in times of rising tensions when they are most needed. Fourth, arms 
limitations may fuel rather than cool down arms races … or they may merely redirect 
arms races as countries steer their military preparations towards non-regulated areas. 
Fifth, if arms limitations are intended to attenuate military rivalries, their rationale loses 
impetus in a context in which either there are no military rivals or it is unclear who the 
military rivals are. Finally, arms limitations may well be afflicted by a vicious paradox, 
namely, that in making war potentially less destructive, they might also make it 
potentially more likely1177  
 
With regard to CW it is has been suggested that the fourth argument applies to CW 
disarmament. CW disarmament has a limited scope, and instead of increasing security 
it could simply create a shift from the use of CW to the use of another category of 
weapons, namely a redirection towards nuclear weapons and with it an increased risk 
of nuclear war.1178 The last point also concerns CW; CW disarmament, by reducing 
the magnitude and scale of war may in fact increases the chances of war.1179  
Secondly, questioning the role of arms control instruments highlights the 
distinction between states and non-state actors and the distinction between states 
parties to arms control instruments which comply with them, and states parties which 
do not. The first distinction is crucial since states are the only subject of international 
law, while non-state actors are not directly addressed by international law.1180 
Unfortunately the new threat mostly comes from non-state actors. Therefore, 
theoretically, the CWC is powerless against this threat; it does not address non-state 
actors and does not mention terrorism.1181 If non-state actors had CW, the OPCW 
could not verify and enforce disarmament obligations. This supports the United 
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States’ criticism that arms control instruments are not suitable to address the new 
threat. However, this statement overlooks some basic facts which tone down the 
distinction between state and non-state actors and the threat from non-state actors. 
Namely, non-state actors are likely to get CW from or be supported by states. 
Therefore, action against states indirectly deals with the threat. Finally, it can be 
commented that the US appears to bypass the national level and act directly against 
the threats to its national security. 
Concerning the issue of states parties to arms control instruments which are 
suspected of not complying with them, the United States’ position also points out a 
redundant concern in international law. It is often said that the United State’s position 
is biased by its own national security interests;1182 however, it rightly suggests that if 
states parties to arms control instruments do not comply with their obligations, these 
states do not belong in these treaties.  
Venezuela, during earlier UNGA discussions on chemical and biological 
warfare, pointed out that states refusing to take part in treaties (i.e. the Geneva 
Protocol) did not necessarily reflect an intention to act against it.1183 Put in perspective 
with the United State’s current concerns about non-compliance, it can be suggested 
that states ‘out’ of treaties, e.g. not parties to it, are preferable to states ‘in’ the treaties 
but not complying with their obligations. This suggestion depends on whether arms 
control treaties can detect violations and eventually sanction states which do not 
comply, therefore enforcing their obligations. According to the United States’ 
position, arms control instruments fail to do so.  
In the author’s view this suggestion is not desirable, as it implies that arms 
control treaties cannot be enforced. It would also further undermine the authority of 
arms control instruments and reflect a lack of confidence in them. This suggestion 
would have great consequences if acted upon. For example, Russia would have to 
withdraw from the CWC since it obviously cannot fulfil its disarmament obligations; 
by remaining a member it would undermine the CWC’s scheduled disarmament 
obligation. However, it also suggests that if a state party is suspected of a violation, a 
mechanism excluding this state from the benefits of the treaty is called for. For 
example Russia could be deprived of certain OPCW benefits until completion of its 
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disarmament obligations. The United States’ preoccupation with non-compliance also 
partially coincides with the issue of non-participation in such instruments. Non-
participation or participation and non-compliance are both seen as a threatening 
behaviour and by extension, thought to contribute to the current threat. 
 The author acknowledges but does not agree with the tendency led by the 
United States to undermine arms control instruments and their primary role in 
international security. Some criticisms of arms control instruments rightly point out 
some weaknesses of and challenges to the CW disarmament regime and arms control 
instruments in general. These aspects of the United State’s position deserve 
consideration because they highlight the difficulties of enforcing arms control 
instruments and point out some limitations to these instruments: mainly, arms control 
instruments are not meant to address non-state actors and they are not very flexible in 
a rapidly changing security environment. However, questioning the substance of arms 
control agreements and the resulting lack of confidence in these instruments seems 
counterproductive. In the author’s view it does not, in any way, contribute to 
international security, yet no suitable alternative to replace or improve the CWC is 
proposed. In that respect, Newman points out that it is ‘far easier to remove than 
replace a regime with a functioning and viable alternative’.1184 The existing CW 
disarmament regime is the only legally-binding, viable solution against CW in the 
long-term that we currently have; it should not be discarded or replaced. The next 
section introduces arguments opposing the US position, minimizes some aspects of 
the new threat and attempts to analyze the contribution of CW disarmament to 
international security. 
Section 3: Arms Control Instruments Have a Crucial Role in the Current 
International Security Environment: the Arguments Supporting the Role 
of Arms Control Instruments 
The intention of this section is to present the counter-arguments to the United States’ 
position on arms control instruments with a specific focus on the arguments 
concerning the role of the CWC. This analysis seeks to clarify the role of 
disarmament in the current security environment. There are errors in the way the 
current threat to international security is perceived and acted upon. There are also 
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mistakes regarding the ability of existing arms control regimes and especially the CW 
disarmament regime, to remedy this threat.  
A. Questioning the Role of Arms Control Instruments in the Changing 
Security Environment is not Widely Supported and Appears to be 
Misguided  
This analysis attempts to invalidate the idea that the new threat justifies abandoning 
arms control instruments, and shows that the adopted arms control policy is 
reprehensible. There are a number of justifications for this different approach. Firstly 
the United States’ position is not shared by the bulk of the international community. 
There is an opposite view that arms control instruments play an important role even in 
the changing security environment. According to this view existing arms control 
instruments, especially the CWC, even though they are not intended for the current 
security environment, can ensure security against the new threat.1185 Secondly, it is 
also justified by the fact that the CWC is legally-binding and therefore its 
disarmament obligations should not be challenged by political considerations.  
 Commentators see different solutions to the CW threat and especially for 
ensuring the CW terrorism threat never materializes. Not all authors see disarmament 
as the primary tool against CW terrorism; some authors favour non-disarmament 
measures. However, there seems to be a consensus that disarmament has a crucial role 
to play against the new threat. The author shares the view that disarmament is a key 
step against the new threat, and may be the best solution available.  
 In order to counter the United States’ position two arguments can be put 
forward. Firstly, is appears that the threat is not always well assessed-or assessed at all 
and that it may be exaggerated. This analysis first diminishes the magnitude of the 
perceived threat to a more realistic level. By minimizing the threat, criticism against 
existing arms control instruments can be put in perspective.  
 Secondly, it is believed that arms control instruments, can be efficient in the 
current security environment. This is particularly the case with disarmament 
instruments like the CWC, which has the necessary tools to ensure security against the 
new threat. Disarmament has a specific role in that respect. It can be concluded from 
this view that the tendency to question arms control instruments is counter-
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productive; there are solutions to guarantee international security from threats without 
compromising the role and reduce the authority of existing arms control instruments.  
B. The New Threat Lacks Assessment and Tends to be Exaggerated. 
Most commentators agree that the new threat is not well assessed or assessed at all; 
some of its aspects can be minimized, others discarded. There is also a tendency to 
exaggerate the threat beyond realistic proportions. The threat is threefold: fear of 
WMD proliferation by states, of WMD proliferation and of use by terrorists, and of 
state sponsorship of terrorism, which includes support for WMD acquisition. The lack 
of threat assessment, especially concerning terrorist acquisition and use of WMD, is 
criticized by experts.1186 Existing assessments focus on the question ‘when’ this threat 
is going to materialize, instead of ‘if’ it can materialize at all, resulting in an alarmist 
tendency to magnify the WMD terrorist threat. As Schmid points out, ‘there is a big 
gulf between the “theoretical possibility” and the “operational reality” of chemical 
and bacteriological terrorism. The debate about terrorism and WMD has been one 
where exaggeration has been the order of the day.’1187 Unfortunately little analytical 
and technical background is provided to justify the likelihood of terrorist acquisition 
and use of WMD. Finally, this threat, and especially WMD terrorism, is perceived as 
increasing, although there is no explanation for this tendency.1188  
Some authors attempt the difficult task of assessing the feasibility of terrorist 
acquisition and use of WMD; they present likely scenarios of such occurrence to 
remedy the lack of threat assessment.1189 The study of WMD acquisition by O’Neil 
proposes and assesses such scenarios of WMD acquisition and use by terrorists.1190 
Based on a technical assessment of WMD production, the study minimizes the 
chances of WMD production by terrorists. This is justified by the difficulty of 
acquiring WMD materials and by the complex technology required to weaponize 
them. As a result even though CW are thought to be the most likely weapon for 
terrorists, their acquisition and use in great quantities remains uncertain. This view is 
shared by other experts, based on previous experience of CW terrorism. They argue 
that CW production is risky for the people involved, costly and technically 
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challenging.1191 It can be concluded that even though CW terrorism is not impossible, 
this threat can be minimized. Another aspect of the new threat, state-sponsored WMD 
terrorism, is discarded as an unlikely scenario, as it presents too many risks for a 
state,1192 and because so far there is no evidence of state sponsorship.1193 
A likely scenario, however, is theft or diversion of CW from existing 
stockpiles.1194 If CW production is as difficult as experts suggest, then it can be 
assumed that theft of CW from existing stockpiles is the most tempting and next 
alternative to acquire CW. This is also the scenario which is relevant from a 
disarmament perspective, and against which the success of CW disarmament is 
crucial. It is the view of the author that this last scenario is the most probable 
regarding the threat of CW acquisition and use by terrorists. This is supported by the 
vulnerable situation of CW stockpiles. For example, O’Neil points out the weak 
security and tracking systems for WMD in the former SU, but these weaknesses are 
not limited to the former SU.1195 However, even this scenario is not well assessed. 
Although the OPCW and CWC member states conduct exercises involving scenarios 
of CW use, there is no scheme involving CW acquisition from existing stockpiles. 
There is therefore, to the author’s knowledge, neither an OPCW document nor any 
official study on the feasibility or likelihood of CW acquisition or diversion from 
declared stockpiles and therefore no sound assessment of this threat.  
It can be concluded that the magnitude of the new threat can be questioned and 
minimized; there is widely shared view that it is exaggerated, which can be linked to 
the lack of credible threat assessment.1196 There is clearly a need for a better 
assessment of the CW threat.1197 This view implies that CW proliferation and 
terrorism is not as urgent a threat as is suggested by the United States. Reducing the 
magnitude of the threat suggests that efforts should focus less on counter-terrorism 
measures and more on arms control mechanisms. Finally, if CW stockpiles are the 
most pressing aspect of the new threat then disarmament efforts should not be held 
back but on the contrary be pursued more actively. Therefore both the perceived 
threat and the response are, in the author’s opinion, flawed.  
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C. The Chemical Weapons Convention Has the Necessary Tools to 
Effectively Address the New Threat 
The view opposing the United States’ tendency to question arms control instruments 
is examined here. Among the CWC provisions that may prove efficient against the 
new threat, a distinction is made between non-disarmament and disarmament 
measures, and emphasis is placed on the latter. It also seeks to heighten the role of 
CW disarmament in the current security environment.  
1. Non-Disarmament Measures 
There are numerous non-disarmament measures in the CWC considered ‘relevant’ 
against the threat and in particular CW terrorism.1198 Authors identify, in various 
orders of importance, the CWC non-proliferation regime; transfers of chemicals; 
verification and monitoring measures, which includes declaration of civilian and 
military facilities and inspections; implementation of penal legislation by member 
states to criminalize behaviours prohibited under the CWC, (hereinafter law 
enforcement measures)1199; and assistance and protection measures, through national 
assistance programs.1200 Other tools contributing to the success of the CWC against 
the new threat are intelligence,1201 cooperation with other international 
organizations,1202 challenge inspections, although this implementing measure is not 
used,1203 and law enforcement cooperation.1204  
These measures have different degrees of usefulness against the CW 
proliferation and terrorism threat. Some authors put more emphasis on law 
enforcement measures, others on non-proliferation and monitoring measures; they 
appear to be the main means against the threat of CW terrorism.1205 Law enforcement 
measures, especially the obligation to adopt penal legislation against all individuals or 
entities under a state party’s jurisdiction or control and which act in violation of the 
CWC, are considered necessary.1206 Commentators expect to see the criminalization 
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of violations of CWC provisions by all member states, and international cooperation 
in enforcing such legislation.1207 In that respect, Berdennikov compares and considers 
the CWC to be similar to conventions against terrorism.1208 To a certain extent, this 
tendency is supported by the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament matters, which 
recommends ‘that WMD proliferation be rendered punishable under international law, 
and perpetrators personally responsible.’1209 It can be remarked that this is consistent 
with the more general tendency to criminalize offences corresponding to violations of 
international law committed by individuals. Non-proliferation measures are another 
key aspect of the CWC against the new threat, as they are ‘depriving access to 
CW.’1210 Their aim is to monitor closely all chemical activities to ensure no CW is 
produced.1211 It is the view of the author that the CWC has indeed many tools to 
effectively address the new threat. However, most of these measures, except for non-
proliferation measures, are not preventive but rather a response should the CW 
terrorism or proliferation threat materialize.  
2. Disarmament Measures Have a Crucial Role Against the New Threat 
Not all experts see disarmament as the primary tool against CW terrorism. However, 
all authors supporting the role of the CWC place a special emphasis on the need to 
disarm CW and agree with the fact that the elimination of CW is necessary against the 
new threat. At the very least disarmament must corroborate other measures against the 
new threat.  
  Disarmament of CW effectively addresses all aspects of the new threat; it has 
both a positive impact on CW terrorism and on non-proliferation. Concerning the 
terrorist threat, disarmament makes less CW available and more difficult to acquire; it 
reduces the chances of terrorist acquisition and diversion of CW through theft or 
attacks.1212 Bustani, then Secretary-General of the OPCW, clearly states the link 
between CW disarmament and it role against terrorism: ‘the worldwide elimination of 
chemical weapons – is directly relevant to the solution of this urgent task [supposing 
chemical terrorism]’. As suggested before, if stockpiled CW are considered the most 
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pressing threat, being vulnerable to terrorist theft and diversion, then disarmament has 
an increased role against CW terrorism: ‘In particular, the timely destruction of 
chemical weapons in declared possessor States Parties would simply eliminate the 
risk of the theft or diversion of such weapons.’1213 In that respect the United Nations 
Department for Disarmament Affairs is even more explicit; in its recommendations it 
states that  ‘The possibilities of chemical weapons being subject to theft manifest the 
importance of destroying all stockpiles of chemical weapons as soon as 
practicable.’1214 Concerning the role of CW disarmament against the threat of 
terrorism it can be concluded, as Bustani points out, that ‘where chemical terrorism is 
concerned, the international community is not starting with a tabula rasa.’1215  
 The disarmament of CW also plays an important role in the goal of non-
proliferation since it ensures that existing CW are not spread, thus addressing the 
issue of horizontal and, as Pogorely describes it, ‘internal’ proliferation.1216 Firstly, 
existing means to secure CW stockpiles, even though deemed insufficient, guarantee, 
in the author’s view, that there is no proliferation of CW from declared stockpiles. In 
particular, verification of destruction with on-site inspections and permanent 
monitoring ensures that no CW is diverted before and during the destruction 
process.1217 Secondly, once CW destruction is completed, which has not taken place 
so far, a final inspection and a final declaration take place, before destruction of the 
CW destruction facility.1218 In its recommendations the United Nations Department 
for Disarmament Affairs also highlights this link: ‘achieving chemical weapons 
disarmament is fundamental to guaranteeing nonproliferation.’1219  
 The support for CW disarmament is shared by CWC member states and by 
international organizations. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs 
recommends the completion of CW disarmament as soon as possible, and  believes 
that the completion of this task can greatly reduce the new threat.1220 The United 
Nations High-Level Panel on Threats also recommends that ‘all states should expedite 
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the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed 
target date of 2012’.1221 Supporters of the CWC role in the changing security 
environment reiterate the importance of disarmament against the new threat. This 
view reflects both support of arms control instruments in general and the role of CW 
disarmament in the international security agenda. For example, Wilkinson places 
emphasis on the need to use measures of arms control and disarmament, and on the 
‘absolutely significant role for disarmament’.1222 Ambassador Toth calls attention on 
the role of preventive measures ‘more related to the arms control and disarmament 
field’.1223 Berdennikov’s position is even more self-explanatory on the matter of arms 
control: ‘The focus of politicians around the world has to return to those instruments 
that could help them fight this new battle.’1224 Finally, Goldblat highlights the clear 
‘need to continue the arms control process’ in the changing security environment.1225  
 The outcome of a successful CW disarmament is the complete absence of CW. 
In turn this means the elimination of the risk of CW use and a great reduction of 
potential acquisition of CW by rogue actors. Disarmament is irreversible and 
definitive; it provides the best assurance against all aspects of the new threat and 
addresses this threat. It is also the view of the author that the verification of 
disarmament by the OPCW offers sufficient assurances to ensure that no declared CW 
is subject to proliferation. Finally, other arguments support the role of disarmament. 
For example, it contributes to reducing the scope and effects of internal conflicts.1226 
Therefore disarmament can be considered the best solution against the threat. Beyond 
the current preoccupation, the successful and timely disarmament of CW corresponds 
both to the success of the CWC and to the resolution of the CW threat, both old and 
new. 
 There is a middle ground view between questioning the role of arms control 
instruments and supporting their role in the current security environment; the view 
that such instruments are an appropriate tool against the new threat.1227 There is some 
                                                 
1221 Report of High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure World: Our 
Responsibility’ UN doc A/59/565, [125] 2 December 2004. 
1222 Paul Wilkinson, ‘Chemical Weapons and Terrorism’ (Paper presented at the Symposium on 
Terrorism and Disarmament, United Nations, New York, 25 October 2001), 1-5. 
1223 Tibor Toth, ‘Chemical Weapons and Terrorism’ (Paper presented at the Symposium on Terrorism 
and Disarmament, United Nations, New York, 25 October 2001), 1-5. 
1224 Berdennikov, n 1093, 5. 
1225 Goldblat, n 4, 245. 
1226 Ibid; Wilkinson, n 152; Toth, n 153. 
1227 Dahinden, n 164, 271. 
  
205 
205 
truth in this view and it is supported by the fact that the CWC was not intended to be a 
convention against terrorism.1228 The CWC is a disarmament instrument in the first 
place; it was not specifically drawn up to deal with the new threat.1229 This is 
supported, for example, by the lack of any mention of ‘terrorism’, ‘non-state actors’ 
or ‘proliferation’ in the text of the CWC.1230 In the author’s view this view may be 
acceptable to a certain extent, yet it can be criticized on the ground that even though 
the CWC is not meant to deal with the new threat, it nevertheless has the necessary 
tools to do so. Also, the CWC seems to have adapted to the current international 
security environment, and since there is not better alternative yet, it can be concluded 
that even though the CWC is not an entirely appropriate tool against the current 
threat, it is not useless and can contribute to reducing it. 
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention can Extend to Non-State Actors 
In response to the United States’ argument that arms control instruments do not 
address and are powerless against non-state actors, Mashhadi argues that the CWC 
extends to non-state actors. He maintains that the CWC provisions apply further than 
CW use in inter-state conflicts, ‘to any use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for 
chemical weapons purposes, whether internal or external.’1231  
 This suggests that the CWC applies to intra-national activities. The United 
States’ argument can also be countered with the CWC law-enforcement provisions 
which require member states to criminalize CWC violations committed by individuals 
or entities under member states’ jurisdiction or control.1232 In that respect Mashhadi 
points out that:  
 
 the enforcement mechanism of the Convention is not limited to prohibited activities 
 undertaken by States Parties. This mechanism extends to any natural or legal person 
 within the States Parties' jurisdiction or control.1233 
 
To a certain extent, the implementation of these provisions by CWC member states 
affects individuals via national penalisation systems. This provision appears to 
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broaden the scope of the CWC from member states to non-state actors and at the same 
time to states not members of the CWC.1234 The same can be said of the CWC non-
proliferation provisions, especially those concerning transfers in the chemical sector. 
If every potential chemical-warfare activity is covered by the CWC, its scope is not 
limited to the activities of member states. Even though the OPCW is powerless in 
states not members and cannot receive declarations or conduct inspections in these 
states, the non-proliferation network seems tight enough that no major chemical 
activity takes place without notice, as is the intent. By making CW unavailable, the 
CWC disarmament provisions extend to non-state actors.1235 It can be concluded that 
the CWC reaches and affects non-state actors via its wide scope over all chemical 
activities, and because it addresses individual behaviours. The CWC therefore 
addresses the threat related to non-state actors, which reinforces its role against the 
new threat. 
 Furthermore, supporters of the CWC and OPCW’s role in the current security 
environment also express the idea that the OPCW has a mandate against the new 
threat, and especially against CW terrorism. Bustani, the OPCW’s former Director-
General, highlights that: 
 
 the OPCW is thus equipped with appropriate means whose proper and coordinated 
 utilisation can significantly reduce the attractiveness of the chemical option as a 
 terrorist tool, and can thus dissuade terrorists from resorting to this weapon of mass 
 destruction. Our Organisation has the necessary mandate and unique expertise in this 
 area. 
 
He concludes: ‘The Convention therefore assigns to the OPCW a clear mandate and 
role where the combating of chemical terrorism is concerned.’ 1236 
Different justifications are offered to support this view. This mandate comes 
from the CWC provisions dealing ‘with materials which terrorists may acquire, or 
may wish to acquire, and use as chemical weapons’1237 and from the disarmament 
provisions. The OPCW mandate is also derived from its resources and expertise in the 
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chemical field.1238 Also, it is pointed out that ‘the CWC does provide an international 
legal foundation for the fight against chemical terrorism’.1239 
 This mandate allows the OPCW to act against the new threat. Such a mandate 
entitles it to a function, and even a responsibility against the new threat.1240 It also 
implies that the OPCW has authority on the matter: ‘Such a mandate gives the OPCW 
legitimacy and authority to pursue efforts against terrorism and non-proliferation. The 
OPCW role against the new threat is derived from this mandate.’1241 This view is 
shared by other CW experts: ‘The OPCW is not a police agency. Our contribution to 
the cause of fighting chemical terrorism flows from the mandate of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.’1242 In the author’s view a mandate also suggests that the text 
of the CWC and the role of the OPCW are interpreted and used beyond what the 
CWC drafters intended. The CWC may not be very flexible; however, it appears to be 
adaptable to new circumstances and to the current international security environment. 
Such a mandate also implies that the CWC is sufficient and therefore there is no need 
to replace or corroborate it with alternative instruments. Finally, the OPCW mandate 
is believed to extend to non-state actors, thus opposing the view that the terrorist 
threat is not addressed by arms control instruments such as the CWC.1243  
Section 4: The Chemical Weapons Convention Must be Implemented to 
be Effective Against the New Threat 
The CWC has the tools and a mandate to deal effectively with the new threat. 
However, in order to accomplish this goal it is pointed out that the existing regime 
must be used and implemented fully. Unfortunately, the CWC suffers from 
implementation difficulties.  
A. The Full Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
Supporters of the CWC’s role in the current security environment highlight the need 
to implement it fully, comply with it and also strengthen it. The call for the 
implementation of the CWC is justified in many respects. It is generally believed that 
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the full and immediate implementation of the CWC ensures security, 1244 therefore 
achieving its intended goal. The CWC can be effective only if it is used to its full 
potential. Dahinden points out that ‘even more relevant than negotiations … is the 
implementation of existing treaties’; it is ‘the essential part in achieving security 
benefits’.1245 He also expresses the idea that ‘implementation must become the new 
priority.’ In light of the current security environment, full implementation and 
compliance with the CWC is even more necessary. Its role against the new threat is 
conditional upon full implementation and compliance with it: ‘By ensuring the full 
and effective implementation of, and full compliance with, the Convention, the 
OPCW can help to significantly reduce the risk of chemical terrorism.’1246 
Disarmament plays a significant role in that respect and there is also much emphasis 
on the need to implement and comply with disarmament obligations: 
 
The destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities is a central 
aspect of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have to sustain 
the full-fledged implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention within the 
crucial parameters of disarmament … that must prevail in the implementation of its 
provisions.1247  
 
The OPCW former Director-General also highlights the link between the resolution of 
the new threat and the need to implement the CWC disarmament provisions:  
 
 The latent virulence of the threat posed by international terrorism adds a strong 
 element of urgency to the need to successfully achieve chemical disarmament … and, 
 for this, efficient verification of compliance is, of course, of undisputed essence.1248 
 
The success of the CWC against the new threat therefore depends on its 
implementation and on compliance with it, and especially its disarmament 
                                                 
1244 Dahinden, n 164, 272. 
1245 Dahinden, n 164, 272-3. 
1246 Mashhadi, n 347, 1-5; see also ‘Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes’ (Occasional Paper  
No 8, Department for Disarmament Affairs, 2004), 25. 
1247 Ibid; Jose M. Bustani, Opening Statement by the Director-General of the OPCW, OPCW Executive 
Council, 26th session.   
1248 ‘Monitoring Chemical Weapons Destruction: Present Realities and Future Challenges’ 
Excerpts from the Statement by the OPCW Director-General Inter-Parliamentary Conference, 
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obligations. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs also 
recommends ‘strengthening and fully utilizing the existing regime.’ 1249  
 Implementation of the CWC is also viewed as a means to ‘preserve the 
acquis’ of arms control regimes against attempts to weaken those acquis and therefore 
the CWC.1250 This requires fully using the CWC enforcement mechanisms and in 
particular challenge inspections. Challenge inspections are meant to resolve concerns 
about non-compliance. If used they could resolve the United States’ concerns about 
states parties suspected of not complying with their obligations, and the subsequent 
criticism of arms control instruments. In turn it would be an assurance that the CWC 
can detect violations and be enforced. Unfortunately challenge inspections and other 
CWC enforcement measures are not implemented, which has drawbacks. Feakes 
expresses the idea that the longer its takes to use challenge inspections, the harder it 
becomes to use them, and the ‘political threshold for requesting one’ increases.1251 
The lack of use also weakens ‘the challenge inspection mechanism on the other 
elements of the CWC verification system’.1252 According to the same author, ‘public 
accusations of non-compliance’ which are not followed by CWC enforcement 
mechanisms also undermine challenge inspections. In the author’s view, the fact that 
challenge inspections have never been requested also leaves an unused potential to 
strengthen the CWC and resolve concerns about non-compliance. This extends to CW 
disarmament as well, since all chemical facilities may be inspected on challenge.1253 
Therefore it appears wrong not to use challenge inspections, as they would both 
enforce the CWC obligations, including disarmament obligations, strengthen the 
CWC regime by fully implementing its enforcement mechanisms and perhaps avoid 
the United States’ criticisms. In the author’s view there is much to gain by 
implementing challenge inspections, as well as other sanctions or enforcement 
mechanisms provided in the CWC. The United States would have more support using 
such enforcement mechanisms rather than using unilateral actions or alternative 
instruments. Therefore, existing sanctions should be used as a priority. 
 In the author’s view other benefits can be expected from implementing the 
CWC. It would see the accomplishment for the first time of effective disarmament of 
                                                 
1249 ‘Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes’ (Occasional Paper  No 8, Department for 
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1252 Ibid. 
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an entire category of WMD under international supervision. Overall it would also 
increase the strength and credibility of arms control instruments. 
 Implementation requires using mechanisms provided by arms control 
instruments.1254 The implementation of the CWC, in addition to enforcement 
measures, comprises a wide range of measures since the CWC covers a broad scope 
of activities. Its supporters emphasize different measures the implementation of which 
is seen as crucial for its success. For example, Mashhadi favours the implementation 
of law enforcement mechanisms to remedy the terrorist threat; it is thought it would 
‘deter terrorist uses of chemical weapons.’1255 It entails, among other things, the 
adoption of national implementation laws, cooperation, legal assistance and the 
establishment of a national authority.1256 Other authors favour the implementation of 
assistance and protection measures against CW use, of non-proliferation measures,1257 
or of monitoring and verification measures.1258 The implementation of other, non-
disarmament implementation measures is also called for, and especially, universality 
of the CWC is thought necessary to strengthen it and succeed against the new 
threat.1259 The implementation of disarmament obligations requires that member states 
declare their stockpiles, adopt a destruction program and allow the OPCW inspectors 
to monitor the destruction of stockpiles.1260 In the author’s view, since disarmament is 
the favoured solution for ensuring security from the CW threat, implementation of 
disarmament measures is the most important goal and should be pursued with greater 
priority over other implementation measures. 
B. Difficulties Affecting the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention 
All authors concur with the idea that the CWC must be strengthened and implemented 
fully, and especially its disarmament provisions. This goal supports the role of CW 
disarmament in the current international security environment. Unfortunately, 
implementation difficulties can be identified.  
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 The main implementation problem relates to the general struggle of CWC 
member states to implement it. Implementation of the CWC is very difficult and many 
of its provisions are poorly implemented.1261 The same authors calling for the full and 
immediate implementation of the CWC provisions also deplore the fact that the CWC 
is poorly implemented and that a majority of member states have not implemented 
key provisions or are delayed in doing so. Dahinden points out that ‘There is still an 
important gap between legally agreed regulations…and the implementation of 
agreements.’1262 Five years after the entry into force of the CWC, only less than half 
of its member states had informed the OPCW of their implementing legislation and 
administrative measures to implement the CWC.1263  
 Implementation difficulties occur with law-enforcement measures, assistance 
and protection, declarations (both of civilian and military chemical facilities and 
activities), transfers of chemicals and disarmament. Law-enforcement provisions are 
particularly difficult to implement; member states fail to adopt the necessary penal 
legislation and cooperate, and they struggle to provide information on the 
establishment of their National Authorities.1264 Another example, the implementation 
of assistance and protection measures, cooperation and funding for assistance and 
protection, is also disappointing. Five years after the entry into force of the CWC only 
a handful of member states (less than 25%) had informed the CWC of their protection 
programs.1265 Also, the CWC voluntary fund for assistance was poorly provided 
for.1266 The foreseeable result is that a majority of states ‘do not have a national 
capability to deal with chemical weapons attacks or with chemical weapons terrorist 
acts.’1267  
 Concerning disarmament obligations, difficulties have occurred with the initial 
and annual declarations of CW stockpiles. It should be reminded that CWC member 
states only have 30 days following the entry into force of the CWC to declare their 
CW stockpiles.1268 However, as of December 2004, 93% of the CWC 167 member 
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states had submitted their initial declaration.1269 The implementation of destruction 
obligations is also delayed and still suffers great difficulties. CW possessors have not 
adopted the mandatory destruction plans or have adopted them late.1270 For example, 
Russia only adopted its definitive CW destruction programme in 2001.1271  
 CW possessors which have acceded the CWC after its entry into force 
(Albania and Libya) have encountered delays and ‘operational’ difficulties. As a 
result their destruction programs are delayed and these states were granted extensions 
of intermediate deadlines.1272 Almost 10 years after the entry into force of the CWC, 
its destruction obligation is very poorly implemented. As of December 2004, the 
largest two CW possessors had destroyed 1.94 and 31.73% of their CW stockpile, 
respectively, instead of the initially scheduled 45%.1273 As of 2006, ‘over 19% of the 
world's declared stockpile of approximately 70,000 metric tonnes of chemical agent 
have been verifiably destroyed’, and 30% of chemical munitions destroyed.1274 It 
should be reminded that the intended final destruction deadline is 2012 (after being 
extended five years from the initial 2007 deadline). 
 There are numerous causes explaining the difficulties in implementing the 
CWC. The lack of adoption of the necessary national implementing legislation keeps 
CWC member states from implementing CWC provisions. For example, this lack 
affects the obligations to declare chemical activities and transfers of chemicals.1275 
Declarations of chemical activities are therefore incomplete, delayed and obtained 
with great difficulty by the OPCW.1276 Declarations of transfers between CWC 
member states is imprecise and often do not match.1277 Concerning disarmament 
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provisions, however, difficulties are mostly of a technical and financial nature. CW 
destruction is time and money-consuming and technically difficult.1278 
 More generally, difficulties to implement the CWC can also be attributed to 
the complexity of the CWC implementation requirements, which can be linked to the 
proximity with the civilian chemical industry. Difficulties can be explained by this 
closeness with authorized civilian chemical activities and the resulting ‘dual-use’ 
nature of the convention. Implementation difficulties can also be linked with the 
decreasing political interest in implementing and enforcing arms control instruments. 
Poor implementation can be largely attributed to the diminished political interest in 
arms control instruments once they enter into force.1279 Berdennikov explicitly points 
out that the implementation of the CWC is not a political priority and incites very 
little political interest.1280  
Conclusion 
The CW disarmament regime is confronted to a changing international security 
environment, in which the role and authority of traditional arms control instruments 
like the CWC are challenged. Their ability and adequacy to face the new threats to 
international security are questioned. Alternative instruments deemed more suitable to 
ensure security are envisaged, with the risk that traditional arms control instruments 
benefit from less support and that their role is diminished.  
 Flaws can be identified in this tendency, regarding the foundations and 
assessment of the new threats to international security, the faults attributed to 
traditional arms control instruments and to the CW disarmament regime.  
Furthermore the criticism of existing tools is not followed with alternatives that are 
able to replace the existing CW disarmament regime. Although it is acknowledged 
that the CW disarmament regime has weaknesses and there are implementation 
difficulties, it remains the central instrument for the control of CW. It remains, so far, 
the only disarmament instrument capable of achieving effective results.  
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General Conclusion 
CW are a recognized threat to international security. The use of CW is banned and in 
order to enforce this ban and to remedy this threat permanently, a sophisticated 
disarmament regime attempts to eliminate CW. This comprehensive disarmament 
regime is embodied in the 1997 CWC, which is the main instrument for the legal 
control of CW. The control and disarmament of CW remains a specific and obscure 
area in public international law and arms control. 
 This study has attempted a comprehensive analysis of the CW disarmament 
regime. Although a variety of disarmament instruments have been envisaged, the CW 
disarmament regime studied is founded on the CWC. This analysis has examined 
whether the regime, and more specifically the CWC, can achieve the effective 
disarmament of CW. The intended result of this regime is the total and effective 
disarmament of CW.  
 The study examined whether and if so, how the resulting international law 
achieved effective results, eschewing a theoretical analysis of how the CW 
disarmament regime relates to and is integrated in public international law and the law 
of arms control. The practical aspects of CW disarmament were favoured over the 
hypothetical extrapolations of the CW disarmament regime, either for the 
disarmament of other weapons or towards the codification and institutionalization of 
its principles. In doing so, the author chose a functional approach to the disarmament 
of CW. It is the author’s belief that focusing on the practical aspects of disarmament 
and on its effective results offers a credible perspective on the international law of 
arms control. 
 The political and legal foundations of the CW disarmament regime were 
examined in the first part of this study, followed by a close examination of the regime 
itself, which corresponds to the legally-binding disarmament provisions of the CWC. 
In accordance with the regime it can generally be noted that the disarmament of CW 
is well under way for the majority of CW possessors, and that the CWC has clearly 
succeeded in accounting for and verifying global CW capabilities. Declarations 
accurately report CW and CW facilities, and assign the disarmament task.  
 However, the CW disarmament regime is only partly successful in terms of 
effective disarmament results. The destruction of CW suffers many technical, 
financial and political difficulties, as the case of CW disarmament in Russia testifies. 
  
215 
215 
The destruction of CW by the main possessors is now delayed and increasingly 
difficult. These delays and difficulties suggest both unrealistic planning and a greater 
disarmament task than that which the authors of the CW disarmament regime 
envisioned.  
 It can be concluded that the disarmament of CW by the main CW possessors 
will clearly not be achieved in accordance with the CWC obligations. Some key 
obligations, the CWC deadlines, the obligations of environmental protection or the 
irreversibility of the CW destruction process, will have to be compromised for CW 
disarmament to be completed. The disarmament of CW in strict respect of the CWC 
obligations is bound to fail.  
 The practical difficulties encountered with CW disarmament imply normative 
gaps in the CW disarmament regime. More specifically they highlight a gap between 
the theoretical aspects of the CW disarmament regime - the CWC provisions on 
disarmament-and the practical results - the destruction of CW capabilities. The gap 
between the CW disarmament regime and effective CW disarmament can be defined 
in terms of theory and practice, in accordance with the distinction adopted by the 
author. 
 The gap between practical and normative aspects of CW disarmament first 
appeared with the technical difficulties of disarmament, which were largely 
overlooked and unanticipated in the CWC. Its provisions on the technical matters 
related to disarmament (destruction methods, environmental and human safety 
requirements) are vague and superficial. The financial difficulties of disarmament 
suggest that the effort required for effective CW is greater than that which the CWC 
members had anticipated and is, to a certain extent, at odds with the political will that 
founded the CWC. This daunting financial burden suggests a reversed proportional 
relationship between the financial efforts (increasing) and the political will to disarm 
(decreasing). It can be noted that there is a legal vacuum concerning the financial 
aspects of CW disarmament. Both financial and technical difficulties can be 
designated as the main causes for the failure to disarm CW. 
 It is unclear whether these matters could have been foreseen during the CWC 
negotiations. It is possible that the political will to renounce and disarm CW prevailed 
over the specifics of CW destruction. However, the lengthy negotiation of the 
elaborate CWC verification system suggests otherwise. It can be submitted that 
disarmament is a highly technical matter calling for a specific negotiating forum, or 
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that an instrument focusing on the practical aspects of disarmament would be more 
adequate.  
 The gap between the theoretical CW disarmament regime and its application 
questions the chosen normative model for CW disarmament. The treaty-making 
process itself (the ‘Geneva Process’) of the CWC is not questioned, but whether the 
chosen type of instrument is appropriate to achieve effective disarmament results can 
be doubted. These doubts are expressed through the criticism of the participation in 
traditional, legally-binding multilateral instruments like the CWC, which is a central 
aspect of such instruments.  
 The experience of CW disarmament questions global participation in arms 
control instruments; more specifically it raises the matter of the utility of the 
participation of states not concerned with CW disarmament matters. There is clearly a 
conflict of interest between the majority of CWC member states which seek to protect 
interests related to their chemical industries and the six states concerned with CW 
disarmament. In light of the 2001 OPCW financial crisis and of the divergent 
objectives and expectations of CWC member states (mainly expressed with the 
criticism of the Australia Group), membership of disarmament instruments can be 
seen to conflict with the current level of state participation in the CWC. Although the 
CWC seeks universal adherence, the success of the disarmament regime is not 
determined by its number of member states.  
 It can be concluded from the experience with CW that disarmament supposes 
a selective, qualified membership based on the weapons capability of states. In the 
case of the CWC such participation is bound to be difficult since all states with a 
chemical industry are de facto involved in the control of chemical activities. It can be 
suggested, however, that without resorting to a discriminatory treaty with two 
categories of states, a two-step instrument is desirable. As CW possessors bear a 
specific responsibility for the disarmament of their CW capabilities, a separate 
disarmament regime applied to them can be envisaged, for example in the form of the 
provisional application of disarmament obligations.  
 The criticism of the normative model chosen for CW disarmament is also 
expressed with the lack of flexibility of the CWC. Because of the delays in CW 
destruction and the subsequent delays in complying with the CWC disarmament 
deadlines, an instrument more adaptable to changing circumstances appears 
necessary. If the CWC deadlines cannot be modified, its member states are faced with 
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a choice between acknowledging violations of the CWC, or the withdrawal of key 
CW possessors from the CW disarmament regime. In turn this would affect the 
credibility of the regime and postpone the completion of CW disarmament.  
 The criticism over the choice of disarmament instruments is raised again with 
the recent tendency to challenge the model of traditional, multilateral agreements as 
instruments for ensuring international security. However, a distinction is called for 
between the two criticisms. The first question sheds doubts on the ability of the CWC 
to deal with the practical aspects of CW disarmament. The second question challenges 
the ability of a disarmament instrument, any type of disarmament instrument but 
especially those founded on the Geneva Process, both to be successfully implemented, 
and to achieve its security goals. This criticism has severe implications that reach 
beyond the choice of a type of disarmament instrument. Finally this tendency is a 
reminder that the control of CW is also a political matter, and in that respect it is 
subject to contextual influence.  
 The choice and adequacy of traditional instruments like the CWC is 
questioned in the changing international security environment, both for their ability to 
complete their disarmament purpose, and for the ability of disarmament to fend off 
new threats to security. With regard to CW, disarmament is replaced with politically-
binding, non-proliferation efforts, envisaged as alternatives to replace existing CW 
disarmament instruments. It results in an abandonment of the CWC as a primary tool 
for security, and reduces its role. This tendency, the potential ‘desuetude’ of 
traditional instruments,1281 has serious implications for the credibility of the CWC and 
challenges the principle founding the CW disarmament regime: the usefulness of CW 
disarmament for international security. 
 In light of the difficulties of disarmament, if the CW disarmament regime fails 
because CW possessors are unable to meet their destruction obligations, the regime 
can legitimately be criticized for its weaknesses. The basic question remains the same; 
can the current international legal disarmament instruments achieve their goals? In 
this case, in spite of violations of some of the CWC’s disarmament obligations, the 
successful disarmament of CW through the CWC, even though it is delayed, remains 
possible. The CWC can be criticized, but not for its inadequacy to address the threat it 
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was created for, as it serves its security purpose. By extension the CW disarmament 
regime, held accountable for security against the threat of CW, will be successful in 
completing the security objectives it was created for.  
 If the disarmament of CW fails because of the desuetude of the CW 
disarmament regime, the credibility of the legal norm controlling CW will be 
undermined. However, if the CW disarmament regime is discarded and disarmament 
operations suspended (or simply under-funded), none of the alternatives proposed can 
seriously be envisaged as a replacement or even credible complement to the existing 
CW disarmament regime. Furthermore, no alternative is proposed to replace 
disarmament as the permanent solution to the CW threat. As the negotiations of the 
CWC show, with the exception of imposed disarmament measures, which can only be 
envisaged in certain cases of threat to international security, there is no viable 
alternative to the current CW disarmament regime.  
 It can be concluded, firstly, that in case the CWC disarmament regime should 
fail in terms of its existing provisions, it should not be discarded, for lack of any 
suitable alternatives to replace it. The failure of strict compliance with the current CW 
disarmament regime is not tantamount to the impossibility of CW disarmament, and 
the implications to the difficult disarmament of CW that reach beyond the matter of 
compliance with legal obligations. In order to avoid the desuetude and eventual 
abandonment of the CWC disarmament norms, either efforts must be pursed to ensure 
compliance, or the norms must be modified to adapt to the current situation. Secondly, 
in spite of practical difficulties the CW disarmament regime progresses and remains 
in force. Failure to comply with the CWC disarmament obligations should not be 
grounds to discard the authority and utility of the entire CW control regime. Although 
some aspects of the framework of that regime can be criticized, its goals remain 
valuable.  
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